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ABSTRACT
The thesis examines selected small national securities markets in 
western and central Europe under the influence of change in the 
structure of world financial market practice and increased information 
flows. Markets studied in detail and visited on one or more occasions 
are those of Denmark, Austria, Portugal, Hungary, The Netherlands, 
Belgium and two German regional exchanges, Hamburg and Bremen. Data on 
the German market as a whole is studied for its relevance to 
neighbouring small national exchanges. The formation of new markets in 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia is observed based on information 
about, and visits to, Prague and Bratislava.
Market institutions, mechanisms and participants, particularly banks 
and brokers, are examined for their contribution to the viability and 
validity of each market and the realisation of development potential. 
The literature of price discovery, returns generation, asymmetrical 
information, market microstructure and investor behaviour is reviewed, 
as is the history of national exchanges for determinants of their 
present-day form and behaviour. Structured, questionnaire-based 
interviews with market participants, other fieldwork information and 
the considerable volume of contemporary press and periodical material 
relating to market reforms constitute the main body of evidence. 
Market-by-market analysis is conducted to support conclusions based on 
initial hypotheses about the function and purpose of small national 
markets and formal models of investor, borrower and broker behaviour.
Trading volume is separately analysed over the longest practicable 
period, using time-series econometric methods for evidence of ability 
to reveal information about market behaviour and reliability as an
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income generator to sustain market-dependent broking populations and 
market institutions.
Institutional factors are found to determine the volume of trading in 
the medium term and hence, via the level of income generated, to 
induce virtuous and vicious circles of development. In the short term, 
trading volume is determined by exogenous shocks and short-run market 
dynamics.
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PART ONE
CHAPTER 1: OBJECTIVES, STRUCTURE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY
INTRODUCTION
This thesis concerns the contemporary development of small national 
securities markets in Europe, as represented by six established 
national and two regional markets in western Europe and four new or 
re-established exchanges in the part of central Europe formerly under 
the influence of the now-defunct Soviet Union. The focus of the 
research is upon institutional factors and the development of trading 
volume. The first aspect is mainly seen through the eyes of market 
participants, principally banks and brokers, with perspectives on 
turnover, viability, validity and potential for development. The 
second is pursued by means of econometric modelling of turnover volume 
in a smaller subset of markets over a long period to establish the 
determinants of volume and the internal dynamics of each market. Both 
lines of research are directed to explaining the continued existence 
of small national and some regional securities markets and identifying 
factors important for their success.
This chapter outlines the aims, structure and scope of the thesis, and 
explains the methodologies and logistics of the empirical research in 
Part 11. Hypotheses are stated and related definitions outlined in 
preparation for more detailed discussion in the rest of Part 1.
Section 1.1: Objectives and structure of the thesis 
As stated, the thesis seeks to explain the contemporary evolutionary 
path being followed by smaller national securities markets in Europe 
in terms of their institutional structure and trading dynamics. Of 
special interest are markets which have undergone major reforms or 
have recently been created or revived following economic 
liberalisation of the former communist world.
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The objectives of the thesis are, accordingly:
1. to understand the rationale for the continued existence of smaller
national and regional securities markets and the continued 
formation of new ones in a world increasingly characterised by 
competing large financial centres.
2. to establish criteria for assessing the medium term validity, 
viability and development potential of national markets as well as 
the nature of net benefits delivered to the national economy.
3. to identify the structures and trading practices most likely to 
favour growth and the stability of market institutions in the 
medium term.
4. to examine in detail the rôle of securities turnover volume:
(a) as an aid to efficient price discovery, to greater
transactional and informational efficiency, and to the 
generation of information externalities, and
(b) as an income source to maintain a viable market with a varied 
fauna of market participants and provide funds for the 
development of stable market institutions.
The thesis is divided into three parts, as outlined below:
Part I: Theoretical and empirical background to the study 
The discussion under this heading deals first with the general 
direction of evolution of world stock markets in a context of relevant 
postwar economic and financial developments, with the objective of 
defining the main lines of enquiry appropriate to a study of smaller 
securities markets under the influence of these broad trends.
Criteria are next developed for justifying the existence of smaller 
markets and evaluating their worth, followed by an exposition of, and
12
commentary upon, two conventional approaches to justifying the 
formation and promotion of national securities markets. The classic 
’developing country’ and economic efficiency arguments advanced 
respectively by Antoine van Agtmael [1984] and William Baumol [1966] 
are reviewed against the evidential background which has accumulated 
since their work was published, including the evidence collected for 
this study. The cited authors* assertions are contrasted with the 
experience of a number of national markets over the last two decades.
Previous theoretical and empirical analysis and research is next
reviewed, concentrating on three topics, namely, turnover volume, the 
structure of the securities broking industry and informational 
considerations. The hypotheses and chosen focus of the present study 
are also discussed in relation to the existing securities market 
literature, which has concerned itself to a great extent with large, 
efficient, transparent markets using the abundant data emerging from 
their operation and concerning itself largely with factors relating to 
price formation and the generation of returns. The process of 
reviewing this literature is therefore largely one of filtering out 
what may be useful for the present thesis.
Part II: The empirical research
The empirical research consists, briefly, of:
1. the design, conduct and analysis of structured interviews with 
market participants in selected markets,
2. a multi-country review of existing research and other literature, 
information supplied by national exchanges, regular monitoring of 
contemporary press, periodical and other material in accessible 
languages (English, German, French) throughout the research period 
and the pursuit of references to earlier relevant material.
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3. econometric analysis of the evolution of market volume in two 
markets, with comparative data from a third, an influential 
neighbour, over a 23 year period to end-1993, using data supplied 
by the exchanges and national regulatory authorities.
Sections 1.3 and 1.4 below explain the choice of markets for study and 
the projects and methodologies involved. The econometric results are 
presented and analysed in chapter 6. Research results for the 
interviews and associated work are presented and discussed in chapters 
7-10 for individual markets.
Part III: Towards a modern national securities market 
Evidence of contemporary market phenomena and the research results are 
analysed together in a single chapter with a view to defining the 
market organisation and behaviour that a small modern securities 
market should be capable of supporting. Derivative markets are an 
important part of modern market development, but are dealt with in a 
summary manner, in terms of facilities that need to be provided, 
rather than in terms of the phenomena that occur within them.
Section 1.2 Hypotheses
The hypotheses underpinning the research are that:
1. There are economic benefits to be identified as a consequence of 
establishing and promoting viable, valid securities markets in 
even the smallest independent sovereign states. They include 
financial and business infrastructure improvements and the 
creation of information externalities.
The main determinant of viability is the maintenance of self- 
supporting levels of turnover. Validity is measured by net benefit 
generated. A third component, development potential, can also be
14
defined: this is the gap between actual and potential net benefit 
available from expansion. The three terms used are further 
discussed and receive closer definitions in Chapter 2, Section 
2 .2 .
2. The structure of many existing securities markets has evolved to 
channel trading gains and market share to controlling groups, 
notably banking and credit institutions, rather than allowing it 
to be spread evenly among a number of market participants. This is 
held to operate to the detriment of the economy in general and the 
viability and validity of the securities markets in particular. As 
such it constitutes a public policy opportunity to improve the 
general welfare by identifying ways to encourage or require 
reforms to improve income distribution as well as the 
transparency, efficiency and stability of national securities 
markets.
3. Improvements in securities markets may be achieved through the 
removal of barriers to the entry of new, small, market dependent 
participants, reduction in scope for corrupt or restrictive 
practices, increased availability of trade information and 
reduced transactions costs. A balanced fauna of market 
participants can be specified, offering a model capable of 
ensuring the supply of financial resources, technical expertise 
and qualified, experienced entrepreneurial individuals.
4. Effective stock market reforms generate only short-term increases 
in turnover volume. They do not necessarily create durable, 
improved volume and structure. One-time reform is useful for its 
own sake to generate increased public awareness as well as
15
increasing the income and funding for future market development. 
Continued or repeated reform is required to increase the 
probability of an improvement in structure and breadth of 
participation. A continuous response is nowadays also required to 
competitive pressure from other centres which diverts turnover and 
threatens the viability of even a strictly national market.
5. There exists a spatial perception of national or regional identity 
among issuers, investors and traders in equity (but not, in 
general, of debt) that justifies the encouragement of national 
markets through the possibility of mobilising savings and 
allocating capital not otherwise readily available to firms from 
small savers, private investors and institutions influenced by 
national or regional considerations. Issuers may also prefer 
domestic investors and a listing on a fami1iar market.
6. Market processes may be operated by specified institutions, but 
are better not embodied in or monopolised by them. Institutions 
whose governance may fall into the hands of a restricted group of 
market participants will tend to act in the interest of that 
group. Open processes, available to all qualified to gain access 
to them, are to be preferred to closed institutions to whom all 
rights of service provision have been vouchsafed. This includes 
the provision of entire securities market sectors or tiers as well 
as support services such as settlement and custody.
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Section 1.3 The choice of markets for empirical study 
The present research arose out of work on economic institutions in 
smaller European countries and was further motivated after 1989 by the 
prospect of new economic entities emerging from the control of the 
former Soviet Union. Two classes of small national securities market 
were therefore selected for study, namely existing markets attempting 
to survive competitive and other pressures and newly established 
centres faced with a choice among existing models. The two groups are 
linked by this consideration, the basic research aim being to reveal 
and evaluate features of existing markets in order to inform the 
design and development of new ones. Enquiries to all known European 
stock exchanges revealed that most were in process of internal reform, 
rendering any conclusions from a large scale survey dubious. The 
choice was therefore made to study a small number of carefully 
selected markets in depth, supplemented by a less intensive 
examination of others to expose salient features not present in the 
primary group. Three markets were settled upon for intensive study.
Two represent directions of development for the transition economies 
while the third, Portugal, has already witnessed a radical economic 
transformation not unlike that of eastern Europe. The two established 
markets were selected as opposite poles within a conventionally 
preferred class of European markets based on bond rather than equity 
trading (von Rosen, 1990), a universal banking environment on the 
German model and no major international aspirations. The first, 
Copenhagen, was of interest for its vigorous espousal of reform and 
new technology. The second, Vienna, had failed to reform effectively, 
but remained viable at most times in spite of being the preserve of a 
traditional banking clique. Both markets trade large volumes of 
securities and appeared to be efficient in terms of price discovery 
and information flow. Copenhagen is, furthermore, an open market with
17
comprehensive reporting requirements while Vienna is a remainder 
market, most trading being done directly between banks. Both border 
the large German economy and its regionalised stock market structure. 
The remaining markets were chosen for specific parameters of interest, 
Brussels was trying to remain an international market and a major 
instrument of deficit finance for the Belgian government at the same 
time. Its broker numbers were plummeting under the influence of 
government-induced reform, a process of forensic interest whose 
outcome was uncertain. Amsterdam was an equity-based market with 
international aspirations, wilting under competitive pressure from 
London. Reform was under way and of interest to follow to its 
conclusion in order to measure success. Budapest was the only emerging 
market with sufficient infrastructure to study in any depth, while 
Prague (and, at the time, Bratislava) offered the opportunity to 
observe the same process at an earlier stage, driven by a different 
process, namely mass privatisation. Finally the German regionals were 
of interest for the likelihood of their surviving as small exchanges 
without status as national institutions. It was, finally, necessary to 
test the validity of the models chosen for intensive study for their 
efficient functioning as markets. The means selected was an 
econometric examination of the structure and evolution of trading 
volume over a long period of time, before, during and after reform. 
Lisbon data proved too volatile to model. The proximity of the large 
German market to the others required that this potential influence be 
controlled for. The German market was therefore included in the 
econometric study in spite of not being closely examined in other 
respects. Finally, having selected markets, three factors combined to 
indicate a structured interview approach in conduct of the 
institutional side of the study. First, in every centre, it was hard 
to establish the exact position of individual broking firms in the
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banking-broking nexus, in particular whether they were dependent upon 
the market or independent of it in their behaviours, without close 
personal contact. Second, market-dependent brokers were all happy to 
talk or to provide readily available information: none were interested 
in completing questionnaires and many were unreliable in 
correspondence. Bank executives were more forthcoming, but this 
asymmetry itself introduced bias. Third, the enormous variety of 
market structures, instruments, trading specialisms and practices to 
be covered would have resulted in a complicated and forbidding postal 
questionnaire, inviting rejection. As a result, a simpler 
questionnaire was devised and administered orally at interview, using 
the interview process both to mediate complexities and generate a 
systematic set of responses, aided by copious open and numerically 
encoded notes for later analysis of respondents' viewpoints and 
observations. Confidentiality was an important element of the 
discussion: emphasis on it appeared to yield useful confidences. Small 
numbers of participants in some markets made identification of 
individuals too easy however. For both reasons, synthesis of views was 
preferred to extensive citation as the means of communicating results. 
Moderate difficulty was experienced in obtaining interviews as 
required. No Dutch bank and no small Belgian broker was willing to be 
interviewed. Other limitations encountered were an actual lack of 
active small brokers in Vienna, the dubious ownership status of 
several broking firms in Lisbon and Budapest and the logistics of 
fieldwork trips which often constrained appointments. The two German 
regional exchanges visited were chosen for logistic reasons. Hamburg 
may be considered representative and Bremen, the smallest German 
exchange, particularly vulnerable. London brokers and others, with the 
exception of the Austrian bond specialist discussed in Chapter 9, were 
selected on the basis of personal acquaintance or a search for factual
19
information and are considered incidental to the main investigation. 
The accompanying Table 1. summarises the membership of the main 
exchanges visited, together with response rates to interview requests 
and correspondence. Interviewees are characterised as market-dependent 
(MD), market-independent (MI) or market authorities (MA). A tabular 
summary of the interview responses is to be found in the Introduction 
to Part (II), preceding discussion of individual markets. Interviews 
were conducted in German, French and English, as required.
Table 1.
LEVEL EXCHANGE APPROACHED
CENTRE MEMBERSHIP /ACCEPTED
TOTALS BY FOR FORMAL
CATEGORY INTRERVIEW
TOTALS
FIRST CORRESPONDENCE 
VISIT AND SUBSEQUENT 
(1992) VISITS (1994-95)
MI MD MI MD MA
2 AMSTERDAM 44 68 6/0 1/1 1/1 (1) (2)
2 BREMEN 1/1 (1)
2 BRUSSELS 12 52 6/3/ 8/0 1/2 (5)
2 BUDAPEST 28 12 3/1 6/4 1/1 (2) (4)
1 COPENHAGEN 21 10 8/5 5/4 1/1 (9) (1)
2 HAMBURG 1/1 (1)
1 LISBON 14 3 10/2 2/2 1/1 (8)
2 LONDON (8)
1 VIENNA 79 6 8/6 6/1 1/1 (8)
TOTALS 43 7
Level 1 markets
The above factors, then, led to the choice of two markets, Denmark 
(the Copenhagen Stock Exchange) and Austria (the Vienna Bourse) for 
intensive study, coupled with econometric analysis of their trading 
volume. These two markets may be characterised as mature, with stated 
ambitions to remain regionally significant, and either recently 
reformed or undergoing reform. Copenhagen has a long-standing 
reputation as a financial centre of excellence, while Vienna has an 
acknowledged poor reputation which it is attempting at present to 
redress. Visits were paid to each centre and interviews carried out, 
supported by correspondence and the collection of published and
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unpublished material. After the interviews informal discussion was 
conducted, and results noted, according to interests and specialisms 
of respondents. The third market chosen for intensive study, Portugal 
, is influenced by Spain, but not in the sense of being dominated by a 
large regional economic power. The Portuguese market has been strongly 
marked by recent political and economic history and may be considered 
to have passed through many of the development phases now being 
undergone by the newly liberalised countries of central and eastern 
Europe. It is therefore a suitable place to examine the problems and 
opportunities that securities markets in many of these countries may 
face: re-establishment; capital flight and shortage; inflation and low 
national income and productivity; privatisation; competitive pressure 
from abroad; bank influence; reform of trading principles and systems, 
and so on. The list of points of comparison with the former eastern 
Europe is considerable (Webb, 1995).
Level two markets
The principal objective of the second level studies was to obtain a 
sound basis for comparison with the exchanges studied in greater 
detail and to assess the effect of increasing competitive and reform 
pressure on the broking community. Fewer interviews were conducted but 
the standard questionnaire was used wherever possible. Amsterdam, 
Bremen, Brussels, Budapest, Hamburg and London were examined at level 
two. Amsterdam and Budapest were visited twice and three times 
respectively. In the German regional exchanges the continued existence 
of the market was the main topic of discussion. London was ’present’ 
continuously through informal professional contacts and enquiries, 
published material and time spent gaining experience on the dealing 
desk of a specialist bond broker with Austrian connections. The 
structure of the London market as such is not considered explicitly 
however. The new markets of liberalised central and eastern Europe are
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still at a formative stage and were included for study to the extent 
that their experience is long and varied enough to reveal a structural 
and dynamic response to events. Only the Budapest Stock Exchange, the 
longest established of the group, was studied in detail.
Level three markets
The markets identified in this section were studied at a low level of 
resolution, mainly on the basis of published material. They are 
Bratislava, Prague and Warsaw. Only Prague and Bratislava were visited 
and discussions held with actual and potential market participants. 
There is reason to believe that events in securities trading as well 
as major changes in privatisation and economic liberalisation policy 
may overtake these markets in their present form and deflect their 
direction of development. Warsaw is included to the extent of its 
price statistics over the first three years of its existence. In all 
the markets studied the The principal influences at work seem to be a 
move from 'institution' to 'process' as the main determinant of the 
form of market mechanism adopted; the parallel development of 
derivatives markets and the increasing flow of liquidity from foreign 
institutional investors.
Section 1.4 Methodology
Four distinct methodologies have been employed in the study, apart 
from reviewing and analysing the relevant academic literature;
1. Visits were made to selected markets to conduct structured,
questionnaire-based interviews with market participants and carry 
out formal and informal interviews with the market authorities, 
supplemented by correspondence and analysis of published material 
supplied by exchange authorities, broking firms and banks. Markets 
were categorised into three levels of intensity of examination as 
already described.
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2. Econometric analysis of trading volume statistics over an extended 
period for selected exchanges was carried out.
3. Existing theoretical models were extended and new ones developed 
to examine (a) the determinants of securities market trading 
volume and (b) the behaviour of market participants and 
institutions.
4. Analysis of contemporary business press and periodical literature 
reporting the ongoing process of development and reform in all the 
markets studied, plus others where relevant to the argument, was 
carried out.
These methodological approaches are described in more detail in the 
following subsections.
1.4.1 Awareness of current developments and the economic background 
The study was conducted during a period of turbulence and structural 
change in the world economy that continues to affect nearly every 
business sector in all of the countries examined. In addition 
financial market institutions, trading methods and instruments have 
themselves have been undergoing a long-running, fundamental worldwide 
transformation which pre-dates the current cycle of economic 
instability. This rendered current awareness and intelligence about 
developments a matter of prime importance. Continuous awareness of 
contemporary developments in the markets selected for study has been 
maintained by daily monitoring of two newspapers (The Financial Times 
and Die Welt), by frequent scanning of other European press in German 
and French and by collecting short series of local newspapers and 
other publications during fieldwork in specific countries. All these 
sources were used to extend an existing press cuttings library dating 
from 1986. Bank reviews and specialist economic publications, from 
Switzerland, Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland, supplied 
material in areas poorly served by press coverage.
23
The economic background for a large number of countries was furnished 
from the seune sources in the form of a cuttings library, partly 
collected for other purposes, and a database of longer-run economic 
statistics on European countries maintained current in files suitable 
for processing by econometrics software as described below.
1.4.2 National securities markets
Basic information about market organisation was requested from every 
known European stock exchange. All exchanges responded and most 
furnished information in English, French or German. The high (100%) 
response rate was itself significant, reflecting concern for the 
propagation of information and an interest in promoting the exchange. 
Most material featured a mix of market and exchange statistics, 
descriptions of trading and regulatory practices, promotional material 
aimed at investors and the annual reports of the exchange authorities 
themselves. A high proportion of exchanges referred to recent reforms.
1.4.3. Broking firms
Certain visits yielded important information about the history and 
current organisation of broking firms, their strategy in the markets 
in which they operated and activities which were significant for 
securities broking in other national or regional markets. These 
contacts were expanded by further correspondence and, in some cases, 
further visits. Although the research was concentrated on smaller, new 
or transforming markets, much was to be learned from certain 
activities in larger, conventionally more liquid and efficient 
centres, in four areas:
1. Specialist dealing and services relating to private investors, 
provincial broking, small and/or illiquid lines of stock, local 
fundamentals research, stock location, private placement and 
preparation for introduction.
2. International dealing capable of being carried on from any centre.
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3. Operations in small national markets for clients in large centres.
4. The determinants of trading volume on a daily basis.
Relevant expertise was found in larger centres, notably London, with 
evidence of its transfer to brokers in the national markets studied. 
Interviews, informal contacts and working arrangements were therefore 
set up with specialist brokers and dealers for the purpose of 
identifying techniques, practices, organisational and trading 
arrangements that are relevant and transferable to smaller national 
markets. In particular, three working days were spent on a bond 
broking dealing desk in London to observe detailed trading activity.
1.4.4. Public information from and about financial markets
In connection with the hypotheses concerning information generated 
from and about financial markets, efforts were made to collect 
material and solicit the views of respondents about the growth of 
'financial' coverage in the news media and periodicals. Language 
limitations often proved a barrier but it was possible to obtain 
useful insights into depth of cover by puzzling out headlines, noting 
the length and content of articles and the volume of listings and 
tables. Respondents were able to give a view about the strength of 
recent public information developments and the standing of various 
titles among professionals. Their responses were analysed to test the 
hypotheses (a) that information generated by financial markets can act 
as surrogate for otherwise nonexistent or inaccessible economic and 
business information and (b) that data and analysis generated by 
journalistic, academic and other enterprise for consumption by 
private and institutional investors, creates positive spillovers in 
the form of information that improves general economic efficiency.
1.4.5. Market structure models
A model to support the hypothesis concerning the population dynamics 
of the securities broking community was written in QUICKBASIC and
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tested against a variety of assumptions about the size, cost 
structure, operating efficiency and profitability of a hypothetical 
securities brokerage ’industry*. A model was also written to simulate 
a traditional two-period equilibrium model (Huffman [1992]) 
continuously through time to expose the implications of changing risk 
preferences of investors through their lifetime and the volume of 
securities trading likely to be generated. A sub-model was written for 
the gearing level choices of firms, with the same objective.
1.4.6. Data sources and analysis of bond volume and share turnover 
The econometric work for this study was carried out using PC- GIVE 
version 8.0 (Doornik and Hendry [1994]). The sources for ancillary 
statistical material were highly disparate and are credited where 
appropriate below. The length of the series required (23 years at 
monthly intervals) and the need to use a wide variety of sources, 
demanded a great deal of comparison, verification, splicing and other 
preliminary treatment. Data had finally to be in appropriate form for 
presentation to PC-GIVE in the form of fixed and equal-length series.
Statistics for the Lisbon and Oporto Exchanges are drawn from the 
Annual Report of the Bolsa de Valores de Lisboa 1991, from various 
issues of the monthly Digest of the Research Department of the Lisbon 
Exchange, from December 1992 issues of the daily Boletim de Cotacoes 
and from circulars and statistical summaries furnished by brokers 
visited, who, for reasons given elsewhere, are not identified. Further 
detailed information on monthly prices and trading volumes from 1985- 
1994 were supplied direct. The kind assistance of Mr. Jose Bessa 
Mendes in providing this information is gratefully acknowledged. 
Statistics for Copenhagen were supplied by the Copenhagen Stock 
Exchange. For early years the Exchange had to perform research of its 
own into file records. This research was commissioned by the present
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author to ensure series of adequate length. Acknowledgement is made 
for the material for later years, supplied gratis, but not without 
effort, by the Information Department.
Statistics for Vienna were supplied in part by the Vienna Exchange but 
in the main from the published monthly statistics of the Austrian 
Control Bank. Statistics for Warsaw were provided by the Polish 
National Bank (Naradovy Bank Polsky) and, for Germany, from the 
Deutsche Bundesbank monthly bulletins. For Sweden figures were 
supplied by the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Use was also made of the 
monthly equity volume series for major countries, published from 1988 
onwards by the ’Financial Times’, based on figures supplied by NatWest 
Securities.
1.5 Summary
This chapter has outlined the overall structure and layout of the 
thesis and its objective of explaining the factors that underpin the 
enduring concept of national securities markets, readily formed and 
re-formed and equally robust to neglect and quiescence as to radical 
political and economic change and competitive pressure. The reasoning 
behind the selection of markets and the choices involved in deciding 
the scope of the empirical study, the resources used and the 
methodologies applied has been exposed. The main hypotheses motivating 
the investigation have been outlined and are further explained and 
refined in Chapter 2, following introductory material on conditions in 
world financial markets.
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CHAPTER 2: THE RATIONALE FOR SMALL NATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS 
INTRODUCTION
This chapter first provides, in Section 2.1, a brief summary of 
larger-scale historical, economic and contemporary financial 
background to current developments in securities markets worldwide, 
identifying factors taken into consideration in the rest of the study 
and stating certain assumptions and limitations on the areas examined. 
In Section 2.2 definitions are supplied for the criteria of 
viability, validity and development potential already referred to in 
Chapter 1. Detailed definitions of criteria are necessary to give 
direction to the empirical work. In contrast to these criteria, in 
Section 2.3, a review is presented of classical ’developing country’ 
arguments for securities markets.
Section 2.1: Recent developments in world capital markets 
Dynamic development has always been the exception rather than the rule 
in capital markets. Large-scale technological, economic and political 
transformations have provided the driving force for episodes of growth 
and transformation, often followed by collapse, reform, consolidation 
and long periods of quiescence. The financing of the Dutch and English 
trading companies during the 17th century, the worldwide railway booms 
of the mid 19th century and colonial expansion around the millenium 
are all examples of such episodes. Many of today’s stock markets were 
shaped by them. Periods of expansion were often ended by financial 
market collapses and interspersed with more ephemeral investment 
surges having more the character of ’bubbles’, using the modern 
definition of the term (for a full discussion see Dwyer and Hafer 
[1988]). The Wall Street Crash of 1929 tempered public enthusiasm for 
stock markets for decades and arguably continues to colour opinion, 
reinforced by the collapse of bubbles such as that of October 1987. 
Economic reconstruction after the Second World War was financed with
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the help of international co-operative arrangements under the umbrella 
of fixed exchange rates from 1944 and without major stock market 
developments. By the 1950s and 1960s, capital markets lived a 
sheltered life somewhat apart from the mainstream of economic life. In 
many countries markets were not well regarded by governments wedded to 
doctrines well to the left of those regarded as conventional today. 
Across eastern Europe, financial markets all but disappeared. Today, 
world capital markets are well into a new development phase, one which 
is unique in that it does not owe its origins to economic expansion 
but to structural change in the world economic and political order; to 
the deregulation of financial flows; to the growth of information and
communications technology; to new financial instruments and
intermediaries; to competition between investing institutions and to 
rivalries between and within financial markets. It is thus important 
to enumerate briefly the factors behind these transformations and to 
assess the present position with regard to what may profitably be 
studied and what awaits further development and research.
2.1.1. Political and economic philosophy
Socialist ideas and Keynesian principles of economic management were 
widely perceived to have failed by the 1970s and were replaced by more 
'liberal* economic views that gave a larger rôle to markets and 
competition. During the 1980s and early 1990s, the main effects of
this change of view have been privatisation of state assets,
respectability and a higher public profile for financial markets, 
trade liberalisation and the removal of many barriers to international 
capital flows. The failure of communism and rapid advance to economic 
normality of the former Soviet bloc’s more market-oriented satellites, 
coupled with the forced renunciation of 'third way' socialised 
economic models by Sweden and others, have reinforced the new model 
during a prolonged severe downturn in world output and trade.
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2.1.2: Oil prices, inflation, currency and interest rate developments 
The tripling of oil prices by the OPEC cartel in October 1973, and a 
further turn to the same screw in 1979, gave rise to international 
financial co-operation to deal with the very large financial flows 
that followed the redistribution of oil-related income. Private banks 
increased their lending to sovereign states and the Eurocurrency 
markets expanded. Price inflation caused the final breakup of the 
established world monetary order into general floating and a period of 
highly volatile interest rates, followed by general stagnation. One 
consequence was, however, a recognition that markets were capable of 
absorbing shocks, and indeed were the only mechanism to do so: shown 
by the continuous cycle of agreement, collapse and renegotiation of 
most institutional initiatives to maintain world economic stability. 
2.1.3: Technology and the management of complexity 
The period of turbulence and stagnation that characterised the 1970s 
was replaced by renewed economic growth in the 1980s. There was 
however by now available a range of financial market instruments 
designed to accommodate large and complex capital flows, to manage 
risk and to tailor borrowing and lending propositions very accurately 
to the needs of issuers and investors. The advent of cheap and massive 
computing power able to calculate the value, risk and return to a 
limitless number of alternative investment positions added precision 
to planning and execution. New communications and information 
management techniques began to allow information to be communicated to 
all interested parties more or less instantly worldwide basis. The 
increasing freedom of capital to travel has thus been complemented by 
a comprehensive guide to the most rewarding destinations.
2.1.4: Present position
It may be that the transformation described above is now substantially 
complete. Apart from further developments in technology, both
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financial and physical, world financial markets may now continuously 
converge and seek (without necessarily reaching) positions of 
competitive equilibrium based on trading out the increasingly well- 
known and accessible opportunities to earn higher than average yields 
in a given risk category in any market. Opportunities for excess 
returns must therefore be considered to be diminishing as improved 
information flows and increasing professional investment activity 
spread worldwide. On the other hand, this trend may be expected to 
increase competitive pressure to seek out areas where the prospects of 
above-average gain have not yet been exhausted. Evidence will be 
presented that this is the case. All the above has largely been 
considered from the viewpoint of securities prices and yields. Many 
studies have been able to point to stable patterns of returns across a 
wide range of countries, unaffected by the way local markets are 
organised, although returns have usually been measured in terms of 
local index movements rather than total yield including dividend 
receipts. The general assumption is made that globally operating 
forces inevitably produce convergence. This 'end of history* view is 
contradicted by a great deal of other evidence however and the rôle of 
transactions volume has been neglected. In established national 
markets there is also countervailing ambition for, and protection of, 
national institutions and practices through improving the ability to 
absorb competitive pressure, or by insulating them from outside 
interest, for example by tolerating corruption by insiders. In newly 
formed markets there is evidence of preferred local trading practice 
emerging despite conflicting foreign advice and pressure. This is 
understandable. Tradition has always been the main force underpinning 
confidence in established markets. With national commercial culture it 
creates a link between market operators and investors: groups who are 
everywhere famously unaware of the details of each others' business.
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It is equally likely, and is retained as a hypothesis of this study, 
that the existence of perceptual national horizons in the minds of 
many issuers and investors, and to a lesser extent in those of traders 
and larger financial institutions, will continue to maintain an 
important rôle for smaller national securities markets. The difficulty 
of disseminating and achieving effective understanding of information 
about complex local situations is likewise a factor tending to promote 
the continuance of national markets. Two major risks characterise the 
present position and are the subject of general speculation, namely:
(a) that the world financial system, including exchange parities, 
may become unstable because of the size of financial flows and 
their concealment by the use of derivative instruments. The 
capacity of the banking system to increase or cut off the 
supply of credit is well beyond the capacity of national 
governments and international institutions to control in the 
short run, and,
(b) that the growing use of derivative instruments per se 
traded in options and futures markets, as well as those 
created by financial institutions for large customers, may 
lead to the collapse of individual institutions whose 
balance sheets no longer disclose the true position, 
particularly as regards interlocking contingent 
liabilities.
These risks will not be considered further in any specific way, but 
since some of the effects of major instability have already been 
observed in national financial markets (for example the reimposition 
of capital controls by the Spanish government during the September 
1992 currency crisis and the effect of this on international bond
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trading), the uninterrupted further deregulation of national markets 
and the permanence of assured freedom of movement of capital cannot be 
regarded as assured in any borrowing or investment decision and hence 
in the development of any financial market.
A further source of apparent instability has been the varying speed 
with which different countries have deregulated, removing interest 
rate and credit ceilings and freeing current and capital capital flows 
from exchange control restrictions. Some uneven features remain.
German banks continue to succeed in restricting competition between 
themselves in a large and successful economy which has nevertheless 
only recently (1994) permitted a commercial money market to function 
with some freedom. Spain, Portugal and Greece have made progress but 
continue to maintain strictly regulated financial markets.
That the freeing up of financial markets increases welfare remains 
largely a presumption, against which may be set disadvantages such as 
overuse of credit for consumption and short term commercial 
investment, with a resultant building up of private debt to the 
detriment of savings and longer-term investment. Other drawbacks are 
the possibility of asset price inflation such as Britain suffered 
after 1988; insensitivity of national economies to previously adequate 
'doses' of monetary policy; and increased financial fragility in the 
form of default risk as debt service ratios increase. As monetary 
conditions ease under the pressure of credit creation, whether or not 
the authorities at any given time wish them to, company gearing levels 
and the general capability of the corporate sector to leverage its 
operations on the basis of rising market capitalisation, increases 
risk. That risk is further increased if finance ministries and central 
banks then respond to the perceived diminution of their policy
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authority by enforcing larger interest rate increases than would 
otherwise be the case. On the other hand breaks in financial markets 
worldwide seem to have proved less damaging to national economies than 
was formerly the case in a supposedly more closely regulated 
environment. In the contentious area of derivative and other secondary 
market instruments it has often been held that well-designed 
derivatives and the securitisation of the assets of financial 
intermediaries such as leasing companies reduce the cost of monitoring 
financial markets and relieve the need for credit rationing.
It has been pointed out by Blundell-Wignall [1991] that if financial 
liberalisation increases liquidity then permanent rather than 
transitory income would increasingly determine consumption 
expenditure; money supply (on increasingly broad measures) would 
decouple from economic activity levels; financial prices, based on 
expectations, would become a better lead indicator of inflation and 
real activity, and the influence of monetary policy on financial 
prices would become more diffuse.
Evidence for the improvement of indicators based on financial prices 
comes from the yield curve, reflecting the underlying term structure 
of interest rates. Blundell-Wignall shows that for all relevant 
countries except Japan the power of the yield curve to explain nominal 
GDP and inflation movements improves markedly in the 1980s compared 
with the previous decade. Another effect of market freedom is seen in 
the increased responsiveness of changes in long rates to changes in 
short rates and foreign long rates; in other words borrowers and 
lenders have greater freedom than formerly to neutralise or trade out 
disparities along the yield curve as soon as they appear (typically as 
a result of central government operations on short rates). On the
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other hand there is evidence of greater financial fragility in the 
form of rising rates of company failure and debt default due to an 
increase in risk-taking induced by competition in both financial and 
non-financial market sectors. Some part of increased risk-taking may 
however be held to be due to the form of corporate bankruptcy 
legislation in many countries where, under limited liability 
provisions, promoters cannot be held liable for the full extent of 
their losses. This, if we are not careful, leads on to a debate about 
information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders. Suffice it to 
note here that there remain profound differences in the level of 
information sharing between continental European, especially German, 
universal banks and their clients, and the more strictly segregated 
commercial credit banking tradition of the US and the United Kingdom.
In common with the empirical results of this study based on an 
analogous treatment of trading volumes, Blundell-Wignall also finds 
increased volatility in bond yields and stock returns. Correlations 
between markets are found only rarely however, usually in connection 
with large disturbances having an international effect. Correlations 
increase between the 1970s and the 1980s (see for example Dwyer and 
Hafer [1988]). The present study finds similarly few inter-country 
correlations with some evidence of increase between the two decades, 
but does not examine international disturbances specifically.
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Section 2.2: Criteria to be applied to national securities markets
For reasons given earlier the evolution of security prices alone is 
likely to yield mixed evidence about the health of a given market. A 
less well studied area has been transactions volume. This has multiple 
implications for:
(a) conventional market microstructure analysis as regards 
immediacy, liquidity and other measures of performance and,
(b) the basic structural form, stability and prospects of 
financial markets considered as branches of commerce dependent 
upon stable or steadily growing income flows for their survival.
As well as being less well studied, transactions volume is less 
publicised in the markets themselves. No market can function without 
price. Its discovery and propagation is the stuff of much market 
analysis. Volume, whether considered as order flow, as completed 
transactions or even as inventory is equally important but subject to 
much greater variation in treatment, with a different motivation for 
doing so, at every level in every market.
It is the basic thesis of this study that the mode of generation and 
the handling of transaction volumes is a fundamental determinant of 
the medium term form and function of smaller national securities 
markets and hence of their prospects. In the short run however the 
causality runs the other way, with volumes dependent on market form 
and functioning. In financial markets there is no long term (for a 
more closely defined statement, and exceptions such as long market 
memory, see Introduction to Part II. preceding Chapter 6. The 
usefulness of markets to their national economy is connected to their 
ability to mobilise savings, allocate capital and improve economic
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efficiency through the transparency generated by an expanded 
information supply. Over the long run however they may flourish, 
languish or even die for a wide variety of reasons unconnected with 
their economic attributes. This phenomenon demands explanation.
The sheer variety and capacity for rapid transformation of securities 
markets also begs questions about their basic nature and the criteria 
to be applied to any study of their individual features. Securities 
markets also behave collectively and need to be studied as much in the 
way of a private industry as a public institution, even in smaller 
countries. They cannot be shown to be a necessary feature of the 
political, economic or social landscape because they possess economic 
justification or because are endowed with any particular constitution 
or regulatory rôle. Counter examples, including the absence of
securities markets, can always be cited. Real world markets can only
be shown to be viable or otherwise and evidence marshalled for factors 
that would improve their viability (or otherwise).
Justification can often be found, on the other hand, for allocating 
resources to create or maintain a market that would not otherwise be 
viable, by virtue of the positive externalities created by its 
operation. Such a market is defined here as a valid market. The ideal 
market is one which is both valid and viable and, as will be seen 
below, has also maximised its potential.
This study endeavours as a result to identify necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the creation and continued existence of smaller
European markets and to explain their past, present and future in
terms of their viability, validity and potential. These terms 
therefore receive more specific definitions below.
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2.2.1: The viability of a national market
A stock market is viable if it can create and maintain securities 
trading at levels of volume sufficient to support its own continuance 
out of revenues resulting from participants' activities, at market 
prices. This is the only necessary and sufficient condition for a 
market to be viable and there is historical evidence that little more 
is required to bring a national public market into existence and 
sustain it over long periods of time. A viable market need not be a 
valid market: as evidenced by the frequent blossoming of speculative 
markets driven by an excess of savings or a gambling culture, 
possessing no legitimate supply side or regular fauna of participants.
Viability is further addressed in this study under the following 
headings:
1. Turnover volume
Confidence in a market on the part of issuers, investors, 
intermediaries and the public is a necessary condition for sustaining 
turnover in the longer run. Confidence is a product of perceived 
market quality, a factor itself dependent at least in part on turnover 
volume. Vicious and virtuous circles in the growth and the development 
of individual markets should therefore to be expected. The 
quantitative material in the study bears heavily on this point. 
Viability is assessed as a function of the behaviour and determinants 
of turnover volume. Turnover is also a widely accepted proxy for 
liquidity, a measure of reaction to information and the basic income 
provider for many market participants. It is accordingly a key long 
term indicator of viability. For a discussion of the relation between 
turnover volume and value and the precise definitions adopted for the 
bond and equity markets in the empirical research, see Section 6.2.1.
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2. The securities industry
Where financial market operations are sufficiently extensive, their 
activities may be analysed in terms of structure and performance using 
criteria employed in other service industries and the microeconomics 
of competitive behaviour. The analysis of imperfect competitive 
equilibrium furnished by Chamberlin is reviewed later, as is work on 
US markets by a number of authors. In smaller markets characterised by 
stagnation interspersed with sporadic bursts of activity, the ability 
of 'survivors' to dominate trading, regulatory and information systems 
requires a socio-political, cultural or historical explanation. This 
is furnished by way of hypothesis and evidence for two models for such 
markets: the 'calving' model of securities firms and the 'starving 
population' paradox found in moribund markets.
3. Corporate Finance
Private firms need to be able to adjust the ratio between equity and 
loan capital employed in response to changes in the risk/return 
relationship they face in their operations through the business cycle. 
Use by listed companies to achieve a desired debt/equity ratio is 
posited as a main indicator for the viability of national stock 
markets and addressed as such in the research. A model is developed of 
the evolution of the basic debt/equity relationship in a typical firm 
through time and its relation to trading volume.
4. Economic convergence and divergence
Recent history has shown that convergence of activity levels, interest 
rates, currencies and national budget frameworks in Europe is not 
inevitable, adding significance to the separate evolution of
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individual national markets. Much of the information supplied by 
respondents and garnered from current literature in the course of 
research predates the monetary and political turbulence of late 1992 
onwards. Later developments may have changed the views of some 
respondents, but most in any case reflect the general view of market 
traders that turbulence and divergence creates business and adds to 
the viability of individual national markets.
5. Regulatory conflict and convergence
Internationally competing exchanges are motivated to lighten their own 
regulatory requirements in order to attract turnover from each other. 
Smaller national exchanges are often obliged to compensate for the 
ease with which their narrower markets can be manipulated by applying 
stricter regulation. In national markets with internationally traded 
segments, conflicts will be observed which require resolution. 
Regulatory conflict is to be distinguished from regulatory competition 
between centres vying for turnover, on which there is an established 
literature.
The minimum standards perceived as required by smaller national 
markets to maintain confidence in their quality increasingly converge 
with those deemed appropriate for international markets. This applies 
whether or not a given market is internationally significant or 
whether the standards are relevant to it. International standards for 
the conduct of financial markets are autonomously developing more 
rigorous and explicit forms as the range of instruments and trading 
methods, as well as the risk of general instability and opportunity 
for fraud, increases. To the extent that these standards and trading 
features have come to determine confidence in national markets they
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have to be applied in order to maintain turnover volume, whether or 
not they are appropriate. This trend appears in the research results, 
particularly with regard to insider trading regulations.
Pressure for national markets to conform to international practice is 
transmitted by the operations of multinational financial institutions 
and consultancies, by cultural changes in market-linked organisations 
and by the influence on market participants and public alike of 
greatly increased information, analysis and published and broadcast 
opinion about world financial markets. In larger markets it sometimes 
asserted that cross-listing can cause pressure for convergence. There 
is no evidence from the present research that this is a factor in the 
small national markets studied. The strength of the transmission 
mechanism in individual countries amplifies or attenuates the 
regulatory convergence processes described above. Regulatory conflict 
and unnecessary convergence may be held to reduce the viability of 
national markets.
2.2.2: Validity of national securities markets
The separate necessary and sufficient conditions for a national stock 
market to exist are few in number and there are no individual 
conditions that are both necessary and sufficient for their creation. 
Necessary conditions are:
(1) the existence of adequate numbers of issuers, investors and 
market entrepreneurs for the incentive to exist for them to 
come together,
(2) a sufficiently we11-developed commercial infrastructure and 
legal or quasi-legal arrangements that allow bargains to be 
concluded, securities to be delivered, title established and 
settlement effected, and
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(3) toleration of financial market operations by the public 
authorities.
Nations can do without stock markets and markets can continue to exist 
in a moribund condition, serving little obvious economic purpose, for 
long periods of time. Existing markets can be brutally disrupted or 
extinguished, as happened recently in Nigeria. There are thus no 
circumstances that render the existence of a national (or indeed any) 
securities market necessary for economic survival. It can only be 
argued that there are costs associated with not possessing a market 
and a range of potential benefits that accrue to owning a national 
securities market with one or another set of operational attributes. 
Even a moribund market, for example, preserves valuable institutions 
that enjoy the confidence of participants. They can be revivified more 
easily than new ones can be created to service the requirements of 
economic or fiscal expansion. A market which reliably delivers 
qualitatively or quantitatively measurable benefits to the economy in 
which it is located, is termed here a valid market. Some further 
aspects of validity are discussed below.
1. Justification.
Into this area falls the question of what disadvantages accrue to the 
non-possession of public national stock markets, what unavoidable 
arguments exist for their establishment or continuance and what 
minimal essential operational characteristics are necessary for a 
valid market to exist.
Securities markets mobilise savings, improve the efficiency of real 
resource allocation and ensure that interest rates and returns are
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market-determined. The analysis of van Agtmael [1984] along these 
lines is reviewed below. The mobilisation of capital for private 
enterprise, public bodies and fiscal deficits supplies a primary 
justification for national public stock markets but is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for their existence or absence in practice.
In many countries private subscribers and domestic financial 
institutions, or the use of international capital markets and lending 
institutions, continue to be the mainstay of corporate and public 
finance even in the presence of securities markets. Markets do not 
guarantee an undistorted structure of interest rates and returns, 
especially to small savers. 'Justification' is therefore a complex 
issue involving the ex ante measurement of public and private benefit. 
The term is to be treated with caution. Only a market which, ex post, 
can be shown to deliver benefits above and beyond the resource cost of 
maintaining it may be held to be valid and offer the further 
possibility of viability in its own right.
2. 'Necessary lies'
Attitudes to stock markets are everywhere contradictory. Confidence 
and trust are regarded as basic, but abuse is common. Insider trading 
is increasingly prohibited but privileged information is widely used 
to obtain excess returns. Markets are alleged to be information- 
efficient and reflect underlying economic reality but everywhere 
behave otherwise for quite long periods. These are weaknesses that can 
be tolerated within a family, but not by outsiders. That argues for 
the necessity of markets that are, for a majority of participants, in 
some sense, their own and dependent on the strength of their loyalty 
rather than logic. National or regional markets may thus be valid and 
indeed better equipped than international entities to serve their
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local economy in a world where no-one meets, or agrees to rely on, 
formal international standards of organisation and conduct. More 
trading may be done with national markets than without them.
3. The spatial 'horizon' of market participants
Issuers large and small, private investors, small savers, professional 
fund managers, brokers, banks, regulators and politicians all possess 
different attitudes to securities trading on national as opposed to 
foreign or international markets. The smaller the country, the more 
likely are these groups to coalesce and be represented by individuals 
with overlapping interests. For instance, in Austria at the time of 
the research fieldwork, the Mayor of Vienna and prominent national 
politician, Helmut Zilk, was the head of a major bank. The country's 
main broadsheet newspaper, 'Die Presse' is owned by the Chambers of 
Commerce. Presidents of regional and national Chambers are often 
elected members of Parliament, even ministers. Smaller enterprises in 
particular are less visible. Their position is affected by 
differential fiscal measures and financing practices which, added to 
small size and, often, poor liquidity, increase the difficulty of 
scrutiny and fundamental analysis by investors abroad. Mapping 
securities markets into their natural, spatial constituency may be 
held to increase their validity for all their actual and potential 
participants, including those based elsewhere.
4. Public policy attitudes
It is useful to categorise the public policy stance towards markets. 
Attitudes include forbidding, directing, regulating, manipulating, 
inhibiting, condoning, reforming, liberalising and promoting the 
operation of stock markets. Condonement is the only necessary 
condition for a market to exist. All policies except condoning involve 
legislative and administrative effort as well as at least implied 
redirection of economic resources, with consequent welfare effects at
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the national and international level. A moment’s thought devoted to 
the possible policy stances listed above is sufficient to show that 
each may have entirely different repercussions upon the viability of a 
market as opposed to its validity. For exeimple, regulating a market 
may increase its validity as a safe resort for investors while 
destroying its viability by diverting a large proportion of trading 
turnover to more lightly regulated markets abroad.
2.2.3: The development potential of national markets
The ratio of the size and complexity of a national stock market to 
that of the national economy in which it is embedded is, on many 
measures, highly variable between countries. A great deal of this 
variation may be explained by the international activities of national 
financial markets and by the entrepreneurial culture of their 
participants. There remains however the question of what is the 
appropriate size for a national market in relation to the national 
economy, and what potential therefore remains to be exploited, 
particularly the potential for positive spillovers, in countries where 
the stock market is under-developed. This way of looking at 
development potential is to be distinguished from simple commercial 
growth and development. Development potential here refers to the gap 
between the present level of market scope and activity and any higher 
level that would deliver increased economic benefits, in the form of 
positive spillovers. A rough equilibrium can be specified where the 
costs of promoting a national securities market to levels of operation 
that are (a) higher than necessary to maintain validity and (b) 
greater than that reached by the naturally viable operation are equal 
to the extra positive externalities. The externality of most interest
45
to this study is information. The operation of markets can be shown to 
create information as a low-priced commodity, or as a free public 
good. It is of particular value to relatively underdeveloped but 
complex economies, dependent on a great deal of information. In all 
economies unlisted companies benefit from information about their 
listed peers. This general treatment of the information externality is 
to be distinguished from the information theoretic treatment of 
securities markets in general.
Section 2.3: Whv are securities markets desirable or necessarv ? 
INTRODUCTION
The case for promoting securities markets in less developed countries 
(LDCs) has been set out by van Agtmael [1984] in the context of the 
lessons learned from third world political and economic mismanagement 
in the 1970s. Some of the main points of that analysis remain relevant 
in a different landscape, namely the creation of new markets in 
eastern and central Europe. The van Agtmael framework begs questions 
however when it is applied to the known deficiencies of some existing 
European markets large and small. Examples would be the failure of 
London's third market and doubt over the future of its second; the 
periodic reappearance of negative interest rates; corruption within 
apparently sophisticated markets such as Vienna and complete 
domination of a market by banks, as in Tel Aviv. A more general 
economic perspective on the functioning of securities markets has been 
supplied by Baumol [1965] whose analysis has been used as a starting 
point by many other authors. Although both authors develop a 
compelling case for national securities markets, the extent to which
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the benefits they identify have not accrued, and the degree to which 
problems van Agtmael in particular associates with non-possession of 
securities markets have persisted, is striking even in mature 
economies.
2.3.1: The van Agtmael scenario
LDC development policies of the 1970s emphasised intervention by 
governments and the planned allocation of resources, rather than their 
allocation through stock markets. Van Agtmael identifies (below in 
bold) a number of benefits that can be conveyed by national stock 
markets in emergent economies as well as corresponding disadvantages 
and problems.
The financial system of a developing country is rendered more 
competitive and efficient through:
1. the availability of alternative, competing saving and borrowing 
instruments and institutions for investors and issuers alike.
Banks, for example, may or may not have a direct interest in 
client firms using the stock market rather than themselves to 
obtain capital. They have an indirect interest in reducing the 
risk implicit in clients’ high capital gearing ratios, as well as 
in opportunities to invest at equity rates of return in companies 
about which they have more information than other outside 
investors. Interview responses collected as part of the present 
research leave little doubt that financial innovation is not 
vigorously pursued by credit institutions competing 
oligopolistically in a less than energetic manner.
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Non-bank financial institutions are in a different position. 
Pension and insurance fund managers compete for levels of return 
that make them an attractive home for savers' funds over and above 
savings bank deposits. Investment banks require corporate clients 
for the flotations and other issues on which their fee and trading 
income is based.
2. opportunities for greater specialisation and financial innovation 
by intermediaries
Even simple broking creates opportunities for specialisation 
that are capable of reducing transactions costs, but only if a 
sufficiently numerous broking community exists to generate the 
necessary competitive pressure. Brokers may be divided into 
those offering execution only, those offering advice in 
addition to dealing services and those acting as discretionary 
brokers: in effect managing private portfolios for their 
owners. The first of these classes will emerge in a 
sufficiently competitive broking market where market share may 
be gained by offering reduced transaction costs. The third is 
likely to become a source of financial innovation in seeking 
to offer increased portfolio performance for clients (PINT 
[1993]/I). The advisory broker remains the norm in most 
markets and, in many countries, the opportunities have often 
been identified and exploited by foreign rather than domestic 
intermediaries.
3. creation of greater public awareness through promotional and 
marketing activities of participants
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Evidence of this was found throughout the markets studied. Little 
of the increased awareness has fed into wider share ownership 
however. In the emerging economies short-lived share booms 
followed by stagnation have been the main result.
4. fewer opportunities for oligopolistic behaviour by banking 
institutions
This relatively mild statement conceals a minefield of difficulty 
in developed as well as developing countries. Van Agtmael is 
referring principally to checks on the behaviour of banks made 
possible by the existence of securities markets and the 
information they, the banks, both universal and credit 
institutions, depending on where in the world one examines the 
case, have to make public about interest rates and securities 
prices. In practice however the banks appear to be among the first 
to exploit securities markets to establish oligopoly and to 
bolster and protect their individual positions in the banking 
sector.
Savings can be more effectively mobilised because of:
5. opportunities to earn higher returns than offered by savings 
deposits
In bank-dominated markets this is not necessarily the case, either 
because the market is itself manipulated by the banks (Vienna) or 
because companies do not pay dividends at levels that reflect 
their earnings, thus biassing returns to capital gains, with 
timing and other factors adding to the risk of obtaining them.
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6. a hedge against inflation in the form of investment in domestic 
wealth-creating equity rather than goods (property, gold, works of 
art) or overseas investment
The hedge in question is often colonised by poison ivy, since 
unanticipated inflation in liberalising economies is itself highly 
damaging. Poor prospects in the home economy also lead companies 
to undertake foreign rather than domestic real investment.
7. market rates are more likely to remain positive than administered 
rates
General economic efficiency is likely to benefit by:
8. increased propensity to save and invest rather than consume or 
export capital
9. reduced administrative corruption and better allocative efficiency 
of real resources by markets
10. the private sector is less likely to be crowded out by government 
funding requirements and better able to compete for resources
11. the facility of savers to liquidate their specific positions in 
the market encourages longer-term commitment in general
12. a balanced term structure of interest rates and better matching of 
funds flows into and out of investments with differing maturities
13. improved information flow about the behaviour of the real economy 
and warning of unfavourable developments, or the adverse
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consequences of government policies, through the collective price 
response of markets
The above group of assertions would appear to be borne out in practice 
only by a roundabout route and over the longer term. The flow of 
information from markets offers, in general, puzzling and 
contradictory evidence about the behaviour of the real economy. It is 
the supply response to demand for analysis and interpretation that 
generates an improvement in information flows of use to decision 
makers. There needs to exist both a stock market and an infrastructure 
of comment and analysis for the relationship between market movements 
and the real economy to become apparent to untrained observers.
There is evidence that the research supporting investment decisions, 
and hence the price response of markets, is generated essentially at 
the country level and is dependent on local knowledge and networks of 
relationships based on confidence. Local brokers and financial 
institutions, including international organisations operating locally 
with indigenous or locally experienced staff, are the basis for the 
information flow. Almost 97% of respondents to the 1992 Euromoney 
European Brokers and Analysts Survey claimed to prefer to deal through 
local brokers and to commission or receive research from the same 
sources. Seventy four percent did in fact also deal through London,
38% through New York and 28% through Tokyo 28%, but local investment 
horizons, demand for locally sourced research material and a strong 
preference for dealing locally, at least in the equities sector, 
clearly exist. This reinforces the argument for ensuring the survival 
of national markets and counters the frequently made assertion that 
the eventual destiny of European securities trading lies in a single 
pan-European market.
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The corporate sector in particular will improve its performance when
it can:
14. adjust its debt/equity ratio at will, under growth conditions to 
leverage its activity levels using fixed interest capital, under 
more uncertain conditions to restrict outgoings to dividend 
streams under its own control
This assertion is given form in the model of corporate financial 
structure developed in Chapter 4.
15. reduce dependence on the credit policies and term lending 
restrictions of banking institutions
These restrictions are often replaced however by the short-term 
requirements of the market and such factors as the crucial timing 
of initial public offerings.
16. appeal direct to investors when high-risk or innovatory projects 
are involved which would be declined by banks or excluded by the 
rationing rules for subsidised credit
17. benefit from venture capital providers’ intervention, once they in 
turn are able to liquidate their successful investments by 
flotation
18. gain productive insights from financial information about firms, 
both externally (other firms) and internally (as a result of 
disclosure requirements)
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19. choose the level of separation of ownership and control and make 
any desired transition by share transactions
These last are important considerations, both for corporations 
with a widely based shareholder body and privately owned family 
firms. They may or may not be facilitated by the existence of a 
stock market however, and can be rendered more difficult. For 
example, the ability of pressure groups and outside interests to 
infiltrate companies at the level of the annual meeting as 
'gadflies* owning a few shares is made possible by access to a 
public stock market (WELT [1992/1).
A large Czech holding company whose chairman was interviewed in 
the course of the present study has been obliged to restructure 
itself on four occasions over three years. The latest (1994) 
involved hiving down activity into a number of subsidiaries, each 
with less than 150 employees to avoid the effect of current wage 
control legislation. Each subsidiary conducts one or more 
businesses, owned but not managerially controlled by the holding 
company. The Prague Stock Exchange began operations during this 
last restructuring but was not able to support complex corporate 
flotations of any kind. The operations described have been carried 
out with a view to eventual listing, but otherwise without regard 
to the presence of a national securities market.
Equity and individual welfare is improved by:
20. opportunity for individuals to participate in economic growth 
areas, with, it may be held, accompanying incentive effects
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21. a low threshold for individual investment and choice of placements
22. opportunities for mutual/insurance/pension funds to run efficent 
investment programmes
This is likely to become an important future rôle for European 
stock markets due to demographic change and difficulty of funding 
state pension schemes.
23. owners of firms’ ability to liquidate their holdings in full or in 
part on retirement, change of interest or as a hedge against 
uncertainty
Liquidation of holdings on retirement is not part of the European 
tradition, rather its opposite, a building up of patrimony. The 
realisation of gains from lucrative buyouts of state assets is an 
advantage that may be sought from central and eastern European 
stock markets although there is little sign of it to date.
24. tax collection can be rendered more equitable and efficient by 
disclosure of financial positions
The large number of bearer securities in circulation, deficiencies 
in tax systems, opportunities for foreign holding structures and 
the existence of loopholes tolerated by authorities as well as the 
skills of bank-based private client investment advisers and 
managers dilutes this point considerably in most of Europe. 
Respondents in all centres were asked about their private client 
activities with replies that were difficult to interpret formally
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but left little doubt as to the importance of their rôle in 
reducing tax exposure.
25. the risk of corporate instability and collapse as a result of 
overexposure to undisclosed commercial and credit risk within 
interlocking groups can be reduced
In summary, merely creating stock markets does not produce all of the 
benefits that can be claimed for them. That depends on the general 
acceptability of the forms and structures adopted and a market's 
subsequent ability to reach self-sustaining levels of turnover, based 
on participants’ confidence in the liquidity, transparency and 
efficiency levels attained and in meeting specific requirements as 
well as the removal or reduction of official barriers.
De facto discrimination against the successful operation of stock 
markets has typically taken the following forms;
1. controls on interest rates, maintaining them below market levels
2. uncontrolled or tolerated high inflation
3. erratic monetary and exchange policies favouring investment in 
land, real estate or hard currencies
4. tax policies favouring bank deposits or public debt ahead of 
commercial private equity and debt
5. tax policies inhibiting disclosure of private investment income 
and holdings
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6. tax policies promoting clandestine or offshore investment
7. tax policies that are not neutral with regard to the term
structure of debt, to equity as opposed to debt, to capital gains
as opposed to income or to preference dividends as opposed to 
interest payments
8. obligations on investment funds to invest in low-yield government 
bonds
9. restrictions on the formation of mutual/pension/insurance
investment funds
10. public enterprise price discrimination and anticompetitive 
behaviour that inhibits the growth of the private sector
11. lax or nonexistent accounting frameworks allowed to form the basis 
for adequate prospectus and general information about viability, 
value and performance of companies
There are of course many examples of all the above listed problems in 
countries with established stock markets. General positive 
discrimination on the part of the public authorities, with a view to 
increasing the number of listings and dealings, can also occur, as 
under:
1. tax or other inducements to float companies
2. privatisation programmes, particularly those with a bias to wider 
domestic public share ownership
56
2. privatisation programmes, particularly those with a bias to wider 
domestic public share ownership
3. tax or other inducements to savers and small investors to take up 
private equity
4. policies to promote the formation and development of pension, 
insurance and other investment funds with large cash flows for 
portfolio investment and the need to provide real returns to their 
subscribers
The above group of points proved difficult to ground in evidence 
and appear to reflect conventional wisdom and a north American 
view of equity ownership that does not travel as well as its 
proponents may instinctively suppose.
This discussion concludes the analysis based upon van Agtmael*s work, 
which provided a fruitful basis for many questions asked of 
respondents during the empirical research. It has not always been 
possible to agree with the assertions listed above however. The 
tensions are reflected in the preceding discussion but do not detract 
from the value of the initial inventory, without which the right 
questions may not have been asked in the first place.
2.3.2: The Baumol scenario
Baumol starts from the proposition that "The allocation of its capital 
resources is among the most important decisions which must be made by 
any economy. In the long run an appropriate allocation of real capital 
is absolutely indispensable to the implementation of consumer
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sovereignty." (Baumol, [1965], pl.). Joseph Zaremba, in a foreword to 
Baumol (Baumol, [1965] pviii.) adds, "An additional factor entering 
into the determination of stock market performance and efficiency is 
that (American) enterprise today obtains only a small proportion of 
its capital needs through new stock issues. Thus if the stock market 
is to serve as an efficient allocator of capital in the economy at 
large, it must somehow exert an influence in the capital markets over 
which it has no apparent direct control but which nevertheless 
comprise the bulk of the capital resource available for investment 
purposes."
In arguments that overlap but do not duplicate those of van Agtmael, 
Baumol asserts that stock markets:
1. Provide information on the current cost of capital to guide real 
investment decisions by firms.
2. Give access to large numbers of investors who each dispose of 
relatively small amounts of capital.
3. Offer a simple mechanism for the transfer of funds at low 
administrative cost.
4. Make available through securities prices an evaluation of the 
financial condition and prospects of borrowing firms.
5. Reduce the required rate of return on funds borrowed for long 
periods by providing liquidity conditions that allow lenders to lend 
short by exchanging their holdings with other parties.
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Specialists, offical brokers and other institutionalised dealers are 
often also required to maintain orderly markets, in other words to act 
in ways that reduce the amplitude of price variations in response to 
given stimuli. That implies costs and risks requiring some reward, 
compensation or insurance. For example there is no way to tell the 
difference between a temporary price fluctuation that can be resisted 
and the onset of a new trend that cannot.
Baumol argues effectively for the view that no-one knows enough about 
the effect of time lags and feedback to impose a duty to maintain 
stability on specialists and official brokers. Without reducing its 
validity this argument has however been overtaken by the development 
of derivative markets as a device to engineer out the dangers of 
excessive exposure to price swings. If a modern real-world exchange is 
constituted without a parallel derivative market being set up, the 
difficulties associated with expecting institutionalised traders to 
maintain stability re-emerge.
Writing before the abolition of fixed commissions on the NYSE (1975), 
Baumol analyses the position of specialists on this type of auction 
market. The arguments apply to contemporary European stock markets 
wherever major institutions have privileged access to the order flow. 
Specialists are in a different position to all other traders inside a 
market as well as investors outside it, in possessing a 'book* of 
current limit orders which provides an excellent source of detailed 
information about trading conditions across the securities they deal 
in, approximating supply and demand schedules to a greater degree than 
is possible in any other market form.
Additional arguments are adduced by Baumol for claiming that stock 
markets have the capability to approach perfect markets closely: the
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product is homogenous, there are a large number of sellers, mostly 
relatively small, and entry and exit are free for investors. This line 
of argument interesting for the present study in two respects. First, 
the consequences of privileged access to the order flow will be 
examined later in the light of experience on two European exchanges, 
Vienna and Copenhagen. One conclusion drawn is that the combination of 
institutional financial power and privileged position with regard to 
information about clients' affairs (particularly corporate clients), 
as well as the existence of their own securities holdings, makes the 
position of banks in European markets much stronger and less
legitimate than that of monopoly specialists on the NYSE, particularly
following the abolition of fixed commissions.
Baumol also produces valid reasons for not using the stock market 
(Baumol, 1965, p.75). They have not lost their force and in this study 
are used as the basis for examining the position of unlisted companies 
in the national markets considered. They may be listed as under;
1. Unwillingness to dilute equity of existing holders
2. Transactions cost of regulatory requirements
3. Other transaction costs
4. Uncertainty on amount yielded by an issue
5. Protecting the value of stock options
6. Avoiding market discipline by use of retained earnings
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In the European context, London excepted, there is not much evidence 
for the assertion (Baumol, 1965, p.79-80) that market sentiment 
affects corporate policy even when no issues are in prospect. And 
Baumol betrays a lack of specialist knowledge when he remarks that the 
offer of shares to current stockholders at below-market prices is a 
'special arrangement' to which neoclassical analysis was never meant 
to apply (Baumol, 1965, p.7). Such rights issue prices are of course a 
way of attempting to equate the claims of current and future 
stockholders to value in the company and prior claims on residual 
equity in the event of a winding up that realises some but not all of 
the balance sheet value of shareholders' funds. They are designed to 
avoid rather than to create rents and market distortions. The 
recipients of rights issues are, in fact, rather apt to complain of 
ungenerous treatment, interpreting rights to mean privileges rather 
than just claims to existing assets.
As with the summaries provided by van Agtmael, the points furnished by 
Baumol proved useful in generating the design for interviews in the 
qualitative research for this study. Trading volume, the means by 
which markets sustain themselves under competition, is an issue which 
largely postdates the work discussed above and for that there proved 
to be no convenient starting point other than the data themselves.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter criteria for the existence of national securities 
markets have been discussed in the light of (a) contemporary 
developments in world financial markets, (b) the need to set out 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the survival and success of 
small national markets before attempting to analyse them
61
systematically and (c) the existence of a conventional rationale for 
the existence of national securities markets as deployed by 
international institutions (as represented by van Agtmael) and 
academia (as represented by William Baumol).
The main conclusion from a reading of contemporary history is that 
certain definite assumptions have to be made about the determinants of 
stability and desirable directions of development in order to permit a 
structured study to be carried out at a time of rapid change. Study of 
the conventional rationale for securities markets leads to the 
conclusion that the multiplicity of factors listed, while mostly 
positive for markets, nevertheless present a diffuse case. Exceptions 
and contradictions can easily be found among real-world financial 
centres. As a result, a simpler, more general set of criteria has been 
devised, against which the success of individual markets can be 
measured. These criteria are captured in the concepts of viability, 
validity and development potential.
The remaining chapters of Part I deal with theoretical and empirical 
considerations that relate directly to the study, as revealed by the 
literature of securities markets, before they, together with the 
criteria developed and discussed above, are applied to the markets 
examined in the empirical research in Part II of the thesis. A return 
is made to aspects of the present discussion in the synthesis 
presented in Part III.
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CHAPTER 3: PRICE DISCOVERY, MARKET EFFICIENCY AND THE ROLE OF 
INFORMATION 
INTRODUCTION
Price discovery is the prime function of any market. All other 
processes by which resources are exchanged among economic agents may 
be carried out in other ways: but finding a price which allows supply 
to equal demand, the market clearing price, is fundamental to most 
unconstrained economic behaviour. In markets for goods, price is 
related to the utility that consumers and firms can extract from them 
and, when markets clear, they are held to be satisfied, allowing 
equilibria to be defined. In financial markets, market clearing 
security prices contain information about the prospective return, 
subject to risk, on investments, as collectively estimated by market 
participants through the act of clearing the market. Trading confers 
no utility until returns are realised however. There arises, 
accordingly, the possibility of further rounds of trading based on the 
new information revealed by price, rather than simple equilibrium. 
Clearly the way in which information is incorporated into prices, and 
in which prices then form the basis for further market activity, is 
fundamental to the efficient operation of financial markets.
In Section 3.1 below we review the process of price discovery through 
the activity of buyers, sellers and intermediaries in securities 
markets and relate price movements to information about potential risk 
and real returns to derive a concept of market efficiency, as defined 
in the standard literature of the subject. A distinction is made 
between the main types of security, equity and bonds, and the effects 
of diversification, particularly diversification between national 
markets, are discussed. In Section 3.2 onwards, issues that relate
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directly to individual national securities markets are discussed, 
beginning with the relation between market movements and the real 
economy. Section 3.3 deals with the rôle of information and proceeds, 
by way of the concept of information asymmetry, to analyse the 
function of financial intermediaries. Two ideas important for the 
empirical research are identified, namely the creation of 
intermediaries by the process of privatisation in the liberalising 
economies of central Europe and the value of market information to 
commercial companies who are not themselves listed on an exchange. 
Conclusions derived from the discussion of price and information 
issues are developed before moving on to consider the related question 
of trading volume in Chapter 4.
Section 3.1; Price discovery, market movements and efficiency.
Security prices should reflect real returns. As is well known however, 
prices move in a more volatile manner than the underlying returns, a 
fact which requires explanation. Cootner [1962] was among the first to 
suggest that movements in security prices should be seen as a series 
of constrained random fluctuations around their true intrinsic value. 
The constraints consist of the limit to random deviation due to the 
activity of 'naïve', 'noise' or liquidity investors producing 
variations which have no relationship to underlying values. Movement 
outside this range invites expoitation but noise investors are not 
necessarily uninformed: they may be dealers adjusting an inventory 
position (Ho and Maoris [1985]) or exhibiting differences of opinion 
(Varian [1989]) about recent information arrivals. Small deviations 
cannot be capitalised upon by informed professional investors because 
of the existence of transaction costs. If prices move significantly 
and sufficiently to overcome transaction costs, professional
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investors, aware of the difference between price and intrinsic value 
will bid up low prices or sell off overpriced securities to realise a 
gain, causing a return to the 'correct' price. Thus, to the outside 
observer, prices will not move far beyond the upper and lower limits 
of professional intervention unless some change in underlying 
intrinsic value occurs.
Samuelson [1973] extended Cootner's model to define the behaviour of 
perfectly efficient prices in perfect markets that remain in 
continuous equilibrium and hence react instantly to new information. 
Real markets exhibit a number of characteristics which undermine this 
process and the assumptions which underpin it. For example, in a thin 
market characterised by low volume and low levels of investor 
attention, prices would move more erratically to new positions over 
long time periods and with greater amounts of variation along the way 
than would be the case of those traded in conditions more closely 
resembling those required by the assumptions. The concept however 
forms a basis for a more general idea of efficient markets where, in 
the absence of other effects, prices fluctuate randomly but in a 
narrow range around their intrinsic values (Fama, [1965], [1970]).
More detailed study of the behaviour of securities prices has also to 
acknowledge the basic difference between bonds and equity. Bonds are 
of course legal contracts entitling the owners of title to cash flows 
of interest and repayment of principal under precisely defined 
conditions. The market price of a low-risk bond can consequently be 
calculated with equal precision by observing the current market 
interest rate for securities of like structure, similar risk and time 
to redemption.
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A general consequence of this fundamental difference between bonds and 
equities is that bond prices move together in response to market 
influences. Individual equity issues are of course governed by the 
circumstances of the issuing company as well as those obtaining in the 
securities markets. In Chapter 6 we offer empirical evidence to show 
that in the small, bond dominated markets of Europe, equity trading 
volume is strongly associated with bond trading volume.
3.1.1: Risk
The conventional quantitive surrogate for financial risk is variation 
in the rate of return, measured either as the variance or as the 
standard deviation of returns. Risk is of interest in the context of 
this study for two reasons. First variance in returns has to do with 
size of market, size of individual issues and of issuing institutions 
and liquidity (trading volume) at any given point in time. Second, the 
appropriate response to risk is portfolio diversification which today 
implies readiness to invest in more than one geographical market. 
Trading patterns in the small European markets covered by this 
research are influenced by the diversification strategies of 
foreigners.
In equities, distributions of returns have been shown on many 
occasions to be quite stable in large and small markets alike (see for 
example Blume, [1971]; Vasicek, [1973]) and Herrera (MISC [1992]/1)). 
The natural variability inherent in equity returns arising from market 
and company-specific events is well understood by investors and the 
public at large. The risk structure of bond holdings is technically 
well-known but not common knowledge. Ross [1976] has classified the 
independent individual risks associated with holding bonds, an 
itemisation of risk incorporated in the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) 
model (Ross [1976]) and supported by empirical estimates of the
66
effects (Roll and Ross, [1980]). Default risk, market risk, purchasing 
power risk and marketability risk are particularly important in the 
newer markets of central and eastern Europe plus Portugal, less so in 
Copenhagen and Vienna.
3.1.2: Diversification
Pioneering empirical research (Evans and Archer, [1968]; Johnson and 
Shannon, [1974]) showed in fact that simple diversification is capable 
of reducing total risk in such a way that it converges to systematic 
risk (the undiversifiable risk associated with movement of the whole 
market), practically removing nonsystematic risk (that associated with 
movements in a specific security), once a level of 10 to 15 securities 
is reached. Later empirical work (Elton and Gruber, [1977]; Tole, 
[1982]) suggests that the number may be somewhat higher. Beyond some 
optimum level, superfluous diversification attracts unnecessary costs.
The number of securities needed to be available to allow investors to 
construct efficient portfolios is still considerable. In markets where 
there is no effective limit to choice and where quality ratings such 
as Standard & Poor's are available, it has been shown by Wagner and 
Lau [1971] that even undiversifiable risk can be further reduced by 
building portfolios out of highest-quality securitites only. This is 
because quality ratings essentially measure the risk of bankruptcy, 
which is correlated across the market, making it a systematic risk, 
but nevertheless a lower risk in the highest rating category.
Markowitz diversification (Markowitz, [1952]) attempts to reduce 
portfolio risk without necessarily reducing returns by deliberately 
selecting assets which exhibit low covariance of returns and is
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equally dependent on large populations of available securities and 
copious information. Diversification techniques imply the kind of 
expertise normally found in larger fund-managing financial 
institutions, creating asymmetry of expertise in smaller markets where 
banks have the necessary resources but independent brokers often do 
not. Portfolio diversification analysis has however been captured in 
the form of readily available software to run on personal computers 
(see, for excunple, Bookstaber, Scott, Foresman & Co, [1985]).
Technical development makes expertise accessible to investors in 
smaller markets, but puts a correspondingly higher premium on the 
quality of information about available returns.
The fact that portfolios will always dominate single assets is a 
powerful argument for advocating policy action to encourage small 
markets in the early stages of development to offer at least a minimum 
number of assets that will allow some elements of diversification. As 
Evans and Archer [1968] showed, the first steps towards 
diversification are the ones that yield the greatest reduction in 
total risk: randomly putting together 10-15 equities will render the 
risk of a portfolio largely indistinguishable from the market average.
Empirical research (Ibbotson and Sinquefield, [1977]; Dusak,[1963]) 
has shown that share price indices, bond price indices and commodity 
indices tend to be uncorrelated. However very few securities within 
markets are uncorrelated, leading to the need for Markowitz portfolio 
analysis to find them and creating an obvious incentive for investors 
in large centres to diversify into foreign markets with the 
expectation of finding more plentiful uncorrelated investment 
opportunities there. With increasing convergence and interdependence
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between large financial centres and a marked tendency over several 
recent business cycles for the major economies to move together, the 
place to look for low correlations has been precisely the smaller 
economies exhibiting out-of-phase business cycles. The trend has moved 
so far that even newspaper readers are now regaled with explanations 
of the risk frontier effects of including emerging markets in the 
portfolios of pension funds (PINT [1994]/1). It might at first seem 
appropriate to look for surges of foreign investment in those 
economies notably out of synchronisation with major investment centres 
as evidence of this. Unfortunately, however, the reasons for 
asynchrony may well be bad for investment and there are many other 
grounds for surges of investor interest. A recent example is the swell 
of interest in Spanish bonds and those of other economies who were, in 
1991-92, exhibiting high interest rates but under an obligation to 
reduce them to converge with the European norm in order to maintain 
their position in the ERM and move towards monetary union. This 
created opportunities for medium-term capital gains to bondholders as 
interest rates fell. In the event they did not do so and the market 
bubble collapsed. Cross-border securities investment flows show the 
consequences of global diversification clearly, as shown by Table 1.
Table 1. INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES INVESTMENT FLOWS
Annual averages among industrial countries ($bn)
1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990
OUTFLOWS 12.4 41.8 176.8 151.6
European Union 3.8 18.9 62.6 79.8
US 5.8 5.8 9.5 28.5
Japan 2.6 13.8 89.9 39.7
INFLOWS 25.0 57.8 186.0 159.1
European Union 8.5 17.7 70.4 94.4
US 4.6 16.7 59.2 2.9
Japan 3.0 11.9 23.3 34.7
source: BIS,PINT [19921/1
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The table also exhibits the influence of economic factors, in 
particular the leap performed by the European Union during a period of 
economic growth accompanied by rapidly increasing levels of economic 
integration in the approach to the Single Market in 1992.
Herrera (MISC [1992]/!) has analysed a number of factors that make for 
real differences between returns in an internationally diversified 
portfolio. Using a multi-index model (see for example Furstenberg and 
Jeon [1989]), risk is examined by region, country and industrial 
sector. Herrera finds that in a nationally diversified portfolio 34% 
of returns variance is to be explained by country factors, 28% is 
accounted for by a regional (here Europe) effect, 9% by industrial 
sector and 29% for 'rest of the world'.
Section 3.2: Market movements and the real economy
The analysis of Prat [1982] is pursued here, supplemented by other and 
later work. Prat studied the relationship between bond yields, share 
prices and yields, consumer prices and national income per capita to 
establish the likelihood and strength of the connections among prices, 
trading volumes and yields on financial markets and the general 
economic conjuncture. The story is one of approximate relationships 
and time lags between correlated variables that vary according to the 
countries studied. Dynamic interdependence rather than causal 
relationships is stressed, particularly in view of the fact that 
informationally efficient markets can be expected to act on 
anticipated economic developments.
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3.2.1; Stock Prices and Bond Yields. Index Movements. Profits and 
Dividends
The relationship between share index movements, profits and dividends 
in the United States has been widely studied. Molodovsky for instance 
used data from the years 1871-1960 to show a general connection 
between the three (Molodovsky, [1962] pp. 12 and 16). Although a good 
positive correlation existed between yields on common stocks and low 
risk bonds between 1871 and 1934 this correlation disappeared 
completely between 1935 and 1960. Prat has confirmed that the 
correlation also breaks down in the period 1947-1980. While large- 
scale, long term variations do not correlate well, Macauley [1938] had 
already obtained much better results by eliminating medium and long 
terms cycles and trends to compare short run effects only. Eleven 
series, some inverted, show remarkably good correlation over a very 
long period, from 1860 to 1935. The series include call money and time 
deposit rates in New York, railroad stock prices and bond yields, bank 
clearings, pig-iron production and and an index (Snyders) of general 
prices (Macauley, [1938], p. 218).
Various reasons can be adduced for the longer-term studies to be 
marked by periods during which relationships break down. Macauley was 
unable to find any strong (inverse) relationship between movements in 
US railroad common stock prices and railroad corporate bond yields 
over the period 1857-1936. He regarded this as primarily the effect of 
uncertainty over future earnings affecting stock prices to the extent 
of obscuring the relationship, rather than a denial of its existence.
A secondary factor, according to Macauley would have been a shift in 
the debt-equity ratio over the business cycle affecting the relative 
prices/yields of stocks and bonds.
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The relationship sought is that between the level of stock prices and 
the rate of interest because, of course, the level of stock prices is 
what determines the percentage yield actually measured from a given 
money level of profits or dividend payments. As well as any 
demand/supply shifts induced by changes in the debt/equity ratio the 
effect of interest payments in themselves has a significant impact on 
reported profits, thus the rate of interest 'leaks' into stock prices 
via the effect on anticipated profits. The effect would be amplified 
by the gearing level. No author to our knowledge, including Prat, has 
made this point. It is usually obscured as theoretically irrelevant 
under the Modigliani-Miller (1958) assumption that income from equity 
and debt is equally taxed in the hands of investors. This assumption 
is not supported empirically.
Fluctuations in long term interest rates with sign reversed have been 
a good predictor of stock price movements one to three quarters ahead 
in a number of countries over quite long periods (see Prat p.66 for US 
1967-76, West Germany 1960-1976, Italy 1952-1976, UK 1952-1976,
Belgium 1952-1976, Switzerland 1952-1976, France 1952-1976, Japan 
1956-1976 and Canada 1949-1976).
Other empirical work (Graham, Dodd and Cottle, [1962] p.481 and pp. 
485-86), again based on American data, has shown that a large number 
of companies see a relationship between dividend and the share price 
while undistributed profits are not particularly valued by the market. 
This corresponds to the results of Blume and Friend discussed in 
Chapter 5. Other studies, notably Malkiel and Cragg [1970], have 
looked for correlation between the share price/profit and the 
dividend/profit ratios. Positive correlations have been found, 
indicating a preference for dividends. Pettit [1971] measured the 
market reaction to dividend changes on a sample of 625 shares in New 
York between January 1964-June 1968 and found a strong price reaction
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to announcements of dividend changes but very little to similar profit 
announcements. Peyrard [1974] and Sigalla [1977] obtained similar 
results for the Paris Bourse.
Arguments for the influence of profits over that of dividends can be 
based on the results obtained by Murphy [1968] from a study of profit 
growth rates and share price growth rates of 203 American companies in 
the period 1955-1964, showing positive correlation between the two 
variables. Lorie and Hamilton [1973] pointed out that there are 
companies which seldom or never pay dividends, companies which are 
moreover in vogue and whose shareholders have obtained high returns. 
And a sectoral study (Friend and Puckett, [1964]) showed that firms in 
stagnant sectors could improve their share price by increasing 
dividends while those in growth sectors could achieve the same thing 
by increased profit retention.
Miller and Modigliani [1961] had of course already made their classic 
attempt to settle the matter at the theoretical level by demonstrating 
that firms facing similar opportunities and risks should be able to 
maintain the same share price whatever their dividend distribution 
policies. This has never been uncontested either at the theoretical 
level (Gordon, [1963]) or empirically, (Gordon, [1959], [1962];
Graham, Dodd and Cottle [1962]. More recently, US and British 
experience offers both statistical and anecdotal evidence (see, for 
example, EGON [1993]/1, PINT [1992]/2) of firms' and institutional 
investors’ preference for maintaining dividends in the face of 
declining profits. The attitude is not universal however and debate 
continues (see PINT [1991]/1, [1992]/3 among many other examples).
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3.2.2: Economie and fiscal uncertainties
The relevance of all this to the present study concerns the likely 
future evolution of financial institutions in smaller European markets 
as increasingly unviable state pension schemes give way to private 
provision. If the path of the UK market is followed the results will 
be profound: in 1963 55% of equity was owned by individuals and only 
10% by pensions funds and insurance companies. By 1992 this relation 
had almost exactly reversed (ECON [1993]/2). Overall empirical 
confirmation is of course entirely dependent on tax neutrality between 
distributed and undistributed profit, which is hard to find in any 
real-world régime, especially over the time-periods necessary to 
establish firmly the alleged irrelevance of dividend policy to the 
evolution of the share price. The portfolio management behaviour of 
the institutions remains in many cases unclear (see for example Davis 
[1988]).
Fama [1981] has examined the relationship between equity returns, real 
economic activity and money in order to account for the widely 
observed negative correlation between inflation and (US) common stock 
returns. The phenomenon should be inconsistent with the ownership of 
real assets as implied by ownership of equity: owning real assets 
should provide a hedge against inflation. Fama finds that real stock 
returns are positively correlated with real economic activity as 
represented by capital expenditure, real rates of return on capital 
and the level of output. Inflation is in fact acting as a proxy for 
other relationships, notably the demand for money, which have 
accompanied and dominated real economic factors to produce the 
observed effect. As Fama admits: "However, this conclusion leaves us 
without an economic explanation for part of the documented decline in
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expected real stock returns during the post-1953 period." (Fama 
[1981], p.563). This concludes the review of Prat's and others' 
contribution to discussion of securities market and real economic 
phenomena.
Section 3.3: The rôle of information 
3.3.1: External value of market information
It may be the case that information arising from financial market 
related operations can corroborate more direct information about 
economic structure and the conjuncture, or, in the case of poorly 
developed or unreliable public statistical services, substitute for 
it. In order for this to be the case, it may be asserted, the nexus of 
all individuals, firms and institutions making up the markets plus 
general business and government decision-making has to be large enough 
to sustain demand in a market for information. There is then potential 
for a synergy extending within and beyond the markets themselves. This 
has nothing directly to do with the use of non-generally available 
information by traders, the asymmetry that drives trading in 
individual securities. On the other hand it does have to do with 
market efficiency, loosely defined for the moment as the rate of 
response to available information. The two questions needing to be 
begged are: 'how much information needs to be available for markets to 
be efficient in some general sense' and 'what constitutes 
availability?'. There is for instance serious doubt that dealers and 
their clients do have access to an item that is reported after the 
close of business and 'available' on an exchange announcement that has 
not yet been circulated. The greater the density of news services, 
investigation and analysis, the greater is the likelihood that
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’available’ information will in fact be of good quality and quickly 
available to all. Market movements which then follow become in turn 
more useful as information. For example, when in 1962, the BMA first 
announced the establishment of a connection between smoking and lung 
cancer, shares in Bunzl Paper shot up, drawing attention to a 
particular connection in the tobacco industry and providing an instant 
forecast estimate of its effects, duly reported upon and analysed the 
next day in the press.
In the empirical part of this study arguments are therefore presented 
and evidence sought for the proposition that publicly reported 
statistics, information and general business and market analysis form 
a useful and significant part of the general commercial and economic 
infrastructure of a country or region and improve its economic 
efficiency relative to a similar entity without this advantage. Such 
information is defined as being of the kind that is free or widely 
obtainable at a low cost in money or effort. It is hard to imagine a 
financial centre that managed to function without some significant 
information spillovers, but the focus of attention in what follows 
will be to note the opportunities for regulatory and market 
authorities to create the necessary environment for useful synergies 
and identify the costs and benefits associated with doing so.
The above concepts represent a considerable extension of the idea of 
"the price system as....a mechanism for communicating information” 
(Hayek [1945]). Financial markets provide information about other 
markets and non-market developments. Clearing the market in one or 
more stages is not the end of the story. If markets are rendered in 
some sense more efficient by improved information obtained at some 
resource cost, and, independently, the rest of the economy could
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benefit from data emanating from the same general sources with some 
further cost, then the total benefits might well exceed the total 
costs. If the two needs are considered in isolation that might not be 
perceived and small or new markets might continue to function 
inefficiently on inadequate information within an economy suffering 
the same problem.
Finally, another important informational aspect of new securities 
markets is the extent to which public comment is informed and 
universally believed myths are routinely countered. Two such myths, 
for excimple, are that market returns can be systematically improved 
upon by investment 'skills* (PINT [1994]/2) and that money flows into 
or out of markets when major developments occur. In the former case, 
to 'beat the market' the investor has to be, and in general remain, 
privy to information about the probability of returns or some aspect 
of market dynamics, as well as concealing his or her trading from 
others who would only have to copy it for any gains to be traded out.
The latter case is a simple confusion of stocks and flows.(ECON
[1987]/!).
Theoretical work by Dow and Gorton [1993] confirms that when it is not 
clear what implications new information has for the value of an asset,
the actual pattern of price movements following the information
arrival may bear little relation to the final price level reached.
They point out that "In general, information structures which differ 
from the standard 'truth-plus-noise' paradigm can result in a rich 
pattern of price responses, while remaining consistent with 
rationality."
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Using a model of returns generation developed by Amihud and Mendelson 
[1987], Damadoran [1993] uses data of daily returns on the New York 
Stock Exchange/American Stock Exchange as compared with NASDAQ during 
the period 1977 to 1986 to estimate a coefficient of price adjustment 
over time, upon the arrival of information. For the purposes of the 
present study the main result of interest is that NASDAQ stocks, as an 
example of an over-the-counter market representing the direction of 
development in many small European markets, have a much lower 
coefficient of price adjustment for periods of up to five days (as 
base period for the calculation of returns) and exhibit higher 
intrinsic variance and noise in the returns generation process than 
stocks traded on the major exchanges. As Damadoran points out, the 
chief significance of the result is due to the smaller equity amounts 
and lower trading frequency of smaller companies rather than the 
difference of market mechanism. This fact emerges when company size 
classes are compared on the larger exchanges.
3.3.2: The Value of Market Information to Unlisted Companies
Unlisted companies can benefit from information about listed companies 
gleaned from the level of individual share prices, market movements 
and the publication of information required of listed companies.
Listed companies in turn can compare their privileged private estimate 
of their book value and profit expectations with the market's 
perception of their value based on some measure of expected returns 
plus published information. To the extent that share prices for 
industrial sectors as well as smaller groupings within sectors move 
together, unlisted companies have advantages in lower costs of 
information production, in concealment of their position and, after 
abstracting from the more general market movements expressed by an
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appropriate index, in benefitting from a free direct impression of 
their sector's prospects based on the share price of listed companies. 
This last item of information is of greatest value within economies 
not well served by research and statistical services or low reporting 
standards. This positive external benefit of stock market information 
extends to the assessment of business prospects on a cross-national 
basis, again particularly where more orthodox research is impractical.
A further positive externality arises in the use of market information 
to value unquoted companies for the purpose of acquisition by private 
sale. The investigation and analysis of such companies, the search for 
interested investors and the broking of deals has become, in the 
absence of an adequate secondary market, a minor industry in the 
United Kingdom. Its inputs are a mixture of freely available and 
highly privileged information.
3.3.3; The market-internal rôle of information
The arrival of an item of information in a securities market may be 
regarded as merely the kickoff in a game whose results cannot be 
predicted. Subsequent price movements, plus the reported volume of 
trading are two means by which the level of reaction is communicated. 
This data is then fed back into the trading process as new 
information, with indeterminate results since the process dynamics are 
now non-linear. In business cultures where the opinion of the markets 
is relevant to real investment and other forms of decision making, a 
further, wider loop is potentially created in the form of business 
policy based on potential market reaction.
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Volume information, discussed more fully in Chapter 4, is distributed 
differently from price information, being less an 'automatic' 
byproduct of the existence of a market than quoted prices; 
intrinsically more costly to produce; requiring initiative to obtain 
and some compulsion to publish. It accrues naturally to dealers but 
not to other market participants. The form of market organisation and 
the level of competition dictates to whom it comes and to what extent 
it may be exploited by them in trading. In many circumstances, volume 
information, expressed as the flow of orders, could be defined as 
privileged, inside information disclosing, for instance, the degree to 
which current prices fail to represent equilibrium values. Its capture 
is worthwhile on its own as a source of information on which to base 
an in-house trading strategy, apart from the commissions and other 
benefits accruing to capture of the order flow considered purely as 
market share within the securities industry.
An important distinction needs to be made between latent and actual 
information flows, that is to say between information that exists but 
is not widely propagated and information which is actually available 
to market participants, individually in groups, or generally. Latent 
information can also be considered to be latent order flow, given the 
accepted proxy relationship between the two. The concept of latent 
information has implications for trading in small, narrow or thin 
markets. Any propagation of information with potential significance 
for trading may generate volume. News of trading activity is itself 
relevant to future trading. The elements of a non-linear expansion of 
trading activity would seem to arise from a simple expansion of the 
information resource, or rather from the actualisation of what exists 
in latent form.
The expansion of information is investigated, market by market,
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in the empirical part of this study. Both an expansion of trading 
volume in line with the growth of information and a tendency for 
bursts of activity to be clumped together is observed in the 
econometric analysis of trading volume in selected markets described 
in Chapter 6.
It has been pointed out at length by Grossman [1989] that prices 
cannot be considered as information in the sense of Hayek [1945]
(p.527) merely by virtue of their rôle within the Marshallian or 
Walrasian frameworks for clearing markets, where demand schedules are 
based on mere comparison of the payoff available from alternative 
investments measured by their market-clearing prices. Prices within 
such frameworks are constraints on action, not information on which to 
base a decision. A practical manifestation of this idea is the limit 
order submitted by an investor specifying a quantity to be purchased 
at or below a given price. By specifying an actual market clearing 
price, the investor indirectly attempts to collate other peoples' 
information with his or her own. A schedule of such limit orders for 
various quantities at various prices defined to be market clearing 
prices, in fact represents a rational expectations model of the price 
function for the market involved, incorporating all the information 
available to the investor and everyone else in the market. It does not 
imply perfect foresight. The idea of prices conveying complex 
information in this sense is due to Lucas [1972].
Returning to Grossman: "The Walrasian equilibrium not only leads to 
poor allocations under asymmetrical information, but also is a bad 
positive model of equilibrium. A good model of equilibrium 
prices..should have the property that traders have no desire to
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recontract...sophisticated traders will desire to recontract at the 
Walrasian price and thus it is not even market-clearing when traders 
have rational expectations." (Grossman, [1989], p.23).
Latent information, discussed earlier above, has been examined by Ho 
and Michaely [1988], although they do not employ the term. They are 
able to show that markets may not attain informational efficiency 
(after Fama [1970]) when public information is costly to produce and 
investors can obtain better quality versions of the same information 
by paying more for it. The obvious case of published accounts is 
cited, where extracting useful information from an apparently 
straightforward document is technically difficult and hedged about 
with potential pitfalls, such as accepting stated depreciation rates 
or stock valuations. Using a rational expectations model for a 
representative investor at equilibrium. Ho and Michaely find that the 
level of informational efficiency depends upon the cost structure of 
the information supply. Conversely efficiency does not depend upon 
investors’ expectations and the risk associated with given rates of 
return. Furthermore, if investors' risk preferences were identical, the 
marginal cost of information at equilibrium would be identical across 
the market, whatever the actual costs associated with finding out 
about this or that individual stock. This rarefied conclusion is 
better examined for possible practical implications away from 
equilibrium and the representative investor. It implies in fact that 
less information will typically be obtained for small companies and 
incorporated in the stock price than for large ones. This is because, 
in the case of a small company, the marginal resource costs of 
acquiring information are likely to be higher (Ho and Michaely cite 
the relative likelihood of having an active public relations 
department) and less volume is available over which to spread costs.
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The existence of ’patchy* information efficiency leads on to the 
possibility of manipulating markets by making available latent 
information, particularly regarding smaller companies. Short sellers 
do not need to obtain new information, but merely to recycle existing 
information that might predict lower earnings, to move the share 
price. Ho and Michaely examine the effect of ’repackaged’ stories 
falling into this category on the daily mean returns during a standard 
’event’ period (see Brown and Warner [1985]) from a sample of 29 
newspaper commentaries published between 1982-1984. They find 
abnormally large price movements over the course of the event period, 
with a disproportionate effect on smaller, more thinly traded stocks. 
Thus a market cannot be considered informational efficient or 
inefficient as a whole, it is necessary to examine the structure of 
information efficiency for any given market in detail before coming to 
a conclusion about its efficiency relative to other markets. Similarly 
the efficiency of a single market may be expected to vary over time 
with the size structure of the companies that make it up and with the 
volume of equity trading taking place. This conclusion is of 
considerable significance for the markets studied in the course of the 
present research. In particular, the relation between ’news’ events 
and large-scale changes in the volume of trading seems particularly 
well-established for both Copenhagen (effect of financial scandals on 
private equity holdings) and Vienna (market takeoff following 
’discovery’ by Fortune magazine). These events are discussed in the 
relevant chapters.
3.3.4: Information Asymmetry
Financial markets have often been described as markets in information 
and information is typically asymmetrically distributed between 
borrowers and lenders, creating a different world from that inhabited
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by many models of firms’ capital structure and market behaviour based 
on information symmetry, such as the Miller-Modigliani [1961] theorem 
where capital structure is based on numerous assumptions which include 
symmetrical distribution of information. Leland and Pyle [1977], 
further discussed below, have shown that there may be a statistical 
variation between capital structures of firms earning the same return, 
but not necessarily a causal one, allowing the idea to survive. 
Nevertheless, information asymmetry has had to be taken into account 
since Akerlof [1970] (see below) and Spence [1973], [1974a], [1974b] 
and probably before all of them. Its importance in the context of the 
present research is that information asymmetries and market 
imperfections are likely to be very pronounced in many of the national 
securities markets researched. Information-related mechanisms have 
also been widely held to be responsible for the two key sources of 
market failure, moral hazard and adverse selection. Hammond [1990] has 
demonstrated the impossibility of perfect capital markets and with it 
the need for perfect foresight and other abstractions inconsistent 
with any discussion of information. When some information about 
individuals is private, perfect capital markets may be impossible, and 
when intertemporal factors are brought into account they are 
necessarily so (Hammond op. cit. p.37.).
3.3.5: Signalling and the rôle of financial intermediaries
Any analysis of securities markets in course of development needs to 
take into account two particular aspects of information asymmetry 
discussed in the significant paper by Leland and Pyle [1977] already 
mentioned. Borrowers will typically know more about the quality of 
their projects than the lenders they need to approach for finance. 
Lenders will be faced by competing borrowers, who may therefore talk
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up their projects. In extreme cases this may be deliberately 
misleading, creating moral hazard. Promotion of projects may lead to 
lenders estimating a higher average rate of return than is actually 
available. Both cases encourage lenders to assume more risk than they 
intend. This will not go unnoticed, leading to failure of the market 
to provide funds. The losers are worthy projects which go by default. 
Leland and Pyle [1977] argue that information about project quality 
can be transferred to lenders via the actions of would-be borrowers in 
taking more equity in their own projects than would be optimal for 
them in the context of a capital market that was willing to lend 
funds. Such entrepreneurs are therefore obliged to sacrifice welfare 
to get their message across.
Leland and Pyle also address the problem of explaining financial 
intermediation as an activity in terms of information asymmetry. 
Information is a valuable commodity, but returns to its sale are 
affected by the fact that buyers can resell without hindrance, 
allowing the originating firm to appropriate only a small part of the 
total market. The quality of information cannot be accurately assessed 
by buyers if there is no way to restrict the number and maintain the 
reliability of sellers. In the manner suggested by Akerlof [1970] poor 
information will come to dominate the market, driving out the quality 
providers who experience higher search costs and cannot compete with 
the purveyors of 'lemons' (inferior merchandise). Financial 
intermediaries, it is suggested, come into being because they are able 
to use specialised information directly to purchase financial assets, 
forming a portfolio which yields a return greater than a set of assets 
put together on the basis of generally available information. The 
state of theory in this area is further discussed in the next section.
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One characteristic of rapidly developing markets is an evolving 
population of financial intermediaries with continuous creation of new 
institutions and products. In the developed western world the process 
has been gradual and evolutionary. In emerging economies of central 
and Eastern Europe it has been slow or rapid according to the 
privatisation method employed to bring formerly state owned assets 
into a public domain defined on market standards. The spread of 
information about successful innovations and alliances between large 
institutions have created the technical resources to move any 
financial product into any market where the regulatory system will 
support it. There is as yet no convincing single model to explain the 
results of empirical research into the pattern of development. 
Intermediaries issue securities and other claims to their customers 
that offer different risk-return characteristics than their own 
assets. Three forms of intermediary can be defined (Dowd and Lewis 
[1992], p4.). A simple broker is merely a channel for transactions and 
the purchase and sale of information and other services. This is not 
an intermediary in the sense of being part of the chain of debt and 
claims stretching between final investors and ultimate borrowers. True 
financial intermediaries are mutual funds whose investors share in a 
portfolio of assets or deposit-takers. Merely differentiating these 
two types of intermediary makes clear why traditional financial 
intermediation theory is unsatisfactory, particularly for the purpose 
of speculating about what forms of intermediary may be expected to 
arise in new and transformed financial markets. Mutual funds tend to 
hold marketable securities and do not guarantee returns to investors 
beyond promotional claims. Deposit takers tend to promise a rate of 
return, indeed to guarantee it, and many of their liabilities are of 
short-term maturity, including cheque accounts. Deposit-takers' assets 
tend to be non-marketable.
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There is no easy explanation for the fact that deposit taking 
intermediaries tend to specialise in non-marketable securities, nor 
the offer of a guaranteed rate of return. Search and verification 
costs supply further illumination however. Search costs are those 
associated with identifying an investment opportunity. Verification 
costs are those of estimating its yield. Leland arid Pyle [1977] 
suggest that financial intermediaries arise as a way of avoiding the 
loss of value associated with disseminating information and leads on 
to the idea that intermediaries use the information directly to 
acquire productive assets, financing themselves by the issue of claims 
to investors who by this means can benefit from the information
without it being disseminated. Specialisation is part of the
information-limiting process. A problem, not avoided by Leland and 
Pyle, is that the investor has to choose among intermediaries rather 
than among original investments. The solution offered by Leland and 
Pyle, as part of their general approach to information asymmetry, is
for the owner of a mutual fund to commit part of his own wealth to the
fund, thus demonstrating and signalling his commitment to its quality. 
This explanation creates sufficient conditions for the existence of 
deposit takers and mutual funds.
In summary therefore, some borrowers may wish to restrict the circle 
of lenders, to rely on one lender or to restrict the amount of 
information they supply. They would typically turn to a deposit-taking 
financial intermediary, to whom they would issue non-marketable 
claims. Those not influenced by these factors would have the ability 
to issue marketable securities which could be purchased direct by 
investors or any kind of intermediary. The former kind of borrower 
predominates over the latter in the developing markets of central and 
eastern Europe, but steady migration from one position to the other
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may be expected to nourish securities markets with rising levels of 
primary issues for many years to come.
3.3.6: Intermediaries created bv privatisation
Privatisation of state assets in emerging countries of eastern and 
central Europe has given rise to intermediaries created or altered by 
a completely different process from that in western markets. The best 
examples are the large numbers of investment trusts created in the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia, or the crippling of established banks by 
closed circles of mutual debt among companies and between companies 
and banks. Since the theory of financial intermediary creation is not 
yet complete and causal factors such as information costs, 
availability and asymmetry might have a completely different impact in 
such economies, the data themselves will generate future debate. For 
instance, as is likely, high search costs might favour the rapid 
development of intermediaries selling to retail investors. On the 
other hand many intermediaries themselves might be corrupt, as seems 
to have been the case in both halves of the former Czechoslovakia, 
leaving investors facing their own information asymmetry vis-à-vis 
competing investment trusts. As Leland and Pyle [1977] point out "..a 
return to information can be gathered only if the buyers of the 
intermediary’s claims believe that the intermediary uses good 
information."
In many ’liberalising’ economies of central and eastern Europe the 
quality of information is compromised by the closed nature of much 
privatisation, preserving as it has the privileges and wealth
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accumulating possibilities of the former nomenklatura. Over- 
regulation; the creation of closed companies whose shares cannot be 
traded without the companies' permission; retention of blocking 
participation by governments and existing managers; the licensing of 
monopoly by tying markets to specific companies and the reimposition 
of price controls on products and services; not to mention a necessary 
semi-criminalisation of business in order to make progress in a 
chaotic environment (Young and Reynolds [1994]), all serve to render 
intermediation and the transmission of information difficult and 
unreliable.
CONCLUSION
The principal aim of this chapter has been to demonstrate the 
significance of the information supply infrastructure of a securities 
market in determining its informational and operational efficiency.
It has been shown that information supply is both an output of market 
structure and its operations and a determinant of them. Markets 
generating certain information patterns will tend to operate in ways 
that relate to what that information does or does not reveal and will 
develop a structure capable of operating within the restrictions of 
the information supply, with higher or lower levels of trading 
activity in the medium term. The general significance of information 
for markets therefore lies in the way it operates to maintain 
sufficient trading activity to underpin viability and validity and a 
self-sustaining feedback relationship. This in turn underlines the 
importance of transparency as a feature of market design and periodic 
reform to ensure that a balanced trading structure is maintained in 
the face of oligopolistic and monopolistic influences. The importance 
of financial intermediaries has been stressed but the subtleties of
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the informational relationships between borrowers and lenders may not 
be easily expressed in traditionally structured markets, or be lost in 
the rough-and tumble of emergent markets.
Chapter 4, which follows, now deals with the general question of 
trading volume, viewed from the perspective of the extant theoretical 
and empirical literature, as developed and extended by appropriate 
models for the markets studied here.
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CHAPTER 4: PRICE-VOLUME RELATIONSHIPS AND THE DETERMINANTS OF VOLUME 
INTRODUCTION
As has already been indicated, this study is primarily concerned with 
the viability and validity of securities markets and their capability 
to deliver benefits through further development. The prime measure of 
all these three aspects of a market's health is transactions volume.
If a market is defective it will not be used: essential trading will 
be accomplished in other ways. If it is healthy, trading volume will 
not only reflect this fact, but will, on the evidence, grow well 
beyond the levels required to issue securities and adjust portfolios 
in line with economic and business fundamentals. In the literature of 
securities markets there is a strong orientation towards explaining 
returns rather than treating volume itself as the dependent variable. 
In some cases the very existence of trading is the object of 
speculation. Research has, however, often shown that volume is 
dependent on market microstructure and the asymmetrical distribution 
of information. The microstructure contemplated has usually been that 
of larger markets in general and US markets in particular. In this 
chapter we begin with the theoretical and empirical work 'as found' 
and then depart from it in specified directions related to the current 
study. In Section 1 the literature of the price volume relationship is 
reviewed, followed in Section 2 by that on the determinants of trading 
volume. In Section 3 an existing model of trade generation is extended 
and adapted to explain the behaviour of diversely motivated agents. 
This leads on to further discussion of market structures and investor 
behaviour in Chapter 5.
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Section 4.1; Research into the price-volume relation 
A thorough review of the price-volume relation is to be found in 
Karpoff [1987] on which the following discussion draws. We abstract 
what is relevant to smaller and thinner European markets, usually over 
longer time intervals than the hour or day, usually in fact monthly. 
Some insights remain of value to establish the importance of volume 
and its implications for trading based on information asymmetry.
Karpoff makes two significant observations about the quality of 
research into the price-volume relation. First, after reviewing 
findings that (a) there is no price-volume correlation, (b) that the 
correlations relate only volume and absolute price changes, (c) that 
they relate any volume and price change and (d) that volume is higher 
when prices increase than when they decrease, we have: "The reason for 
these seemingly inconsistent findings is that most tests are based on 
implicit assumptions that the price-volume relations are functional 
and monotonie....Thus, a researcher may find weak support for any of 
the above hypotheses and stop looking for the others, (op. cit. pl20). 
Elsewhere: "Is the theory that guides empirical work in this area 
adequate? The models reviewed in this paper sacrifice generality for 
tractability and this has led to some artificial behavioural 
classifications such as "optimists/pessimists" and "bulls/bears". An 
important but difficult area for further work in this area is to 
develop a theoretical understanding of markets that incorporate many 
diverse agents." (op. cit. p. 123).
The above represents a neat summary of the problem of analysing 
European markets where the fauna are not only diverse and not amenable 
to the representative agent approach, but one or another group often 
dominates. This is particularly true of banks, who do not figure in
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us markets to the extent they do in Europe. Their presence can distort 
the whole trading structure by its influence upon capital requirements 
as well as trade and position size . Under the heading ’tractability’ 
also falls a traditional preoccupation with equilibrium models that 
can be analysed for optimal solutions in an environment that is both 
linear and reductionist. To the extent that theory can help at all in 
the face of complex stochastic phenomena, the present study chooses a 
model environment of agents with complex motivations, acting through 
time, using assumptions that would be recognised by practitioners.
Market lore has it that (1) a small volume is most often accompanied 
by a fall in price (2) a large volume is usually accompanied by an 
increase in price (3) a large change in volume may be accompanied by 
either a large fall or a large increase in price. These are the basic 
empirical findings confirmed by many studies starting with Ying 
[1966]. The basic relationship found is a positive association between 
price variability as measured by the square of price change (to 
render all data positive) and trading volume. Ying’s results are 
further discussed below in section 4.2.
Some authors have interpreted price change as market response to new 
information and volume as a measure of the extent to which investors 
disagree about how to evaluate it (Richardson, Sefcik and Thompson,
[1986]). Beaver [1968] maintained that "(price tests) reflect changes 
in the market as a whole while (volume tests) reflect changes in the 
expectations of individual investors. Verrecchia [1981] examines this 
contention in some analytical detail, concluding however that "the 
degree of volume reaction to new information cannot be used to infer 
unambiguously the extent of agreement among investors about how that 
information should be pursued."
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The chief value of volume data therefore appears to lie in acting as a 
proxy for rates of information flow to investors that cannot be 
observed directly. This enhances its value as a trading tool, 
particularly when captured in detail by one trader in the form of 
order flow, especially if the information does not have to be 
published in detail. Stickel and Verrecchia [1994] have analysed the 
relationship empirically with some care. To present the bad news 
first, price prediction from volume information turns out to be 
feasible only within the bid-ask spread, where it has no arbitrage 
value. The so-called bid-ask bounce - transactions within the spread 
that contain no information (Roll [1984]) - also supplies noise to 
confuse meaningful price signals. More interestingly, Stickel and 
Verrecchia show that volume information allows price changes that flow
from genuine information to be distinguished from those that do not.
Investors seem to conclude that a price change supported by strong 
volume is likely to represent the activity of informed investors. The 
authors test this proposition with positive results using daily 
earnings announcements, coupled with the relevant trading data on the 
NASDAQ-National Market System (NASDAQ-NMS) in the period 1982-1990: 
that is to say since the first opening of the NMS. The study is
replicated on non-announcement days with similar results,
demonstrating robustness to other kinds of information arrivals. They 
conclude that without volume support, even large price changes do not 
reflect an underlying change in value and are typically partially or 
completely reversed on the next trading day.
Volume information can also provide an additional parameter to apply 
in using variance to estimate risk, as well as to resolve the well- 
known problem of leptokurticity in returns distributions where the
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efficient market hypothesis in any version would predict normally 
distributed returns. In the former case Carpenter and Upton [1981] 
have used a factor , m, the rate of information arrival, to adjust 
beta estimates for finite-time price adaptation. Trading volume is a 
proxy for m. Likewise, in the second case mentioned above, 
leptokurticity in returns distributions almost disappears when price 
changes are grouped by volume classes proxying for m (Clark, [1973]).
Other uses of volume data jointly with price data to improve empirical 
tests are reviewed by Karpoff [1987]. In particular Karpoff poses the 
interesting question: "Does the size of the market affect the price- 
volume relationship ? In the course of analysing price-volume 
relationships on speculative markets Tauchen and Pitts [1983] had 
already pointed out that if the volume of trade is trending strongly 
over a period, then a rise in the number of active traders involved 
can conceal the basic relationship between the square of price change 
and the trading volume: simply because more traders will generate more 
transactions by their presence. The data therefore need to be de­
trended where appropriate, to arrive at values that represent an 
underlying general level of activity with number of traders held 
constant. This is not particularly satisfactory, but the underlying 
situation is nevertheless entirely typical of smaller markets 
undergoing sporadic bursts of activity over short time periods. 
Messembinder and Seguin [1993] extend the evidence reviewed in Karpoff
[1987] for positive correlation in real time between trading volume 
and price volatility: they find that negative price shocks are 
generally associated with smaller volumes than are positive ones.
Kyle [1985] redefines volume as a measure of market depth, where depth 
is identified as the order flow that would be necessary to cause
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prices in a market to move by one unit. Depth is found to vary with 
the level of recent market activity using data of daily settlement 
prices, trading volumes and open interests stated on eight futures 
markets. This all lies a little way from our main focus, but the main 
result may be robust over longer time periods and in different 
markets. It is shown that unexpected volume shocks have a larger 
effect on price volatility than anticipated ones, an effect magnified 
when the shocks are positive.
An interesting result with potentially far-reaching implications for 
further research and applications in real-world markets is the 
conclusion drawn by Jones, Kaul and Lipson [1994] that the 
relationship between trading volume and market volume is dependent 
only on the number of trades involved and not on their size. Thus the 
volume of trading disguises the real operator by aggregation. No 
information is conveyed by the trade size itself. As the authors point 
out (op. cit. p. 645) "Our findings are quite contrary to the old Wall 
Street adage that "it takes volume to move prices.""
Theoretical models of the relation between volume and absolute price 
change have to consider trade size, but treat it differently according 
to whether they fall into the competitive or the strategic category, 
and draw their conclusions from overall volume rather than the number 
of trades. ’Strategic’ models often consider a monopolistically 
inclined informed trader who disguises his or her position by making 
several small trades rather than one large one (see most recently 
Foster and Vishwanathan [1990] or Kyle [1985] and Admati and 
Pfleiderer [1988]). In ’competitive’ models information asymmetry is 
considered as the relative precision of information held by informed 
as opposed to uninformed traders, with trade size positively
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correlated with information quality (Pfleiderer [1984] and others). 
Most recently Holden and Subrahmanyam [1992] have achieved a synthesis 
of the two model variants but retain the overall result that the size 
of trade matters, along with volume.
Jones, Kaul and Lipson [1994] used a purely empirical approach to 
contradict the above approaches, along with those of a number of other 
volume-oriented seekers after the information content of market 
events. Beaver [1968], Bamber [1986], Jain [1988], Morse [1981], 
Richardson, Sefcik and Thompson [1986] and Ziebart [1990] are cited as 
examples. Jones, Kaul and Lipson show that in nearly all cases the 
volume-volati1ity relation disappears when the relation between 
volatility and the number of transactions is controlled for. The data 
are daily trading volumes of NASDAQ and NMS securities over the period 
1986-1991. The average size of trade (total number of securities 
traded divided by daily transactions volume) retains statistical 
significance in association with absolute price change only for 
smaller firms: that is to say, only in normally thin markets. All 
results were insensitive to other possible measures of volume such as 
dollar value, number of shares traded or the turnover ratio (number of 
shares traded divided by those outstanding).
The Mixture of Distributions Hypothesis (MDH), which claims that 
volatility and volume are correlated only because a mixing variable in 
the form of information arrivals is related to them both, is 
sufficient to account for the relation normally posited. Jones, Kaul 
and Lipson [1994] point out that their results are validly interpreted 
by the MDH, but that it offers only a statistical rather than a valid 
economic explanation of events. Easley and O'Hara [1990] and Harris
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and Raviv [1993] invoke the number of bargains in asset price 
determination models, albeit using a standardised unit trade size, 
with the latter authors showing a positive correlation between number 
of trades and absolute price change.
None of the above cited studies seems to point to an obvious intuitive 
conclusion. Indeed a practical a priori assumption could be made in 
the absence of empirical evidence: unless traders know a great deal 
about the holdings of others, only the fact of a trade, and not its 
size, is information about potential returns that can be validly 
incorporated in the price. An attraction may be inferred by seeing a 
great number of people flocking to the ticket office, but its nature 
will not be revealed by observing how many tickets they each buy, 
particularly as, among the punters, there will always be ticket touts.
Section 4.2: The determinants of transaction volume
The study of the determinants of transactions volume, as opposed to 
the rôle of trading turnover in price formation and returns generation 
in securities markets, has a curious history. While real-world markets 
have shown dramatic growth, much theoretical work has concluded that 
trading volumes are likely to be small or nonexistent in equilibrium. 
Varian [1989] discusses the problem in detail. The empirical work of 
those who have concentrated on the determinants of volume has, as has 
been seen, produced results which are useful in short period (daily or 
intra-day) trading situations, but notably lacking in insights into 
longer-run phenomena and, least of all, in conclusions about the real 
origins of normal trading activity levels, as opposed to bubbles and 
other transient phenomena such as initial public offerings (IPOs).
Most recently the joint determination of price and volume has been
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favoured. Karpoff [1987] is typical "Empirical relations between 
prices and volume can help discriminate between differing hypotheses 
about market structure." op. cit. p. 109. The literature relevant to 
the origination of volume per se is reviewed below.
As, it may be argued, the lifeblood of the securities trading 
'industry' in the countries studied, all possible determinants of the 
level of activity are important and medium term considerations 
predominate over the short run. Insights into the future direction of 
turnover volume are of practical use for planning purposes and to 
identify entrepreneurial opportunities. Unlike price determination 
studies, useful results are unlikely to suffer the indignity of being 
traded out of existence on becoming known to the markets.
We approach the problem from three directions. First, in the course of 
reviewing this part of the literature, the work of those authors who 
have treated transactions volume as a major variable of interest are 
identified. Among these authors, those whose model formulations 
accommodate a richer market fauna than the representative agent and 
are capable of long run dynamic analysis, are considered in detail.
As a second stage, a promising model (Huffman [1992]) has been 
extended to take account of hypotheses developed in the course of this 
study and used to provide a background, although not a complete 
theoretical underpinning, for the analysis of the empirical data. The 
final goal is to explain the very large evolution of securities market 
transaction volumes that has taken place since the early 1970s.
4.2.1; Empirical research on the determinants of volume
Osborne [1959] was probably the first author to apply quantitive
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techniques to securities market trading, explaining trade volume as 
the means by which price changes and associated price relativities 
were 'diffused' across the market. Granger and Morgenstern [1963], 
using cross-spectral analysis, found that "the volume of shares 
transacted bears no discernable relationship to any conventional 
concept of supply or demand." despite certain correlations between 
volume and daily highs and lows. Charles Ying [1966] took similar 
data, namely daily NYSE closing prices and volumes on the S & P 500 
Index of common stocks (CM used individual transactions on two stocks 
only), to derive the opposite conclusion, namely that large increases 
in volume are accompanied by large price changes; that large volume 
levels are associated with price rises and small volumes with price 
declines. Crouch [1971] reported similar findings. These results are 
also in line with received market wisdom and explanations are to be 
found in a number of studies independently of the approach employed. 
Ho and Maoris [1985] for example, find continuous marking down by 
traders is a response to the holding cost of a long position in the 
absence of buying volume at current prices. Many studies have been 
criticised on grounds of the appropriateness of their data however 
(see Epps, [1975] and Karpoff [1987] who furnishes a succinct 
inventory of the genre). Epps' [1975] approach was the first to 
postulate a distinctive behavioural cause for the urge to trade, 
namely differences of expectations as to future prices ("bulls" and 
"bears") resulting in buying or selling volume respectively.
This line of argument has subsequently matured into the 'differences 
of opinion' explanation for trading, as opposed to differences in 
information or endowment, and is represented most recently by Hal 
Varian [1989]. Price change is understood to represent the market
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absorbing new information while volume indicates the measure of 
disagreement involved in doing so. It has been pointed out however 
that "it is difficult to think of a sensible theory with vastly 
different beliefs that are sustained over any period of time" (Chari, 
[1989]). Copeland [1986] took forward the 'diffusion* idea from 
Osborne [1959], this time in the context of the diffusion of 
information serially from trader to trader, with volume being 
generated in the process. Others have extended the model with 
inventory and speculative considerations.
Another approach, based on an abstract definition of traders’ 
collective behaviour is to be found in Epps and Epps [1976]. Here, 
traders are held to react differently to price changes for a single 
transaction according to the volume of the transaction: in this case 
they act simultaneously rather than serially. This assertion is 
contradicted by the empirical result of Jones, Kaul and Lipson [1994] 
already discussed. Although empirically supported, Epps and Epps' 
version of the "mixture of distributions" hypothesis is merely a 
return to the contradictions of price-volume linkage and difficulties 
of complexity discussed in the previous section. Over-concentration on 
price or attempting to make 'lumpy' return distributions (Clark 
[1973]) disappear has caused many researchers to stumble on arriving 
at real-world volume-related phenomena that destroy equilibrium 
solutions. For example, Tauchen and Pitts [1983] p. 504: "..our 
applied work suggests that if the volume of trading is strongly 
trended over the sample period, then the results of a price 
variability-volume study can be very misleading. A sharp rise in the 
number of traders can conceal most, and perhaps all of the relation 
between the squared price changes and the volume of trading."
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All this gives rise to considerable doubt about the true explanation 
of volume by price or price by volume or any single joint cause. We 
are in any case able to desert the field on grounds of inapplicability 
to the circumstances of small, heterogenously organised, although not 
necessarily inefficient, markets in Europe. One idea is retained from 
Tauchen and Pitts [1983] however and further developed in Carpenter 
and Upton [1981], namely that calendar time in a securities market is 
not relevant. Rather the rate of information arrivals, for which 
unobservable variable the transactions volume is the usual proxy, is 
to be taken as a measure of effective time. We further retain the 
conclusion of Karpoff (Karpoff, 1987, p. 121.) that "simultaneous 
large volumes and large price changes - either positive or negative - 
can be traced to their common ties to information flows." Where we 
differ perhaps is in attributing to information flows the degree of 
precision implied by the use of a short, neat term. Information flows 
end up in fact becoming, contradictorily, like Sir Julian Huxley's 
celebrated definition of God, "a symbol for man's residual ignorance". 
As Johnston [1991], p. 61, observes, "the inscrutable and the 
unknowable may be ascribed the properties most convenient for the 
current problem".
Some loose relationship of trading volume to the growth of information 
is nevertheless detectable in the longer run using monthly data in the 
European markets studied in detail in the next chapter. The scale and 
time invariance of the relationships among volume variables found 
there is noteworthy. A similar invariance in the structure of 
information flows may be postulated whereby complex, larger-scale 
phenomena are absorbed more slowly but in the same manner as the 
immediate news items which generate the well-studied dealings that
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arise in minutes or hours . By the same token, the information 
contained in market-clearing prices, although occasioning 
recontracting in the very short run (Grossman [1989]), may be held to 
contain a long run component. For instance when 'prices advance on a 
broad front* for several days or weeks, does this not convey 
information useful to inform the longer-term investment decisions of 
agents in a way that daily price movements cannot? Morse [1981] and 
Beaver [1968] offer evidence of the persistence of high volume after 
the information events that apparently gave rise to them have long 
passed. Karpoff [1987] (p.123) finds this "puzzling". The present 
author does not, particularly in view of the emerging possibility of 
non-linear dynamic responses to information flows in financial 
markets. If the present research affords evidence of scale and time 
invariance in price-volume and volume-volume relations over long 
periods in smaller markets, an interesting avenue for future research 
in the direction of grounding those relationships involved more firmly 
would seem to open up.
Section 4.3; A model for the generation of trading volume in 
securities
There is a contradiction between the diversity of information sets 
possessed by agents in some models and equilibrium in financial 
markets where all information is reflected in prices and hence known 
to all agents. There is therefore likely to be no trade in 
equilibrium. Huffman [1992] has attempted to construct an equilibrium 
model in which informed and uninformed agents trade and maximise their 
expected utility at equilibrium, but where exogenous shocks prevent 
the uninformed from obtaining perfect information. Trading takes place 
even at equilibrium and the volume of trade varies as the price of
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capital deviates from its expected value. This is consistent with 
market behaviour as observed by Karpoff [1987]. We are not in sympathy 
with the Huffman [1992] model as a useful description of the behaviour 
of agents in small European markets but find it convenient to adopt 
its utility function and other features in a model developed in the 
next section. The model also employs some assumptions used by the same 
author (Huffman [1987]) in the construction of a dynamic equilibrium 
capital asset pricing model (not directly relevant here) for its basic 
motivation to trade. Huffman's contribution to the final result below 
is therefore acknowledged, but we set off in a rather different 
direction in order to develop a simple model of the volume-related 
behaviour of agents in securities markets.
4.3.1: A model with homogenous agents diversely motivated bv life 
cycle stage
The assumptions of the model are that agents come into existence in 
time period tj with a fixed endowment of capital that is capable of 
yielding a dividend in each time period and a price on capital 
markets. The capital markets operate in a costless manner and have no 
intermediaries: agents trade freely if they wish to do so.
The agents are assumed to have an intertemporal substitution function 
with a risk-averse profile. In other words they are prepared to 
sacrifice present for future consumption as a decreasing function of 
present consumption and to maximise their utility by an appropriate 
choice between consumption in the present and future periods, the 
latter made possible by reinvesting the balance of their capital and 
dividend after present-period consumption to yield income and capital 
gains at a later date. The choices of a typical agent are modelled
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over his or her lifetime. Since continuous time simulation is used, 
agents at all stages of their life cycle, with differing levels of 
wealth and risk preference, will be active at any one time. Shuffling 
the ages randomly and summing these 'typical' agents produces cross- 
sectional heterogeneity.
Huffman suggests a two-period model of the form
1-p J [ l-P p>0, p#l (1)
where an appropriate choice of p in the basic expression component
yields a risk averse intertemporal substitution function of the form 
shown in Figure 1.
The term c^  in the full expression represents consumption in the tth 
period. The ec.-term is reserved for random preference shocks applied in 
the Huffman model and reproduced here only for documentation purposes. 
The superscript j represents the jth agent, again cited only for 
completeness.
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Figure 1 : INTERTEMPORAL SUBSTITUTION FUNCTION
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Figure 2: PRESENT AND FUTURE CONSUMPTION
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The relationship between present and future consumption is summarised 
in Figure (2) which shows that maximum consumption in period 2 would 
be achieved by drawing on the proceeds of capital Xj at a price of Pj 
after drawing interest upon it. Maximum consumption in period 2 
would be yielded by reinvesting this sum in its entirety, giving 
(xjrjrj/Pj) + (x^ rj): that is to say this period's interest converted to 
capital at the end-of-period price P, plus the existing capital x% 
left to accumulate interest during period 3.
The combined slope of these functions is therefore
 (2)
which after some elementary algebraic manipulation yields the much 
simpler relation
(3)
This by appropriate substitution, simplification of terms and dropping 
the #t-term and superfluous superscripts, gives a new expression
,1-p
1-p
(1 + ^ )
1-p
1-P
 (4)
where the optional power^  n,allows a multi-period interval of forward
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substitution if required. This is an addition to the Huffman model 
which amplifies the urge to invest but does not change the 
relationship. If n is set to one, agents do not get rich very quickly 
under most assumptions.
Simplifying the terms in a way that allows easy computation and 
differentiation with respect to consumption in period 2 we obtain
{TM-TC)^
-R  R ....
In any two-period pair, utility is maximised by setting the derivative 
of (2) to zero.
c^-^-r(77f-rc) ‘^^ =o____(6)
This yields the basis for proceeding to the next period, at which 
point we depart from the Huffman [1992] model by exploring the 
behaviour of agents through time as their wealth and age increases.
The methodology is thus continuous simulation of utility-maximising 
behaviour through time. The relevant time is the lifespan of an 
individual agent during which period risk preferences change with a 
rising level of wealth and the approaching end of life. This 
characterisation of an individual agent may also, very conveniently, 
be extrapolated to the general population, given that the average age 
of the population in most countries is rising due to demographic 
change and the first fortunes made in the post-war period are falling 
into the hands of an inheriting generation.
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Agents construct a portfolio with a low risk and a high-risk asset 
which combine to give the maximum return consistent with acceptable 
levels of risk, eventually actually setting aside assets in trust for 
descendants or to endow a worthy cause. Some general assumptions are 
made about the lifetime risk acceptance/aversion profile. These are 
made in a relative rather than an absolute sense: in other words a 
risk-averse agent would be able to vary his or her risk without 
actually becoming risk-accepting as such - hence the generally upward- 
concave substitution function.
Young, not-rich agents are assumed to be more risk averse on the 
ground that risking their patrimony would risk their entire income. As 
they become richer and have both a higher level of consumption and 
more wealth to fall back on they become less risk-averse. Finally, 
when rich, they again become risk-averse, preferring to sleep at 
nights rather than add to already substantial wealth by risky 
investment. In the final phase risk aversion is allowed to increase 
without limit. This function involves discarding high-risk assets and 
represents endowing descendants or causes with assets before death. We 
do not treat the case of agents who consume capital towards the end of 
their life with a strategy of matching maximum total consumption to 
life expectation (see Huffman [1987] p.145).
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Figure 3: LIFETIME CONSUMPTION, INVESTMENT, TRADING
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The lifetime profile of such an agent is exhibited in Figure 3. The 
results are the output of a QUICKBASIC program (UTILVEST.BAS: see 
Appendix 2) which maximises the utility of consumption and investment 
using (6) in each period to arrive at wealth and age-adjusted risk 
preferences. These give rise to a required rate of return in each 
period. That in turn is realised by partitioning wealth into a two- 
asset portfolio based on a high risk/high return asset (the ’equity’ 
component) and a low risk/low return asset (the ’bond’ component). 
Figure 3. therefore exhibits the mix of the agent’s portfolio and 
shows in addition total assets, total consumption and the required 
rate of return. Endowment is represented by the difference between 
capital at the peak of wealth and the remaining holdings of bonds and 
equity. It may be asserted that agents would in fact always wish to 
increase their capital in order to leave a maximal inheritance: this 
is a risky strategy since the date of death cannot be predicted and 
inheritance taxes may supervene at any time, hence the common practice 
of consigning wealth to trusts at an early date.
The volume of trading which results purely from portfolio growth and 
asset switching is shown as the bottom line of Figure 3. It is not 
difficult to see that the addition of Huffman’s information shocks, as 
well as a range of economic factors that tend to vary the yield gap 
between equity and bond returns would all further increase trading 
volume.
A similar exercise is attempted from the supply side using the simple 
paradigm of a company that grows from a small size in a finite market. 
Its real rate of return is postulated to fall with growth over time, 
either because it comes to exhaust market demand or because rivals
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enter the industry. In this model, business risk is represented by 
historically reducing margins (a valid contemporary phenomenon). 
Further risk is incorporated for gearing levels and interest cover 
which has the prudential effect of limiting bond issuance. Business 
risk has the effect of increasing the dividend requirement.
Figure 4. shows the balance sheet structure of the firm in terms of 
equities and fixed interest debt assumed to take the form of 
debentures. This is in response to the changing total risk profile 
illustrated at the top and gives rise to securities market trading 
(including, in this case, primary issues and bonus issues) illustrated 
on the bottom line. The model is schematic and the parameters used may 
be perused in the QUICKBASIC listing already referred to. Its 
development proved instructive however in that a wide variety of 
parameterisat ions resulted in a stable, sensible capital structure, 
which nevertheless implied continuous changes in the gearing level to 
respond to the current relationship between total risk and real 
return. Adjusting their gearing level in response to changes in risk 
and return in real markets is, it may be asserted, the ultimate 
motivation for securities market activity by commercial firms.
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Figure 4: LONG TERM CORPORATE TRADING
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Conclusion
The motivation for developing the model extension presented in this 
chapter has been to demonstrate that trading volume can be generated 
by normal investment and issuance needs: in the first case through 
portfolio adjustment throughout the individual agent’s life cycle and, 
in the second, by gearing adjustments required in response to changes 
in business fundamentals. It is of course possible to envisage a 
general equilibrium model based on both the supply and demand sides of 
securities markets as represented by the two models described above. 
This is left for a future development.
The result obtained contrasts with the thrust of some of the evidence 
presented in the literature reviewed earlier in the chapter, namely 
that the existence of trading volume is difficult to explain. It 
should also be noted that there has been no need to refer to the 
price-volume relationship discussed at the beginning of the chapter, 
since this is essentially a short term phenomenon. On the other hand, 
one should be aware that trends are often established as a result of 
initial impulses. Short term volume increases, exogenously induced by 
whatever means, can operate to establish a longer-term higher level of 
trading. Evidence for this is considered in Chapter 6 and elsewhere, 
for example in the context of the effect of one-time market reforms 
upon the volume of transactions.
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CHAPTER 5: MARKET STRUCTURES AND INVESTOR BEHAVIOUR 
INTRODUCTION
The behaviour of broking firms in smaller financial markets is a 
complex mixture of price and nonprice competition, collusion and 
observance of ’territories’. Occasional breaches of accepted practice 
and fresh outbreaks of competitive behaviour are characteristic, often 
induced by the appearance of new entrants, mergers and changes in 
market and regulatory structures.
The markets chosen for study are small, volatile and subject to the 
pressures of emergence and transformation. This fact militates against 
a reductionist approach in analysing the forces at work, particularly 
as regards seeking competitive equilibria based on pure price 
competition. Price competition between small numbers of firms, based 
on the Bertrand and Cournot duopoly models is often referred to in the 
literature on financial markets but, for the reasons given above, is 
not dealt with here.
The tool chosen for analysis in this case is the theory of imperfect 
competition that may be traced back to Alfred Marshall [1920] but best 
developed in Chamberlin [1933] whose analysis is followed below.
In the rest of the chapter we examine markets and the securities 
broking industry in terms of their microstructure and consider 
investor behaviour. In all cases the aim has to be the extraction of 
useful insights into the behaviour of European markets examined from a 
literature dominated by north American thought and practice. Direct 
evidence from European markets is presented in section 5.4.
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5.1: The securities broking industry under imperfect competition 
The key to this form of competition is product differentiation, 
whereby suppliers of a product or service maintain elements of 
monopoly by incorporating unique features, protected by patents, 
trademarks, copyright or difficulty of reproduction. They are however 
exposed to competition from rivals with similar but not exactly 
identical offerings. A producer is enabled to maintain a price 
differential and monopoly profits that correspond in size to the 
unwillingness of his customer, at the margin, to defect and meet most 
of his or her requirements elsewhere. The utility to the consumer of 
the unique, as opposed to generic features of the product or service 
will determine exactly what price differential can be maintained.
In Chamberlin's (1933) analysis only a short run equilibrium is built 
on price discretion and may be observed. The long run equilibrium is 
achieved by entry and exit of firms, yielding an industry with stable 
numbers and modest profits. This is less easy to observe in small 
markets but is intuitively acceptable to market participants in 
smaller centres, as was revealed by the results of interviews and 
discussions.
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Figure 1 : THE SHORT RUN
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The model is based on the difference between observed demand, the 
locus d°d® in Figure 1. and hypothetical demand dd^  for a firm's 
product, the hypothetical component being a firm's estimation of 
demand for its product provided competitors do not change their 
prices. This demand will not be perfectly elastic, even in the 
presence of a large number of firms, because of the ability to 
differentiate products and for price changes to have an impact that is 
imperceptible at the level of the industry. A price p^  is therefore 
adopted, equating marginal cost with marginal revenue on dd\.
All firms rationally follow suit, causing output to fall from to Qj 
at price pj on the observed demand curve. The hypothetical demand 
curve has now shifted to d^ jd^ j. Equilibrium is only achieved where the 
hypothetical marginal revenue curve intercepts the marginal cost curve 
and d'^jd^'j crosses d°d°.
This equilibrium may be seen to be unstable however, since it will not 
be maintained if the intercept price at d^ jd^ j, d°d° is above or below 
average cost at this point, entraining gains that can be competed for 
by new entrants or losses that will force eventual exit from the 
industry.
A long run equilibrium is only furnished by exits and entries yielding 
the solution seen in Figure 2. where average cost, individual firms' 
hypothetical demand and observable demand all meet at a point which 
must, by construction, be a tangent to the average cost curve at an 
output level less than that which would yield minimum average cost.
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Figure 2: THE LONG RUN
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We therefore expect to observe competition characterised by 
discretionary pricing, with exits and entries leading to the formation 
of a stable stockbroking 'industry' over a sufficiently long period 
undisturbed by shocks or strong exogenous influences.
Where pricing is not discretionary in the short run, in other words 
where a regime of fixed commission rates obtains and is effectively 
enforced, then nonprice competition based on services may be expected. 
This has been demonstrated by Shepard [1975] in the case of the US 
securities brokerage industry based around the New York Stock 
Exchange. The economic loss of efficiency involved was expressed in 
the form of a range of service provision which tended to exceed the 
requirements of many clients. The system was of course swept away in 
the major 1975 reform which subsequently served as a model for London 
and others.
5.2: Dealership versus auction markets and the role of market making
5.2.1.: Price Discovery
We follow Schreiber and Schwarz in Amihud, Ho and Schwarz [1985] p.19, 
and many others in maintaining that price discovery is the primary 
function of a securities market, and that the physical processes of 
matching buy and sell orders merely show by their complexity that it 
is no simple matter to find the correct price at which trading should 
take place. Trading arrangements should be seen as an important 
ancillary to the price discovery process. Excessive competition, for 
example, can induce traders to break up the flow of orders to hide the 
information it is capable of revealing, so making it difficult for the 
true market-clearing price to be found.
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Efficient price discovery is important because trading costs and the 
variability of demand from investors cause the prices at which markets 
clear to vary unceasingly. Transactions priced on the basis of order 
flow will not in general reflect equilibrium values. Schreiber and 
Schwarz [1985] show for example that short period price changes within 
a single trading day would significantly alter the rate of return on a 
stock held for one year, according to when, during the trading day, it 
was traded at each end of the holding period. The effect, commonly 
plus or minus 10% on the return over the year, is well outside what 
would be expected from a normal, information induced change.
Ho, Schwarz and Whitcomb [1985] produce results suggesting that 
theoretically desirable equilibrium prices can only be achieved over 
an extended trading period, either continuous or passing through a 
number of rounds. Effective price discovery is nevertheless 
indispensable, because equities do not have any intrinsic value 
derived from elsewhere. Investor demand for different risk/return 
classes is not stable and trading is not a friction-free process. 
Continuity of trading, low transaction costs and easily available 
information are therefore all equally important attributes of any 
market. This conclusion is broadly supported by the present research 
as well as anecdotal evidence from many financial centres. For 
instance the relationship between individual stock returns and the 
market index is usually strong when measured at monthly or longer 
intervals, but becomes progressively weaker as shorter time intervals 
are selected, suggesting that time is required to establish a correct 
price.
Bagehot [1971] was the first to analyse market microstructure from an 
economic point of view and also the first to make the distinction 
between information and liquidity trading. The rôle of the specialist
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in US markets is interesting, since variants of this role are to be 
found in European markets, albeit informally and in fragmented forms 
in most cases. The specialist may:
(1) set the spread, but provide immediacy only as a passive accepter 
of orders at the quoted price (see also Demsetz [1968]).
(2) as an entrepreneur making profit at the expense of liquidity 
traders and losing out to informed traders (see also Copeland and 
Galai [1983]).
(3) as an inventory trader for whom the spread is an opportunity to 
improve the inventory position towards an optimal value (see also 
Smidt [1971]).
This group of perspectives is also discussed by Barnea [1975] and puts 
the dealer in control of spreads and the provision of liquidity to the 
market. In this study we are less concerned with inventory 
considerations than with the existence of limit orders. This is 
because, under European conditions, dealing inventory is difficult to 
distinguish from portfolio holdings by the major banks. The use of 
public limit orders to provide competition, although less well 
developed than in the US, is a more practical policy option than that 
of a system of specialist inventory-holding quasi-monopolist dealers. 
Public limit orders are also an information-oriented, transparency- 
increasing measure. Techniques and systems rather than privileged 
participants also represent movement in the direction of process and 
away from institutions, argued for elsewhere.
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5.2,2 Liquidity, immediacy and inventory
Considering markets which are not well supported by trading, Schreiber 
and Schwarz [1985] give three definitions of illiquidity, all linked 
to the reasonableness of established prices:
1. Where price volatility renders the convertibility of an asset into 
cash uncertain.
2. Where an investor with large holdings cannot change his or her 
position without moving the price.
3. Where actual market prices do not bear a consistent relation to 
those that would prevail if trading were frictionless, that is to 
say without transactions costs, information costs or inventory 
costs.
The last of the above definitions applies to the market as a whole.
The first two apply to individual stocks.
Schreiber and Schwarz [1985] further show that market design 
influences the degree to which prices approach equilibrium, largely 
through the extent to which markets create liquidity, as defined by 
the liquidity ratio, namely the value of shares traded for every one 
per cent change in the share’s price. The larger is this ratio, the 
more liquid the market may be considered to be. This is purely a 
demand and supply ratio however and says nothing about price movements 
induced by information. If new information arrives, the number of 
trades required to move the market to a new price level is a measure 
of efficiency. The fewer the trades required to move the price to its 
new value, the more informationally efficient is that market. The 
liquidity ratio is thus to some extent only a measure of the degree of
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instability of prices and has therefore to be treated with some 
caution according to the circumstances which apply and the use to 
which it is put.
A market maker supplies immediacy as defined by Demsetz [1968] when he 
or she offers prices without seeing orders. This implies the market 
maker taking risk and holding inventory, a service paid for in the 
bid-ask spread. Cohen, Maier, Schwarz and Whitcomb (CMSW) [1979] have 
reviewed the literature on market makers as suppliers of immediacy. 
Amihud and Mendelson [1980] and Mildenstein and Schleef [1983] and 
others demonstrate that a market maker's price setting is largely 
based on inventory considerations. Stoll [1978a] and Ho and Stoll 
[1981] view inventory as a portfolio held unwillingly and although the 
size of the spread is largely independent of the inventory position, 
it does reflect return variance in the stocks held. It is therefore a 
reward for risk taking in inventory. The spread is also influenced by 
the information asymmetries already described in Section 3.3.3 and 
further discussed in the next section.
5.2.3 Market structures
Biais [1993] has analysed the structure of fragmented (telephone and 
electronic) markets and their centralised (floor or pit with open 
outcry) counterparts for differences in price formation, liquidity and 
numbers of dealers. In centralised markets the traders are market 
makers or processors of limit orders, whereas in fragmented markets 
they are dealers. Following Ho [1983] and Ho and Stoll [1984] it is 
considered that, in centralised markets, dealers can observe their 
colleagues' trades and infer their inventories with some accuracy. In 
a fragmented market, even where the quotes displayed are firm (in SEAQ 
alpha stocks, French OAT bonds and NASDAQ equities for example) it is 
not actually possible to infer the prices at which trades take place,
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since they may be negotiated over the telephone within the quoted 
spread. It is also difficult to use behavioural cues such as level of 
activity to infer selling or buying pressure dictated by the need to 
optimise inventories for the prevailing market conditions. For 
exeimple, an informed trader in an open outcry market can see his or 
her price immediately 'shaved' by a not necessarily well-informed 
neighbour (this is the reason that the 'tick', a well defined minimum 
price step, is used to protect specialist dealers from fine 
undercutting on the New York Stock Exchange), whereas the telephone 
trader cannot be so observed.
Schreiber and Schwarz [1985] also discuss the consolidation of order 
flow, meaning, in effect, the exposure of all orders to the market, in 
the context of the NYSE specialist system. We must ask whether 
consolidation is possible and desirable without specialists. The 
question is an important one for small European markets since (a) the 
number of markets with specialists is small and diminishing and (b) 
the tradition of a market, or that of its neighbours or advisers 
involved in setting up new trading arrangements, may render a system 
of specialists unacceptable, whatever its merits. It may well also be 
the case that specialists impose more costs than they generate 
benefits. The alternative is the full and clear exposure of the order 
flow on trading screens, perhaps accompanied by additional analysis of 
trends and movement summaries.
Ho and Maoris [1985] point out that the dealer-based NASDAQ market 
making system is greatly different from that operated on most European 
exchanges. Against the obvious benefit of the ability of dealers to 
enter and leave the market without hindrance and for stocks to be 
traded by one or more dealers, equally for individual dealers to deal
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in any number of stocks they wish, must be set the basic trading rule 
of the NASDAQ system that dealers must offer firm quotes on any orders 
coming to them. Thus the basis of competition is the capture of order 
flow. It may be argued that competition based on the capture of order 
flow in smaller national markets may lead to the same problem that 
exists there already, namely its retention by large financial 
institutions able to benefit from trading both on the knowledge gained 
from the order flow and by such techniques as recouping on a 
manipulated spread what is lost on a shaved commission, and vice 
versa. Ho and Maoris also point out that the float in a stock, usually 
determined by corporate management at the time of issue, is an 
important determinant of the stock's trading characteristics. 
Competition based on order flow capture would naturally tend to focus 
on the heavily traded stocks with a large float, leading to the 
neglect of others.
NASDAQ market makers bear costs that auction dealers do not, in 
particular inventory. As well as the financing cost of holding 
inventory, dealers must bear the price risk of unanticipated price 
changes and must be prepared to offer quotes to other traders and to 
investors who are better informed than they are, and who will trade 
against the market maker. Time is the fundamental determinant of 
inventory cost and the thinner the market, the longer a dealer will 
take to turn over his or her inventory. This is a severe inhibiting 
factor on small dealers thinking of trading thin stocks. In a large 
enough market, dealers can control excess or inadequate inventory by 
dealing with each other. Market makers can protect themselves against 
the vagaries of the order flow by limiting the size of the 
transactions they are prepared to entertain at the current quote and,
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by adjusting the quote as required, avoid having too much or too 
little stock on their books. These are unlikely to be available 
options in a very small market, or may put small dealers in debt to 
large portfolio-holding institutions who are also competing as dealers 
as is the case with European banks. Inventory costs, particularly in 
the presence of asymmetric information,have been examined in detail by 
Glosten and Milgrom [1982] and Copeland and Galai [1983].
What of auction markets? The periodic call auction has been the most 
typical market in Europe before the reforms and technological changes 
of the late 1980s. Their form and evolution is examined in Chapters 7- 
10. Until work on the microstructure of markets began to reveal extra 
complexities, the marketmaker in an auction market was assumed to be a 
Walrasian auctioneer with sufficient information to ensure that 
transaction prices were set equal to fundamental prices. In other 
words, between the beginning and the end of a trading session prices 
might fluctuate with dealing activity but at the end would remain 
unchanged at the fundamental price in the absence of new information.
At one extreme of the call auction market is the automatic order 
processing system, where the market maker is in effect a computer 
collating orders. Such a market has been analysed by Ho, Schwarz and 
Whitcomb [1985] (HSW), who show that, because orders arrive 
anonymously and are batched without public disclosure; because 
recontracting cannot occur; because additional orders to balance the 
market cannot be solicited and because the market maker cannot enter 
orders for his or her own account, this type of market can generate 
trading strategies that may induce increased price instability. In 
other words transaction prices may deviate increasingly from 
fundamental prices. Both of the preceding examples also fail to take
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account of the rational expectations equilibrium (Grossman [1981], 
where, because the market price aggregates all available information, 
the fact of being able to observe the resultant price causes investors 
to want to trade again. The market may have cleared on the first 
auction, but it has generated the desire to trade again. Recontracting 
is the key problem of periodic call auction markets. The disclosure of 
orders as they are submitted would help traders to work out the likely 
market clearing price and possibly place additional orders. The 
problem created by this possibility however is that everyone, in 
wishing to see everyone else’s orders, would wait until the last 
possible moment before placing their own. As a third possibility, if 
the marketmaker is an involved auctioneer, able to accumulate orders 
and observe imbalances, then it is possible for such an auctioneer to 
use the advantage of seeing the order flow to ensure that imbalances 
are eliminated. In practice however this is done by allowing the 
marketmaker to trade for his or her own account. The ability to do 
this profitably creates once again competition for order flow, leading 
potentially to its capture by one or more of a small group of powerful 
financial institutions.
If trading is continuous, the information contained in price changes 
is made available to the market at all times and recontracting can 
occur at will. Ho and Stoll [1983] show that limit orders placed by 
investors in possession of information in a market where there is no 
market maker in effect carry out the same function as the bid and ask 
spread in a dealership market.
A periodic call auction may provide a disincentive to increased 
trading volume by the mechanical nature of its operation. For example, 
in several markets, such as Zurich until recent (1994) reforms,
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multiple trading rings are required to divide the market into 
manageable segments. Brokers need to deploy more floor personnel; a 
problem mentioned during interviews in Lisbon; and there is a general 
lack of apparent immediacy in trading. A possible merit of periodic 
call is the use of delay to ensure that information is revealed in the 
prior placement of orders. An example of this is when, in continuous 
markets, a severe imbalance of orders suspected to be caused by 
information asymmetry occasions a trading halt and initiates a call 
auction at the restart. It is notable however that, in practice, 
markets such as Copenhagen which have adopted continuous double sided 
auction, without market makers, in association with the introduction 
of electronic trading, rarely if ever have need for trading halts. 
Quantum turnover volume increases have also occurred following the 
move to continuous trading.
A market maker may be considered an active price stabiliser if his or 
her behaviour is to anticipate price trends and trade ahead of them, 
thus moving the price towards the (anticipated) correct fundamental 
value. Stoll [1976] found that in general market makers did not behave 
as active price stabilisers. The somewhat different view that market 
makers are destabilising (see, for example, Ney, [1970]) is a popular 
view rather than one supported by research, or indeed regulatory 
policy. It finds some echo in the practice of many exchanges, 
including newly formed ones in central Europe, to limit price 
movements within the day, typically to 5% or 10%. For reasons of 
viability in the markets considered in this study we are inclined to 
prefer a fully transparent continuous auction market with a public 
limit order book and no market makers. Here traders possessing varying 
amounts of information trade against each other and the implied spread 
is represented by the prices bid and offered stated in limit orders.
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5.3: The behaviour of investors
There have been many attempts to explain investor behaviour at the 
theoretical level. In Chapter 4 an attempt was made to demonstrate one 
aspect of investor behaviour, namely the propensity to trade itself. 
More complete approaches have used utility theory. Utility theory (Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern [1947]) proceeds from the assertion that 
investors are risk-averse, wealth-maximizing, rational and able to 
compute the choices before them, however complicated the probability 
structures upon which they are predicated. Empirical research 
discussed below has tended to show that support can be found only for 
the first two attributes.
5.3.1. The Wharton Survey
Blume and Friend [1978] were commissioned by the Twentieth Century 
Fund to study the investment patterns of individual US retail 
investors. The survey analysis is still well-regarded today (Nagy and 
Obenberger [1994]) but predates a great deal of work in Behavioural 
Finance (see Kahnemann and Tversky [1979, 1982] and Statman and 
Caldwell [1987] as well as utility theory based empirical studies such 
as Baker, Hargrove and Haslem [1977].
Blume and Friend show that analyses of market aggregates and the price 
behaviour of individual issues going back as far as 1928 carried out 
as part of their study show no evidence of the growing role of 
institutions affecting market efficiency and no particular economic 
reason for encouraging greater relative participation by the 
individual investor. A direct 'classical' utility-based wealth 
maximisation motive underlying most investor behaviour is established.
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This evidence of shareholders’ behaviour and intentions is confirmed 
in a more recent survey of retail investors by Nagy and Obenberger 
[1994], based on information from 137 experienced retail investors 
with holdings in Fortune 500 firms, who responded to a detailed 
questionnaire asking for direct responses to developments in 34 
investment variables classified as to "act upon", "consider" or have 
"no influence". Wealth maximising factors predominated over 
behavioural factors as the focus of investors’ attention.
In the Wharton survey 45% of respondents used earnings volatility as 
their measure of stock risk while 30% used price volatility. The 
authors note that this is at odds with the normal academic studies 
which typically rely on past price fluctuations or on market returns 
to measure risk. Investors seem to rely more heavily on past earnings 
volatility for this purpose. It is evident however that private 
investors do not like fluctuations. 65% of respondents said they would 
be less likely to buy or hold a stock that fluctuated a great deal for 
no discernable reason. Upward movements would have much less effect on 
their opinion than downward movements. The SEC measures volatility 
within a month by the interquartile range of the percentage changes in 
the value of the market as defined by the daily close of Standard and 
Poors Composite Index (op.cit. p.161).
The authors of the Wharton Survey work also find that institutions are 
generally loath to exercise influence over management and prefer to 
sell out if they dislike a situation; still an important current 
issue.
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5.3.2: Spatial preference in equity investment
The tendency for equity investors in particular to possess a natural 
spatial preference is referred to in the empirical part of this study 
as their 'horizon', since this was the term used in discussion with 
interviewees. This natural hypothesis was confirmed by the responses 
received and indeed regarded as a perfectly ordinary and accepted 
phenomenon, used among other things for promoting wider share 
ownership with slogans analagous to 'I'm backing Britain'. In the 
financial markets literature the phenomenon is termed 'home bias' but 
has resisted a number of attempts to account for it in economic, 
informational or market structure terms.
Cooper and Kaplanis [1994] review the evidence and construct a model 
of their own, with negative results. They find that home bias cannot 
be accounted for by two of the principal candidates, inflation hedging 
(Adler and Dumas [1983] and Stulz [1981a]) or the costs of 
international investment (Black [1974], Stulz [1981b], Cooper and 
Kaplanis [1986]). The authors directly tested observable portfolio 
holdings against the predictions of a model in which investors in many 
countries attempt to maximise returns using a portfolio which includes 
a component to hedge domestic inflation. Inflation risk, induced in 
part because investors in different countries are constrained to 
consume different bundles of goods, is expressed as deviation of the 
exchange rate of a currency from purchasing power parity (PPP).
Earlier contributors to the literature (Eldor, Pines and Schwarz
[1988] and Stockman and Dellas [1989]) considered the rôle of non­
traded goods in inducing investors to adopt a home bias as protection 
against price uncertainty in this sector. French and Poterba [1991] 
assume greater 'optimism' on the part of domestic as against foreign 
investors. This factor certainly has some support from the empirical
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research carried out for the present study: not generally expressed 
as 'optimism', but as 'greater certainty' about how to evaluate good 
or bad news emanating from firms and information-producing agencies.
Statman and Caldwell [1987] have shown that properly diversified 
portfolios with significant home bias can nevertheless earn similar 
returns to the universal 'market' portfolio. Table (1) summarises 
empirical data from a number of countries and indicates the importance 
of the phenomenon.
Table 1. HOME BIAS IN NATIONAL EQUITY PORTFOLIOS
COUNTRY
DOMESTIC
MARKET CAPITALISATION 
AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
as at December 1987
PERCENTAGE OF EQUITY 
PORTFOLIO IN
EQUITY
France 2.6 64.4
Italy 1.9 91.0
Japan 43.7 86.7
Spain 1.1 94.2
Sweden 0.8 100.0
UK 10.3 78.5
USA 36.4 98.0
Germany 3.2 75.4
TOTAL 100.0
source: Cooper and Kaplanis [1994]
5.3.3.: Investor preferences, life cycles and risk aversion
A conjectural 'investor's life-cycle' model for the generation of 
trading volume was developed in Chapter 4. Supporting empirical 
evidence is supplied by Cohn, Lewellen, Lease and Schlarbaum [1975] 
who find that in general risk aversion increases with the wealth of 
investors. LeBaron, Parrelly and Gula [1992] have since found a wider
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range of factors that might be responsible, not all of them rational 
in a utility or wealth-maximising sense, but commonsensical in the 
context of the investor's individual circumstances. Barnewell [1987] 
offers a psychographic explanation of investor behaviour while Warren, 
Stevens and McConkey [1990] consider demographic and lifestyle 
factors. Both are perhaps difficult to translate to a non-North- 
American environment. Riley and Chow [1992] come closest to the 
rationale espoused in the extended Huffman model of Chapter 4. They 
conclude that increasing income, wealth, age and education all 
contribute to a lowering of risk aversion. Once investors have reached 
the goal of satisfying their consumption needs, represented by the 
convergence of consumption to a stable level in the model of Chapter 
4., they may be considered free to consider the longer term, including 
transfer to the next generation. Gunthorpe and Levy [1994] provide 
support for this proposition, finding that optimal portfolios change 
"drastically and systematically with changes in holding period" (op. 
cit. p. 51.). The further out the investor's horizon, the greater is 
the proportion of low-risk assets that should be incorporated in the 
portfolio, even if, in a strict analysis, returns are held to be 
independent over time and stationary.
5.4: Evidence and models from European securities markets 
In this section we seek to bridge the gap between the focus of the 
literature and that of the empirical research. In doing so it has 
proved necessary to create several new models of market structure and 
behaviour that may be held to characterise the evolution of European 
securities markets specifically.
If European markets as a whole, or particular individual centres, 
offered a radically different profile, that would constitute an
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opportunity to diversify away risk or earn excess returns. The iron 
law of markets, that gains are traded away and cannot subsist once 
known about, would obtain. The centre involved would suffer or benefit 
from investor attention until its returns were roughly in line with 
others, all relevant factors (such as tax, local inflation and 
currency parities) being equal. This is what is, in fact, observed.
We first review the evidence for returns generation, then, in section
5.4.2, discuss international investor interest followed by large-scale 
phenomena such as convergence and European regulatory integration. 
Euromarkets and international equity issues. Throughout, some examples 
are drawn from the London market but, as is made clear, only where 
relevant to smaller markets. London cannot be considered, for most 
purposes, a typical European market. In section 5.4.3, the prospective 
influence of financial innovation is briefly reviewed.
Section 5.4.4 onward is devoted to discussion of terminology, 
definitions and models which have proved useful in the empirical work 
of Part II.
5.4.1: Phenomena and evolution of European markets.
A comprehensive review of the behaviour of European markets is to be 
found in Hawanini and Michel (1984). Many of the surveys reported 
there employ data from the 1970s and earlier when, as has been clearly 
shown elsewhere, the whole climate of securities trading was 
different. Paradoxically this is of little importance however.
Hawanini and Michel confirm that as regards prices and returns 
generation, the behaviour of European markets is surprisingly similar 
to that of American markets. In particular they are informationally 
efficient, often exhibiting strong-form efficiency as well as
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responding similarly to American markets in tests against standard 
asset pricing models. Later studies continue to confirm these basic 
results.
Hawanini and Michel thus establish that there is probably not a great 
deal more to be learned by further geographical extension of price and 
returns behaviour studies. They are reticent on volume however, 
leaving the field clear for efforts to secure a satisfactory 
explanation of the great general increase in trading volume and 
volatility observed in the 1980s.
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) cannot be rejected for 
European markets, but "the evidence in favour of this pricing model is 
usually rather weak" (op. cit. p.11). On the other hand the 
leptokurtic distribution of stock prices, held anyway by other authors 
to be evidence for underlying weakness in the CAPM is entirely similar 
to that on the NYSE. Hence investors should be expected:
(a) to behave rationally in seeking to maximise returns in line with 
expectations formed partly out of price information, and/or,
(b) to exhibit 'herd' characteristics and short term speculative 
behaviour leading to the formation of bubbles and periodic collapses, 
and/or,
(c) to exhibit a mixture of all these things plus elements of dynamic 
response to prior period outcomes and 'market memory' phenomena.
Hawanini and Michel find it a "peculiar situation" (op. cit. p.54) 
that banks in Europe have simultaneous access to both markets and
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information about their customers that could be useful in investment 
decision making. In purely numerical terms American practice in 
separating banking from securities trading is in fact the more 
peculiar phenomenon, but the difference has enormous implications for 
comparisons of market structure and behaviour, as well as for policy 
models of markets suitable for emerging economies.
Section 5.4.2: Large-scale market evolution
We now examine larger scale evolutionary processes affecting 
securities markets in Europe. With one exception they tend to act in 
the direction of deregulation and de-restriction at the national 
level. The exception is the European Commission Directives that affect 
all markets, but not equally. Of the markets considered in this study, 
those not already European Union members or candidate members, have 
all expressed an interest in eventual EU membership. Prospective 
candidates have tended to behave in approximately the same way as 
existing or candidate members, modelling their policies on the 
requirements they hope eventually to have to meet.
5.4.2.1; Foreign interest in European markets
A particular reason for increased international interest in smaller 
European markets lies in their relatively low levels of informational 
efficiency. With the stubborn exception of so-called *time-arbitrage*
- the ability to exploit known differences in the volume of activity, 
and hence information that affects prices, at various times of day, 
after trading breaks (Goodhart, [1988]) and seasonally - there remain 
few opportunities to exploit inefficiencies in the dissemination of 
information in larger markets. The introduction of new instruments
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that are, for a time, imperfectly understood, even within efficient 
markets, has offered opportunities to exploit informational 
inefficiencies, but opportunities to develop new instruments in 
existing established markets have now largely been exploited. Even 
leasing and student loans receivables have been securitised and ever- 
wider ranges of derivative instruments continue to appear (ECON 
[1993]/2). The overall relatively inefficient developing markets now 
create the best circumstances for sophisticated foreign investors to 
compete for excess returns based on superior powers of information 
processing and analysis.
In moving the focus from large, mainly north American markets to small 
European ones it is necessary to identify the level at which 'the 
market' is pitched for the purpose of identifying risk diversification 
opportunities. The components of systematic risk can be analysed by 
using multiple indexes. These may represent world markets, country 
markets or international industry sectors(Furstenberg and Jeon,
[1989]; Grinold, Rudd and Stefek, [1989]). Of particular interest to 
the present study is the behaviour of stock returns at the individual 
country and European levels. Herrera (Herrera [1992a], [1992b]) 
analysed a diversified sample portfolio of 340 European shares for 
their monthly returns in the period June 1981 to March 1991. Using 
standard indexes restated to give equal weight to all shares 
represented, variance in the portfolio returns were explained as to 
34% by individual country effects, 28% by Europe-wide effects, 29% by 
world market effects and only 9% by European-level industry effects. 
The implication of this result is that industrial sector analysis is 
not of great benefit in selecting stocks (although fundamental 
analysis at the individual company level remains an important
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underpinning for the selection of individual stocks. The size of the 
European component may be expected to grow at the expense of the 
country component as economic integration proceeds.
5.4.2.2: Convergence
One way of obtaining evidence for increasing levels of integration and 
convergence among European markets is to study the relationship 
between domestic and 'offshore* interest rates. Under the parity 
theory of interest rates (see, for example, Shapiro [1992]), perfect 
capital mobility between countries will ensure that returns are 
equated between domestic and foreign investments when denominated in a 
common currency. Such a measurement is possible due to the existence 
of the Euromarkets, allowing the yield on a Eurocurrency deposit and a 
domestic money market deposit to be compared. Any yield difference is 
a measure of the extent of divergence. This analysis has been 
performed by Aylward [1992] for a range of countries for the period 
1985-1991: in summary they show steady convergence among the main EU 
economies and their satellites (such as Belgium and Holland) with 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom the exceptions. Aylward also 
applies the test of stock market correlations of daily returns for 
sample periods within the same general time span. Again, without 
citing the detailed results, correlations are shown to increase 
significantly, arguing for a considerable and continuing increase in 
the level of capital mobility within Europe as a whole. These results 
however predate a period of general turbulence culminating in 
Britain's departure from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992 
and a subsequent debate about the structure, pace and direction of 
integrated economic policymaking which has not been restricted to the 
United Kingdom.
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Weakness in correlations between markets, coupled with the 
availability of higher returns in higher-risk reforming and developing 
economies, in principle offers opportunities for international 
investors to choose portfolios that earn better returns, but, due to 
the scope for further diversification held out by weak correlations 
between markets, at no greater risk. The increase in returns has been 
estimated at around one percentage point on an equity portfolio that 
adds 20% of emerging market stocks to its fully diversified 'major 
market' holdings (ECON [1993J/1). Given that, in 1991, American 
investors held only 0.5% of their equity portfolios in all emerging 
markets taken together, the scope for intervention in small European 
markets over the medium term would appear to be large.
5.4.2.3: The Euromarkets
The history and broad features of the mature, London-based Eurobond 
market are well-known and are not described here in detail. The recent 
evolution of the whole Euro-market is however of interest as an 
example of the extent to which a minimally regulated international 
market can develop both a secure and reliable trading structure and an 
increasingly intricate range of products and facilities: in 1992 it 
allowed $279 billion to be raised in 15 currencies by institutions 
located in 40 countries, not, of course, restricted to Europe.
The Euro-markets may be viewed as a growing threat to national primary 
and secondary bond markets to the extent that cost and flexibility 
advantages now permit smaller and smaller issues while differential 
regulatory burdens remain a problem in single countries.
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5.4.2.4: International Equity Markets
The evolution of an international primary equity market to parallel 
that of the Euro debt markets has yet to begin in earnest. Precursor 
developments such as the extension of NASDAQ to European equities in a 
single country, coupled with appropriate developments in global 
settlement and custody services are in the pipeline. As to actual 
current developments, global equity issues have already been 
established by the expedient of issuing multiple listed tranches on 
different national exchanges under the general supervision of a lead 
manager for the whole issue. Global Depositary Receipts (GDRs), on the 
lines of the American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) long used by European 
companies on US markets, have now made their appearance, providing a 
half-way house to truly international equity issues. Although new 
equity capital now flows across national borders at increasing rates, 
firm and market size considerations probably ensure that it will not 
prove a serious threat to smaller national markets in the foreseeable 
future. The very large firms interested in global issues are mostly 
unable to raise their requirements in any one market, at least without 
serious price distortion. And smaller companies are affected by 
spatial considerations - the investment ’horizon’ within which they 
are known and accepted by investors and outside of which they are 
invisible to all but professional analysts operating mainly in 
secondary markets.
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5.4.2.5: European Commission Directives
Directives are alluded to here only briefly in the interests of a 
complete discussion.
The Large Exposures Directive is regarded by the securities industry 
as a regulatory response to pressure from the banking industry, 
forcing financial institutions capable of handling large issues to 
comply with capital adequacy requirements on the same scale as for the 
banks themselves: it is therefore of some interest as a competition 
issue.
The Admission Directive sets out terms for the coordination of minimum 
admission requirements for companies to obtain an official stock 
exchange listing. The Listing Particulars Directive lays down a range 
of disclosure requirements according to the type of security for which 
a listing is sought. The directive gains particular force from a 
frequent national requirement for large investing institutions to 
maintain a major proportion of their assets in the form of officially 
listed securities.
The Public Offer Prospectus Directive defines the disclosure 
requirements for offerings of unlisted securities. It is, however, set 
about with numerous exceptions. This and the Listing Particulars 
Directive embody the idea of mutual recognition, whereby approval in 
one member state is held to satisfy the requirements of all others, at 
least in principle.
The Investment Services Directive governs the behaviour of financial 
intermediaries.
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5.4.2.6: Group of 30 Standards
The group of 30 is a respected, self-appointed body of bankers which 
has taken the initiative in specifying improvements to international 
securities trading and settlement. Of most significance to smaller 
national exchanges is the pressure the Group of 30 has exerted for 
more rapid settlement, based on the T+1 standard (settlement one day 
after conclusion of a bargain). More rapid settlement, together with 
the increasing levels of technology required for communication, 
trading and administration nationally and internationally, has 
variously reinforced reform and put pressure on traditional broking 
firms as reported in Chapters 7-10.
5.4.2.7; Corporate finance and the economic and market cvcle
In European markets the ’startup/grow/float/cash-in’ cycle extolled in 
US business mythology is simply nonexistent. This fact changes the 
corporate finance landscape in its entirety. We concentrate however on 
effects that may be expected to be observed in capital markets.
After a recessionary trough has passed, gearing can safely be 
increased and loans or bonds preferred to equity. Near the top of the 
cycle the reverse applies (ECON [1991]/!). The evidence shows that 
initial public offerings (IPOs) of equity are historically more likely 
to be successful from the issuer's point of view, near the top of the 
financial market cycle than elsewhere (Loughran and Ritter [1993]). 
This occurs usually, but not always, before the top of the economic 
activity cycle, and towards the end of a so-called bull market phase. 
Most countries of Europe exhibit the seune pattern with long periods of 
virtually total inactivity in between. In the absence of a national
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stock market to signal turning points, the pricing and timing of debt 
and equity issues to meet real business requirements is difficult. On 
the other hand the long new issue dry periods between corresponding 
cycle points are a major factor in reducing the viability of 
individual equity markets. Given the frequency of reform, new bursts 
of activity often take place under different rules to those which 
prevailed during the preceding period, leading to uncertainty about 
the duration, strength and stability of the new market run. Equally, 
discontinuity privileges institutions able to benefit from upsurges of 
activity when they occur, but whose survival is not at risk from 
periods of stagnation because they have other activities. In general 
this means banks.
Banks may also take a different view of the amount and circumstances 
under which they would encourage smaller clients to issue equity, in 
which they may participate, according to the likely degree of 
liquidity if the share is/will be quoted. Banks may inhibit liquidity 
in stock markets by smothering other participants and this very lack 
of liquidity may well then also inhibit them from supporting customers 
in equity issues.
Banks are also inclined to favour arcane capital structures that 
dilute the influence of shareholders. Price differences occur between 
companies with complex capital structures and those with simple ones, 
favouring the latter (PINT [1993/1). Attempts to simplify capital 
structures thus give rise to price changes in the shares affected.
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5.4.3: Financial innovation
The role of derivatives markets has widened dramatically since the 
hulk of the research for this study was carried out, although only a 
short time span is involved. In this section we briefly consider the 
implications of financial innovation and derivative markets in 
particular for the future of smaller European capital markets on the 
basis of indirect evidence.
Miller [1991] conducts a discussion of financial innovation in terms 
that are extremely relevant to the survival and development of 
securities markets as business organisations, dependent on the 
generation of "transactions, clearing and settlement services to the 
customers at prices remunerative to the exchange's members" (op. cit., 
p viii). Miller identifies the source of most innovation as the 
incentive to avoid regulatory and tax burdens by redefining or 
relocating a source of income by appropriate new instruments 
and transactions with the general effect of permitting what was 
formerly restricted and/or attracting a lower incidence of tax than 
would otherwise be the case. The stream of opportunities can be 
expected to remain inexhaustible as the authorities respond by 
changing the tax and regulatory structure in the "regulatory 
dialectic" (Kane [1986]). Indeed, the opportunities offered by 
regulatory and tax changes can be construed as an ongoing subsidy 
to financial markets, in the form of the gains or tax savings made by 
their clients as instruments are devised to avoid them.
Miller also offers a definition of significant innovations as those 
that "continue to grow, sometimes very substantially, after their
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initiating force has been removed”. Examples, such as foreign 
participation in Iberian bond markets are cited elsewhere in this 
study.
The demand for immediacy, as opposed to mere liquidity, is an 
important factor in determining whether a market has a future. 
Immediacy was discussed in section 5.2.2. and there defined as the 
ability to buy or sell a security immediately rather than waiting for 
a counterparty to be found, implying that dealers will set a price 
without seeing orders. The desire to buy or sell itself is motivated 
by a 'liquidity event* (Miller, op. cit. p25), namely the perception 
that actual holdings deviate from desired holdings in some way. The 
demand for immediacy depends on the volatility of prices and the 
extent to which the risk of an unanticipated price move can be 
diversified. The suppliers of immediacy are the marketmakers who are 
better able than the individual investor to diversify the risk of 
holding a security whose price may change: they are thus in a position 
to make net gains by, in general, selling at a better price than they 
offered to the investor.
Liquidity in the service of immediacy allows markets to be analysed 
using their level of need for immediacy (i.e. the risk of price 
volatility during the period a final buyer or seller might expect to 
wait to find a counterparty). Immediacy is the criterion against which 
the degree of liquidity actually supplied is measured.
5.4.3.1: Index futures contracts
Constructing a portfolio is only incidentally to do with the specific 
equity stocks included in it. The objective of stock selection (except 
for some specialised professional 'stock-pickers* who, even if
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successful, must always remain a minority) is to reduce the level of 
risk. Portfolio construction then reduces merely to a choice of the 
equity and debt proportion at any one time, in turn governed by a view 
of the ongoing relationship between interest rates and levels of 
business activity. A mechanism to facilitate the necessary trading 
without dealing directly in a suitably wide range of stocks is of 
course the index futures contract. It is thus not surprising that 
volumes in the index futures market have increased enormously and 
that, as Miller points out, "transactions undertaken in response to 
anticipated (or feared) changes in the immediate macroeconomic 
environment..now tend to be directed to the index futures market 
rather than the stock market."
For smaller European stock markets the opportunity to benefit from 
extra turnover volume and, for national economies, the possible 
welfare gain from an additional sensitive indicator of short term 
economic and business prospects has not in fact been missed. All the 
markets surveyed in this study now have formal or informal derivative 
markets alongside them. Sometimes, as in the case of Lisbon they have 
been formally launched as a major high-risk investment for the 
participants - in the Portuguese case the whole future of the Oporto 
exchange has been wagered.
A serious objection to the existence of traded options and futures 
markets is the possibility to create so-called portfolio insurance, 
i.e. risk reduction, strategies. The construction of these strategies 
is not considered here, only the potential effects are significant. 
Many commentators hold that strategies to limit the downside risk in 
portfolios by complex put and call arrangements automatically generate 
trading patterns that reinforce einy pre-existing market price
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movement, particularly in view of the fact that such strategies 
involve program trading and timing rules that operate automatically to 
produce 'herd* effects - that is to say, positive serial correlation 
in securities transactions. The issue is largely unresolved and 
currently the subject of regulatory initiatives in many parts of the 
world.
5.5: Towards a balanced ecoloev of market participants
In this section we develop several definitions and models that will be 
useful to describe, analyse and draw conclusions about the markets 
considered in Part II as well as to illuminate the final summary and 
conclusions in Part III.
5.5.1: Market structure and dealing practice
The small size of many domestic markets can result in severe damage to 
their infrastructure or virtual extinction as a quite common result of 
a change in trading conditions. This, in principle, requires 
continuous attention from public policymakers wherever the market 
participants do not have a direct interest in the future of the market 
themselves. Markets need to be structured so as to ensure that their 
governing institutions are populated by agents whose main interest is 
in the maintenance of a viable, valid market.
Two classes of agent may be defined for this purpose:
1. A market-dependent firm is defined as one whose existence is
dependent upon sustained trading activity in securities markets.
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The definition includes institutions who conduct other business 
than securities trading, but only where the continuance of trading 
activity is entirely dependent on profitability, without cross 
subsidy, and would be discontinued if regular trading losses were 
to be incurred.
2. A market-independent institution is one with substantial business 
interests other than securities trading, able to subsidise trading 
losses, willing to accept them in order to remain in the market, 
and capable of using resources generated elsewhere maintain or 
improve its competitive position.
This usage contrasts with the conventional appellation of 'independent 
broker’, applied to firms who are not part of a more broadly based 
financial institution. Such brokers are typically anything but 
independent in the sense that they exist only where trading conditions 
permit them to earn a living.
Simply insisting that brokers handle every transaction may protect the 
species but destroy the habitat. In the Dutch market for example, the 
practice, prior to the September 1994 reform of market trading rules, 
of passing practically all transactions through the 'hoekmen', or 
specialists, many of whom were poorly capitalised, was widely held to 
have been responsible for poor liquidity, high transaction costs and 
consequent diversion of trading volume to London. The reform in fact 
concentrated on reducing the number of 'hoekmen', not entirely 
unopposed since the changes effectively eliminated the breed, in order 
to create an effective group of market makers on London lines, with 
capital resources sufficient to support their book.(PINT [1994]/1).
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The above given definitions of market-dependent and market-independent 
participants are maintained throughout the rest of the thesis for the 
purpose of considering arguments and evidence related to the rôles of 
these parties in maintaining viability and validity in their national 
market.
5,5.2: The minimal broking firm and broking firm * calving*
As has been seen, the structure of the securities broking industry is 
susceptible to analysis using the microeconomics of imperfect 
competition, concepts such as entry barriers and other theoretical 
apparatus available within the structure of industrial organisation 
economics. This has been done for the US market by Shepard [1975]. The 
markets studied here are in general too small to permit any form of 
equilibrium analysis, too heterogenous for straightforward quantitive 
approaches and undergoing too rapid change for longer-run comparisons 
to be useful. On the other hand two characteristics of the modern 
broking firm can be specified to help explain structural change in 
established markets and illuminate developments in new and emerging 
markets:
1. The minimal broking firm
Formerly, the only basic resource requirement for an independent 
broker was a telephone and a simple record-keeping system such as an 
order book. Such brokers still exist, for example in Brussels. No new 
minimum standard can yet be formulated and may be expected to emerge 
by natural selection, exhibiting different characteristics in 
different markets. A simple model for such a standard can however be 
proposed on the basis of the evidence provided by the numerous visits 
to broking firms carried out for this study. The model is articulated
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here only in sufficient detail to indicate the amount of resources, 
pre-existing skills and effort required to create a new firm in a 
given market.
The general model is that of a partnership or a limited company with 
capital requirements that relate more to its commercial viability as a 
small firm than to its dealing activities. On the basis of observation 
in the course of the empirical study, about six persons are typically 
involved, two in an administrative capacity and the other four acting 
as principals, dealers, analysts and salesmen in various combinations. 
The number six - and the functions listed - came up many times in the 
course of interviews and discussions. The individuals involved are 
required to have a substantial skill endowment in formal and business 
education as well as examination and experience-based qualifications 
as demanded by the regulatory authorities under which they operate. 
Microcomputer-based systems are required for trading, together with 
communications links to the markets and subscriptions to at least one 
information service such as Reuters and/or Bloomberg. A not 
inconsiderable expenditure is required for promotion and/or research 
(terms which are often, in practice, interchangeable). The required 
education, trading and professional skills, investment and starting 
client base form a much more formidable barrier to industry entry than 
would face a normal commercial entrepreneur in a trading or service 
provision environment.
2. 'Calving' of new broking firms
The obvious source for new firms formed out of small groups of 
professionals is existing banks and other large financial institutions 
operating in the markets. This in fact turns out to be the case in
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established markets. Numerous broking firms interviewed in the course 
of the empirical research were formed (usually some time ago) by 
individuals and (more recently) by small groups who had left larger 
organisations, usually, but not always, in buoyant market conditions, 
to exploit current opportunities. There exists an opposite tendency 
for large institutions to absorb broking firms. The process, 
interestingly, tends first to preserve and then systematically to 
extinguish the identity of the acquired firm, presumably for marketing 
reasons. Reabsorption was not observed during the empirical research 
and would probably not, in the nature of the case, have been revealed 
by interviewees. It is however well documented in the public prints, 
as numerous examples from larger markets attest. (PINT [1992]/6, PINT 
[1993]/2, PINT [1993]/3). Pigure 3 illustrates the whole process of 
calving and reabsorption in the form of a complete life cycle model 
for a market-dependent broking firm. A bank with a securities trading 
department that is an integral part of an organisation (1) may find a 
group of traders and other professionals departing to form their own, 
independent firm (2), usually during an equity boom or other 
favourable trading period. The firm may grow and acquire useful 
specialisms and a desirable client list. At this point it may become 
attractive to a major institution, particularly if, because of a less 
favourable trading climate, the price is right, and be acquired as a 
subsidiary (3). As the above cited examples show, the acquiring firm 
often extinguishes the separate identity within its own corporate 
framework by (4) absorbing the subsidiary, but retaining separate 
trading activity, particularly where insider trading is regulated, 
only eventually integrating the activity to return to position (1). 
Pigure 3. refers to a bank-based or dominated market like Vienna or 
Copenhagen (further discussed in Chapters 7 and 9), but the model is 
to be observed operating in other markets as the examples cited show.
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Figure 3: THE CALVING CYCLE
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5,5.3: * Starvation* of the broking firm population
There is, unfortunately, another influence at work on market-dependent 
firms in a market where cyclical or structural decline in volume is 
under way. The demise of colleague or competing firms is perceived as 
a benefit by the survivors, with the remaining business accruing to 
them. As shown in the simple model developed below, the effect becomes 
more pronounced the more serious is the underlying situation, with the 
result that no action may be taken to assure the continuance of the 
broking sector as a whole.
The starving population paradigm may be adduced, drawn from 
microbiology. It has been used to explain the survival of bacterial 
populations, in particular to solve the problem of their survival well 
beyond the period that would be predicted on the basis of the 
available food supply for the metabolic needs of individual organisms. 
Such populations characteristically survive for long periods in a 
starving situation, reviving dramatically to exploit food supply 
opportunities as they occur. The survivors in fact feed upon the 
metabolic components of the non-survivors, exhibiting complex dynamic 
changes in numbers, including even temporary growth.
The model has obvious application to the population of broking firms, 
the denizens of an industry characterised by feast and famine. In 
particular, the clients and skilled staff of a recently defunct firm 
become available to the remaining firms in the market. In a market 
such as Brussels, characterised until recently by a large number of 
small brokers, the client redistribution effect is small unless large 
numbers of brokers are going bust within a short time. At the time of
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the fieldwork visit this process was however in full swing. In a much 
smaller broking community, the extreme case is Vienna, the loss of one 
broker can transfer a large amount of business to the remaining one or 
two, creating for them the illusion of growth in a contracting market.
One conclusion that can be drawn from this model is that contraction 
of the broking firm community should not be expected to occur as a 
linear function of business volume or commission income, even though 
other variables, such as the total number of dealers employed, may 
well be expected to do so.
A simple model of the process can be constructed to give some 
impression of the nonlinearities involved. Figure 4. shows the ratio 
of profit to turnover in a broking community comprised of 
heterogenous1y sized firms with market volume continuously reducing 
through time. Firms have fixed costs related to their size, but size 
is not assumed to imply higher returns to scale. The market is 
simulated through time until the community is extinguished. Firms are 
eliminated in each period as soon as their net revenue is insufficient 
to cover fixed costs. Since this may occur to larger or smaller firms 
indifferently in any one period, windfalls of varying size occur, in 
the form of extra market share and temporarily increased volume, to 
the survivors. This is represented in terms of profit levels and the 
profit to turnover ratio. The results arb striking. Noting that the 
only parameters of the model are trade volume, the number of firms and 
the size of their fixed costs, the profit to trading volume of the 
survivors is shown to be extremely volatile and likely to disguise the 
secular downward trend in the underlying variables, trade volume and 
market capacity. It is not necessary for the whole market to decline 
to obtain this result, only the share going to market-dependent firms.
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Figure 4: BROKING FIRM STARVATION "GAINS"
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Various parameterisations of this model are possible, including more 
detail on the redistribution of skilled resources as well as merely of 
turnover. However the simplest structure possible still succeeds in 
making the point. A listing of the program STARVATA.BAS is supplied as 
Appendix 3. A perusal of the QUICKBASIC code and commentary will 
reveal the detailed rules applied.
CONCLUSION
In the first part of this chapter we reviewed the mainsprings of 
securities market behaviour, namely the way in which the market is 
organised, competitive factors arising from market structure and the 
behaviour of investors. The conclusions that may be drawn are in some 
cases confirmable from simple anecdotal evidence and, in others, 
highly dependent on theoretical analysis of the circumstances of the 
individual market.
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Perusal of the press reveals that, in the short term, markets respond 
in a very similar manner to stimuli, however they are organised. That 
appearance is in part journalistic treatment and disingenuousness by 
market participants because information influences investor behaviour. 
Does the evidence reviewed in this chapter support the idea of all 
markets being similar in the short run ? The answer is, in general, 
yes. Most mechanisms for arriving at a price and trading securities, 
whether under marketmaking or auction systems, whether put through the 
market or dealt outside it, produce the same result. The differences 
lie in the total income available from investors' transaction costs - 
commissions, fees and the spread - and its distribution among market 
participants. Investors are sensitive to transactions costs but, apart 
from fund managers in large centres, do not switch between markets in 
the short term. The medium term is a different matter. Here we have 
tradition as well as the structure of the market to consider: market 
share and influence enjoyed by individual participants, the risk 
culture of investors and issuers, the history of trading volume, the 
imminence or recency of reform and existence of long term drift to 
other centres through cost or regulatory differentials. In all these 
respects each market has to be considered (a) as the product of its 
own history and (b) as moving in one direction or another under the 
influence of institutional and market change. Detailed evidence for 
selected markets is considered in Chapters 7-10 and, separately, under 
the heading of trading volume, as a measure of medium term viability 
and validity for all markets. The clear conclusion is that specific 
market microstructure is irrelevant to trading volume, provided it 
suits issuers and investors in the country involved and is not 
undermined (a) by a differently organised rival market or (b) through 
capture by a major participant with suppression of information 
(notably order flows) and competition. This conclusion is taken up
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again in Part III. In the second part of the chapter it was shown, 
first, that European markets yield broadly similar net returns, as 
adjusted for local factors like as tax and currency. Opportunities 
exist to diversify portfolios and reduce risk, but not to gain excess 
returns for a long period. Gains are traded away by international 
investor attention, but that is not the same thing as market 
convergence. Convergence is driven by European integration rather than 
market phenomena as such. The process is not continuous. European 
directives and Group of 30 initiatives are of relatively minor 
importance to date. Thirdly, financial innovation, especially the 
growth of derivative markets, is important but has not formed part of 
the present study. Small national markets compete for volume against 
larger centres rather than among themselves. Minor exceptions such as 
Vienna/Budapest are dealt with elsewhere. Fourthly, the focus for 
future competition is likely to be in the tradeoff between lightness 
and effectiveness of regulation, in reduction of transaction costs and 
in the provision of efficient, transparent trading systems and 
information services. This competition may result in casualties among 
regional rather than national exchanges but is unlikely to result in 
the demise of any national stock market. The risk of temporary 
collapse and decline into a moribund state is nevertheless 
historically well established and remains present for all exchanges. 
These conclusions, finally, required further structural foundation 
than is available in the literature. Models and definitions to support 
the empirical research described in Part II were therefore proposed. 
Factors contributing to the wellbeing of national exchanges and the 
means to reform, including many existing available trading and 
organisational models, are well understood by market authorities and 
others. It is hoped that the models and terminology developed in 
Section 5.4.3 will contribute to the debate.
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PART II: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
INTRODUCTION TO PART II
The organisation and methodology of the empirical research was 
introduced in Chapter 1. Here we provide a brief recapitulation and 
guide to the structure of this section. Chapter 6 stands apart from 
the rest in that it applies econometric methodology to a small group 
of markets to discover what determines the evolution of trading volume 
over a long period, motivated by the consideration that trading volume 
has already been identified as the 'lifeblood* of small national 
securities markets, as well as regional markets within countries. 
Methodologies are described in the introduction to Chapter 6.
Chapters 7 to 9 describe, analyse and evaluate the qualitative 
research carried out in Copenhagen, Lisbon and Vienna: markets studied 
at the greatest level of detail, as defined in Chapter 1. Chapter 10 
deals with all other markets studied, at various levels of detail. In 
chapters 7 to 9 a similar division of material and layout has been 
followed. In Chapter 10 the same organisation has been introduced 
where possible, but with omission or merging of topics as dictated by 
the level of detailed enquiry undertaken. Conclusions are drawn with 
respect to each market at the end of the relevant chapter or section, 
but comparative aspects and general synthesis are deferred until Part 
III (Chapter 11). All the enquiries in Part II cover a long time 
period. In Chapter 6 the period 1971-1993 is analysed (elsewhere 
numerical data covering only part of the period were available: in 
certain cases, later data are also tabulated). In Chapters 7 to 10 a 
much longer period is reviewed, encompassing the history of each 
exchange from its origins, and dealing with more recent evolution from 
as far back as seemed necessary to throw light on present-day events.
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Nevertheless, in general, the choice of a long time period does not 
impute validity to the long term. As has already been asserted, the 
long term probably does not exist in any meaningful sense for 
securities markets. Long time periods have nevertheless to be 
considered, not only to provide evidence to support this assertion, 
but also in other respects. Throughout this part of the thesis, 
markets are considered to draw on their past in two ways:
1) In the econometric sense, markets may have a memory as measured, 
loosely speaking, by autoregressive tendencies in the data. This is 
more important for their short term dynamic behaviour than their 
medium term evolution however. We examine the data using econometric 
methods only for evidence of short-run dynamic influences on the 
volume of trading therefore. In the medium term we merely observe the 
large-scale evolution of volume and enquire into its causes, looking 
primarily at such factors as information expansion, the development of 
technology, competition and reform, which are less amenable to 
econometric analysis. A long-run model of the relation between equity 
turnover and bond trading volume is in fact successfully developed in 
Chapter 6, but this too should be interpreted as providing evidence of 
persistence, stability and measurability in an enduring short term 
behavioural relationship (cointegration maintained by an error 
correction mechanism), rather than a long-run structural feature of 
the markets concerned.
2) As regards their institutional, commercial and economic 
development, markets have a much longer memory of what went before. 
This memory of past practice persists in the culture of trading and 
transmits one very significant element onward through time: it 
establishes the level of trust between participants that allows a
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level of confidence sufficient to permit trading in a very ephemeral 
commodity, securities, to take place. The upper and lower limits of 
trust are set by knowledge of past behaviour, good and bad, as 
modified by agents' judgement of the extent to which past trading 
behaviour is likely to be reproduced in future. On the other hand, the 
rate at which trading practice is being influenced by competitive, 
regulatory and technological change (including the technology of 
investment instruments themselves) sets another kind of limit, namely 
the extent to which the past is any guide to the future. Once again, 
we therefore elect to consider only the medium term, defining that to 
mean in the present case, the maximum length of time over which past 
practice offers any realistic guide to the future. As a rule of thumb, 
this period should perhaps never be considered to exceed the working 
lifetime of a market participant.
COMPARATIVE STATISTICS AND SURVEY DATA
As an aid to understanding the discussion of individual markets, some 
basic data is now presented in a format which allows direct 
comparison. Table 1. below gives comparative statistics of established 
stock exchanges studied, plus London and NASDAQ for comparison 
purposes. The most important characteristics to note are the dominance 
of bond trading and the small size of the market-dependent broking 
sector. Conventional ratios of market capitalisation to turnover and 
GDP are vitiated by the large size of the bond sector and the year-on- 
year volatility of equity turnover and prices, as exemplified in the 
econometric study.
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Ta b l e  1.
RO. OF LISTED EQUITY MARKET TURROVER VALUE BORD TRADIRG MEMBERSHIP
COMPAIIES TURROVER VALUE OF ASX AS % TURROVER SYSTEM MI=MARKET IRD.
YEAR ERD (1992) VALUE DOMESTIC OF VALUE OF GDP D=DEALERS MD=MARKET DEP.
LISTED COS. *(1994) A=AUCTIOR R/A= ROT AV.
DOHESTIC FOREIGR Ü") (£i) ((') P=PRESERCE OR ROT APPLIC.
C=COMPUTERS
FOREIGR % S=SCREER TRAD. MI MD
AMSTERDAM 251 246 49 28,979 283,135 10.25 81.8 81,311 D, P, C 44 68
BRUSSELS 164 154 48 6,011 42,383 14.29 34.3 824 A, P, C 12 52
C0PEÎBA6EI 257 11 4 10,536 21,619 48.60 40.3 517,867 A, S, G 21 10
STOCKHOLM 108 10 8 15,350 50,366 30.42 64.3 309,743 A, S, C R/A R/A
6ERMAKY 425 240 36 258,718 217,935 118.89 26.0 632,299 A, S, C R/A I/A
LISBOl 100 0 0 792 5,748 14.04 H.a. 5,311 A, S, C 14 3
MADRID 401 3 0 21,544 76,880 28.57 25.2 5,552 A, S, C R/A R/A
VIEMA 94 47 33 2,774 12,386 21.77 14.5 659 A, P, C 79 6
(1) 7,700 11,505 - 30,059
SIITZERLAID 180 240 57 76,489 129,209 58.91 104.7 R/A A, S, C R/A I/A
LOIDOI 1878 514 21 1,044,713 624,393 167.31 115.8 633,038 D, S, C R/A I/A
source: Stock Excbange Yearbook 1994 and (l) Austrian national Bank monthly surveys, 
Roell (1991), CÏSI (1985), Lewis (1996)*.
Table 2. presents stylised responses to the structured, questionnaire- 
based interviews for the markets studied at Level 1, where the sample 
is large enough to support reasonable comparisons. The views of 
market-independent (MI), market-dependent (MD) and market authority 
(MA) institutions are compared. In this presentation the significance 
of the data lies in the differences of viewpoint represented by each 
party and supports the discussion in Chapters 7 to 11 (the 
distribution of views was not dissimilar in the Level 2 study, but the 
numbers are not large enough to support this stylised presentation).
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T a b l e  2 .  R e s p o n s e s  t o  s t a n d a r d  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
(For full text of questions see Appendix 1.)
DENNARK 
MI MD MA 
I. Market dependent on special situations;
tax bias 
gov’t deficit
privatisation 
property values 
foreign investors
y X II
5
1 3 1
1 4 
5
4
2 2
interest different 4 I
inter bank trading 5
2. True extent of trading:
y X K
price formation 5
trading volume 4 1
spreads and comms 3 
fundamental vais. 5 
price related inf. 4
3. Trading affected by:
y X N 
4
2 2 
1 3
1 3
1 2 1
y X R
2 2 
2 2 
I 3 
3 1 
1 3
y X 
1
y X
1
1
I
1
1
Mi
(y=yes, 
y X 
2 
1 
2
AUSTRIA
MD MA
=Some extent, R=
y X K
1
(y=yes, X=Some extent
y X R 
4 1 1
3 2 1
4 ! 1
5 1 
4
y X R 
1 
1
1
1
y X
y X R
1
1
1
1
1
MI
y X 
2 2
PORTUGAL
MD
y X R
1 2 
1 2
1 3
3 1
2 2
3 I 
3 1
1 3
X R
1 1
2 2 
2 1 
3 
3
1 2 
1 1 1
y X R
3
2 1 
1 2 
1 2 
2 1
MA
y X R
I
1
1
1
1
1
1
X R
y X R ; y X R ! y X R !! y X R 1 y X R ! y X R J! y X R y X R y X R
turnover tax 5 ! 4 ; 1 !! 6 ! I ! 1 II 2 2 1 2 1
capital gains tax »1 11 !! 1 5 ! 1 ; 1 4 3 1
inheritance tax 11 11 !! 6 1 1 ! 1 II 4 3 1
pension funding 3 11 2 2 ! I !! 3 3 1 1 ; 1 i; 3 1 1 2 1
. Interviewees’ interests:
(f=forld, R=Region, C=Country)
I R c ; 1 R c ! I R c !! 1 R c ! 1 R c ! I R c !! 1 R C I R C 1 R C
countries 2 2 1 ! 1 3 ; " 1 1  1 1 1 II 11 j * 1 * 1 II 2 1 1 2 1
(A=A11, T=Trading, [^Commission)
A T C ! A T C ! A T C !! A T C 1 A T C ! A T C !î A T C A T C A T C
types of business 5 j 1 I 2 ! 1 1 ; 1 < 1  II 1 1 3 1 1 1 II 4 1 2
(A=A11, C=Corporate, P=Private)
A C p ! A C P 1 A C P !! A C P i A C P Î A C P !! A C P A C P A C P
types of client 5 ; 1 2 1 1 It r 1 , 1  II 11 3 1 1 1 II 4 2 1
(A=All, E=Equity (mainly), D=Debt (mainly))
A E D ; A E D 1 A E D li A E D 1 A E D ; A E D !! A E D A E D A E D
instruments/ikts 5 11 2 2 ! U r  1 I 1 II 1 1 ^  1 * 1 II 4 2 1
(A=All, C=Corporate, P=Private)
A C P ! A C p ; A C p ;; A c p 1 A c p ; A c p !: A C P A C P A C P
other services 5 ! 1 2 I ; H r  1 , 1  II 1 1 ^  1 ‘ 1 II 4 2 1
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Table 2. contd.
mmi
UD klA MI
AÜSTRIA
MD MA MI
PORTUGAL
MD MA
5. Parent bank relation, if any:
org’n/control 
source of trading 
source of issues 
client/market info 
capital resource
S ff R
2
2
S I R
1 1
S I R
(S=Strong, ï=leak, R=Rone. no entry means all are principals)
S I R S I R S I R 1 R
1 1 
1
3
2 1
s r R S I R
6. Strength of Bourse:
(G=Good, A=Average, P=Poor)
G A P G A P g a p ! 1 G A P G A P G A P ! 1 G A P G A P G A P
b r ok i n g  5 1 2 1 1 !! 5 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 2 1 1
b u si n e s s  finance 3 1 2 2 1 1! 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 2  1 1 2 1
small savers 3 1 2 2 1 ;1 1 4  1 1 1 11 2 2 2 1 1
v o lu m e  4 1 3 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 1
p u bl i c  o p in i o n  5 4 1 1 1 < 2 1 1 1 1 3 1 2 1 1
ba l a n c i n g  interest 3 3 1 1 ! 1 4 2 1 1 1 1 1 2  1 1 2 1
. Limits to participation:
(S=Severe, A= Ac c e p ta b l e ,  R=Rone)
S A R S A R S A R ;1 S A R S A R S A R 11 S A R S A R S A R
nu mbers of brokers 5 3 1 ;1 4 2 1 1 11 3 1 2 1 1
seat p r ic e  or cap. 5 4 1 1 1 6 1 1 11 4 3 1
t e c h n o l o g y  r e q u ’d 5 2 2 1 1 1 2 4 1 1 11 3 1 1 2 1
o t her r e strictions 3 2 1 ;1 3 1 2 2 1
8. Small saver participation:
I L : 
1 3 1
I L :
4 !
9. Soundness of equity:
H 1 L 
1
(H=High, I=Intermediate, L=Loi) 
; H I L : H I L ; H I L 
: 3 1: : i
(G=Good,
G A P G A P G A P i 1 G A
new issues 3 1 2 1 11 4 2
finance for SMEs 3 3 1 11 3 2
stock liquidity 4 1 2 1 1 11 4 1
savers/investors 3 2 1 1 11 4 1
public info. 3 2 3 1 1 1
). Trade diversion abroad:
(M i g h ,
H 1 L fi 1 L H 1 L 11 H I
instruments 4 1 3 1 11 1
issuers/investors 4 2 1 1
past 4 1 1 1 2
present 3 1 I 1
future 4 1 1 1 1
domestic funds 4 1 11 2
[. Size of funded pension sector:
H I L 1 H I L H 1 L 11 H I
past and present 1 4 1 4 1 11 1
future 1 4 1 2 2 1 11 2 4
 A=Average, P=Poor)
P G A P 
1 
1
1
G A P 
1 
1
1
1
=!ntermediate, L=Low)
H 1 L H
I L I L
I L 1 H 1 L 
1 3 ! 12
G A P 
3 1
1 3
2 2 
I 3
3 1
1 L
2 2 
2 2
1 3
2 2
2 2
3 1
I L I 
1 3 !
I L 
1
G A P 
2 1 
1 2 
2 1 
I 2 
3
G A P 
1 
1
1
1 2
3 1 1 2  1
1
H I L 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1
L 1 H I L 
1
1
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CHAPTER 6: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF BOND MARKET VOLUME AND SHARE TURNOVER 
INTRODUCTION
In Part I, Chapter 4, the literature relevant to the evolution of 
trading volume was examined and ideas developed concerning specific 
determinants of trading activity. We now develop further hypotheses 
and test them in the course of examining the behaviour of data from 
selected markets, of modelling the evolution of trading volume in 
general and of analysing the short-term dynamic relationship between 
equity turnover and bond volume in particular. Hypotheses are stated 
in Section 1 and the literature background briefly recapitulated. The 
scope, methodology and data of the econometric study are described in 
Section 2. The rest of the first half of the Chapter follows the 
methodological order of the work and reports, successively, data 
treatment and transformations; investigation of seasonality and of 
stationarity in the data at various lag lengths; establishment of the 
order of integration; tests of static association between series, plus 
discussion of the implication of these associations. The second half 
of the chapter, beginning in Section 3, deals with the development and 
testing of:
(1) single variable models regressing selected variables on their 
own past values for evidence of autoregressive processes, and
(2) multi-variable models considered to encompass the process 
generating the volume data of the securities markets studied, 
and progressively reduced, using a general to specific 
methodology, to obtain a parsimonious representation of the 
process, then.
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(3) error-correction models of the long-run relationship observed to 
persist between equity turnover and bond trading volume.
Two satisfactory models are found and described, for the Copenhagen 
and Vienna markets respectively, with corroborative evidence from the 
German market. Conclusions are developed and discussed at the end of 
the Chapter and further integrated with those of the quantitative 
research in Chapter 11.
Section 6.1: Hypotheses and relation to literature 
The widely accepted hypothesis of joint determination of price and 
volume has been assumed valid for very short term dyneunics of the 
markets studied. Daily and intraday determinants of price and volume 
were not part of the present study however. Attention focussed instead 
on monthly transaction volumes in bond and share trading: both are, as 
already discussed, important for assessing the validity, viability and 
development potential of small securities markets dependent on 
turnover for their future growth. 'No-trade theorems' were rejected in 
favour of the extended Huffman model of trade generation also 
discussed in Chapter 4. This model offers an alternative to the 
'differences of opinion' approach (Varian [1989]) and, in effect, 
substitutes changing tastes and priorities among investors over their 
lifetime for differing interpretation of information arriving in 
markets as the basic long-run motive for engaging in securities 
trading. The idea of enduring differences of opinion has been 
criticised by Chari [1989] and is not consistent with the hypothesis 
developed below that trading volume is driven by increased 
availability of reliable information at an ever-reducing resource cost 
of production. In view of extensive collinearity among the variables 
it is difficult to establish a direct relationship between the long-
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run growth of trading volume and general economic growth at current 
prices as measured, for example, by money GDP. On the other hand it 
would be unwise to reject such an obvious relationship or to avoid 
investigations in which basic economic variables are embedded (see for 
example Grossman and Shi Her [1982]).
Trading volume growth has in most cases outrun economic development 
however, as Figure 1. shows, and this requires explanation.
The hypothesis for which support is sought here is that the level of 
trading activity on the part of individual agents, hence collectively, 
is a function of transaction costs when these are defined to include 
the cost of procuring information to support the relevant decisions, 
and of the level of certainty, defined as knowledge about the 
prospective risk inherent in a given portfolio. The degree of 
certainty is also a function of information and may be incorporated 
into the present definition of transaction costs as follows:
(1) An investor requires a given, market determined rate of return 
to compensate for a given perceived level of prospective risk.
(2) The perceived level of prospective risk may be held to be higher 
by virtue of incomplete information about the actual level of 
risk of a given portfolio and uncertainty about future market 
developments.
(3) The required rate of return is net of transaction costs. This 
includes such items as commission, spread and administrative 
cost but is held here to include the cost of acquiring 
sufficient information to identify desired trading opportunities 
or justify ones currently being considered.
168
Figure 1. THREE YEAR MOVING AVERAGE BOND VOLUME, EQUITY TURNOVER AND 
MONEY GDP
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(4) Information acquired in order to identify trading opportunities 
will not necessarily be associated with any specific trade. It 
is hard to envisage a situation where investors or traders 
restrict their information purchases to what is relevant only to 
deals already under consideration. There will therefore exist a 
certain 'mass' of information associated with a given level of 
trading activity which will in general serve both to inform 
specific transactions and to increase certainty about the level 
of risk involved in any transaction.
(5) Any reduction in the price of a unit of information of given 
utility may therefore be expected to induce the following 
effects:
(a) to reduce the transaction cost of identified transactions, 
thereby inducing additional transactions as a result of 
new opportunities identified at an enhanced or maintained 
return net of transaction costs.
(b) to increase the total demand for information in accordance 
with its price elasticity of demand
(c) to increase certainty levels, thereby inducing 
transactions previously inhibited by uncertainty
(d) to operate a multiplier effect on future demand for 
information and upon transactions, resulting from the 
impetus supplied by (a) and (c) above, given the feedback 
widely believed to exist between current and future 
transactions levels.
Mainly anecdotal evidence about the growth of general market 
information has been collected for this study, but there appears to be
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no difficulty in sustaining the argument that the real and money 
volume of securities trading would be expected to increase at a rate 
generally in excess of the real and money rates of economic growth, by 
virtue of the increase in information supply. On the other hand, 
identified defects in the information supply would be expected to have 
the opposite effect, particularly as regards the level of uncertainty. 
This is also supported by the evidence, here in the case of the 
Austrian market.
One thing that is known to financial markets under even the weakest 
set of information assumptions is the broad order of the lags involved 
for real economic shocks of various kinds to work through the system. 
This implies (a) known length for discount periods before losses and 
gains materialise and (b) the understanding that there is plenty of 
time during that interval for further shocks, with quite other effects 
and lags, to occur. The result is that one should not expect financial 
markets to react to changes operating over the longer term, even if 
they are severe, in the same way as would be expected in the short 
run; the intermediate dyngimics furthermore are complicated and 
affected by information feedback mechanisms from price and order flow 
data. The difficulty has been identified by, among others, Doornik and 
Hendry [1992] (p.4): "economics time series data are generated by a 
process of immense generality and complexity. The econometrician seeks 
to model the main features of the Data Generation Process (DCF) in a 
simplified representation based on the observables and related to 
prior theory —  there are many necessary but no sufficient conditions 
for model validity.."
In view of the above arguments, in the empirical study to be 
described, volume data from selected markets have been analysed in
171
accordance with certain basic expectations about their behaviour, 
which constitutes the prior theory, confirmed where possible by 
appropriate modelling procedures and tests, as follows:
1) The evolution of trading volume over time is analysed as a 
combination of deterministic and stochastic processes arising 
from trend factors and feedbacks from previous events in single 
time series after first justifying and performing certain data 
transformations and testing their validity for incorporation 
into time series models. The possibility of seasonal influence 
is tested, as is the nature and extent of associations between 
series, particularly spatially between different financial 
centres. Given clear changes apparent between two 'epochs' 
discernable in the data, temporal comparisons are also made and 
analysed. Single and multivariate time series models are however 
constructed only for the whole of the period. This corresponds 
to hypothesising that the parameters underlying market 
behaviour are constant and that the changes are a dynamic 
response to exogenous influences. Chief among these is the 
growth of information supply and related computing and 
communications developments facilitating trading.
2) Deterministic trends underlying the individual time series for 
bond volume and equity turnover is expected to be a compound of 
general economic growth and a factor representing the effect of 
reduced transaction costs as defined above. A long run steady- 
state measure of these combined influences is therefore sought. 
No attempt is made to distinguish the individual contribution of 
each factor separately.
3) Trading volumes are further hypothesised to be jointly 
determinated, with prices, as one part of a set of possibly
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cointegrated time series within each market selected for study. 
That implies, indeed requires, prior definition of long term 
behavioural relationships between the variables. Appropriate 
hypotheses are established alongside the relevant equations as 
these are developed below. We focus specifically on the 
determinants of equity turnover, arguing that this is heavily 
influenced by events in the bond markets which dominate in the 
small national financial centres studied. A model for the 
generation of equity turnover is developed for each centre 
studied.
Data on three markets, transformed, tested and modelled in the manner 
described above and in the introduction to this chapter formed the 
material for the empirical study. The whole process is now considered 
in further detail.
Section 6.2; The empirical study
Three markets, studied separately and in comparison, were chosen to 
form the basic research object for this part of the analysis. The aim 
was to explain their behaviour in terms of trading volume as well as 
to provide a benchmark against which to draw inferences about the 
behaviour of other, less well-established centres surveyed. The 
markets selected were the Austrian and Danish markets, complemented by 
the German market for purposes of comparison in light of the 
likelihood of interconnection. For reasons discussed below, as well as 
on obvious geographical, economic and institutional grounds, the three 
markets are linked in the eyes of investors and highly visible to each 
other. The Danish market has run a positive yield differential with 
the German market. This was held by several interviewees in Copenhagen 
to be one source of investor interest, and hence of trading volume, in
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Danish bonds. The Austrian market is perceived to shadow the German 
market closely. Austrian long bond yields and interest rates move in a 
much narrower band than the Danish equivalent and the band is centred 
on German rates rather than lying above them. All these differences 
can also be explained by general economic performance however, in 
particular a lower level of consumer price inflation in Austria than 
in Denmark at most times, and the fact that Austrian monetary policy 
shadows that of Germany. The composition of the three markets in terms 
of the instruments traded (government, bank and other debt, together 
with equities) is somewhat different, which invalidates absolute yield 
comparisons.
6.2.1: The data set
Transaction volume data and related time series were collected for the 
period January 1971 to December 1993. The task was not without its 
difficulties and this fact is significant for the conclusions of the 
study. Most stock market» were willing to furnish information that was 
easily available, even if not published. Volume information was not 
always easily available however and, in the case of the Danish market 
had to be purchased in view of the work involved to extract it from 
records. Cohen, Maier, Schwarz and Whitcomb (CMSW) note in their 
survey (CMSW [1986], p. 37) that "nearly every foreign exchange has 
some "hole” in its price-volume reporting system. Perhaps the worst 
offender is London" (prior to 1986). These 'holes' in the information 
generally available, although of a different nature in each market, 
obscure significant aspects of their activity from general view.
Equity and bond turnover figures were obtained in the case of Denmark 
direct from the Copenhagen Stock Exchange, for Germany from the 
statistical annexes to the monthly bulletin of the Deutsche Bundesbank
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and for Austria from the analogous publication of the Oesterreichische 
Nationalbank. Bond series were in nominal values and equity series in 
market values, both measured in national currency at current values. 
The underlying assumption of this treatment is that the stock of bonds 
in issue and the volume of trading would be expected in general to 
rise in line with any fall in the purchasing power of money over the 
long run even after abstracting from the effects of economic growth. 
On the other hand, the stock of nominal-value equity would not 
necessarily rise in the same way, initial public offerings being 
heavily influenced by trading conditions and the evolution of the 
corporate financing tradition of each country, but market valuations 
and the money measure of trading volume would be expected to do so.
The increasing value of the existing equity stock would therefore 
broadly equate with the renewed and ever-increasing stock of bonds in 
issue at nominal values.
Figure 2. shows the original data series for bonds. In the last box 
the series are superimposed with matched ranges to allow coincident 
patterns to be observed. These are noticeable whenever large temporary 
shocks occur. The Austrian and German markets are, as expected, 
closely related, while the Danish market 'takes off in volume terms 
later than the other two over the period studied.
Figure 3. shows the equivalent equity turnover data series. Here the 
behaviour pattern in the three countries is visually similar but with 
the market cycles displaced from each other in time with peaks and 
troughs of activity apparently only weakly reflected in other markets.
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Figure 2. MONTHLY BOND TRADING VOLUMES, LOCAL CURRENCY
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Figure 3. EQUITY MONTHLY TURNOVER, LOCAL CURRENCY
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Bond trading volume and equity turnover data were adjusted as required 
for changes in recording methods that took place during the sample 
period in all markets, notably as a result of moving to reporting both 
sides of the market (purchases and sales). Changes induced by market 
reforms, such as integrating off-exchange trades into the reported 
figures, could not be adjusted for, since the behaviour of the data 
prior to reform was a matter of conjecture.
Stock market indices were obtained from the same sources, supplemented 
by historical statistics published in Mitchell [1992] to fill in 
lacunae and assist in ensuring the accuracy of splicing at the time of 
index rebasing.
The evolution of the series of equity market indices in all three 
countries is shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. MONTHLY EQUITY INDICES
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Consumer price indices, short term interest rates and long bond yields
on government stocks for all countries were taken from one source,
namely the long running monthly series of international comparative 
statistics published by the Oesterreichische Nationalbank.
Short interest rates, long bond yields, equity returns and the yield 
gap were reduced to real terms using consumer price indices. Equity 
returns were conventionally defined as the percentage difference 
between annual rests of the stock market indices, measured monthly, 
and hence do not reflect dividend payments. The yield gap was 
calculated as index returns on equities less the long bond yield, both 
as defined above.
Real short interest rates are displayed in Figure 5. Denmark displays 
a markedly different pattern to the two German-speaking countries 
which tend to share the same experience.
The appropriateness of using real rather than nominal bond yields is
illustrated graphically in Figures 6. and 7. Raw yields converge 
towards the end of the sample period because of economic integration 
and low inflation. Before that they reveal widely divergent behaviour. 
When deflated by the consumer price index a much more closely 
connected cyclical pattern emerges and convergence is not complete 
owing to the maintenance of a yield differential in the Danish market. 
The first differences of the real yield data are seen to exhibit much 
lower volatility as compared with the raw yield series.
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Figure 5. REAL SHORT INTEREST RATES
AUSTRIA DENMARK
REAL SHORT (3 HTH) 
INTEREST RATES
20
15
lO
-2 -5
-4 -lO
1980 1985 1990 1995 1975 1980 1990 19951975
GERMANY
AÜS
GER
DEN
-3
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
12
-4
-8
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
181
Figure 6. LONG BOND YIELDS AND FIRST DIFFERENCES
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Figure 7. REAL LONG BOND YIELDS AND FIRST DIFFERENCES
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Systematic shifts constituted an interesting feature of the data, 
creating an opportunity to examine market structure and behaviour, but 
a problem in terms of the final statistical model to adopt, as well as 
in respect of effects on stationarity tests.
A large 'step' in Danish bond volume was observed, dating from 1988-1, 
due to a combination of market reform requiring more complete 
reporting and the generation of extra business as a result of systems 
and information flow changes emanating from that reform. This 
development seemed initially to justify the use of a dummy variable 
from 1988-1 for some tests although it was later found to be 
unnecessary in modelling, particularly when differenced data were 
used, reducing a step change to a single 'impulse'. The surge in 
trading volume which followed reform has to be regarded as an integral 
part of the data series. A similar shift in the Austrian equity market 
in 1985, traceable to a single published article in Fortune magazine 
rather than to market reforms, are likewise regarded as exemplifying 
existing market behaviour rather than indicating a major shift in the 
character of the market.
In analysing the data and modelling the markets concerned, no attempt 
was made to accommodate parameter shifts that could not be identified 
with known exogeneities. It is assumed throughout that shifts in 
turnover volume may be generally considered a proxy for departures 
from equilibrium as a result of price changes consequent on the 
arrival of information related to the real economy. Any attempt to 
forge links from economic events to market developments risks what has
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been described in this context as "the temptation to engage in 
mechanical curve-fitting exercises" (Judge et al. [1988], p. 436.).
The evidence for direct and immediate linkages between the markets and 
the real ecconomy is weak, both in the relevant literature and as 
confirmed by the present research.
6.2.2: Data transformations and tests
Preliminary tests of the individual data series in various forms 
revealed the need for care in transformation and produced the well- 
known distortions of established tests and measures which arise on 
taking logarithms, differencing and on the inclusion of lagged 
variables. These data related issues are now identified in summary 
form, followed by the results of the detailed testing, before 
proceeding to a discussion of the modelling strategy finally adopted.
1) Logarithms
Taking (natural) logarithms of monthly bond trading volume statistics 
(1971-1 to 1993-12) produced roughly linear trends in all three 
markets, revealing an exponential trend in the underlying data and 
allowing visual examination of data for the early years, which, 
because of large scale increases, was not easy to peruse in levels. 
Figures 8 and 9 exhibit the similarity of the behaviour pattern of all 
three markets when the bond volume and equity turnover data are 
examined in this form.
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Figure 8. LOGARITHMS OF MONTHLY BOND TRADING VOLUMES
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Figure 9. LOGARITHMS OF MONTHLY EQUITY TURNOVER
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2) Differencing
Models and tests based on autoregression of variables in first 
differences produced poor results compared with exactly similar 
formulations in seasonal (i.e. annual) differences. This was of course 
due to impounding a year's worth of change into each of the model 
variables, as opposed to a single period's worth. It was eventually 
considered appropriate to use first differences although this created 
a higher hurdle for the modelling process in terms of producing 
results with a meaningful economic interpretation, not least by the 
test of forecastability.
1) Trend effects
Modelling bond volume and equity turnover data in logarithms against 
their own previous values with two lags, but without differencing, 
produced exaggerated model 'fits’ (see Figs 13 and 14) reflecting not 
agreement among the variables but the influence of strong linear 
trends in the data. These were dealt with as part of the process of 
transformation and testing required to produce stationary series as 
reported below.
2) Presence of lagged variables
All models in lags produced Durbin-Watson test results converging on 
2.0 as the number of lags included increased. This is, again, a well- 
known result and obliged recourse to Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests
(see, for example, Cuthbertson, Hall and Taylor [1992], p. 107-9).
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3) Number of lags
In general one lag rather than two, three or more, proved to be a 
sufficient representation of the data. The test result increased in 
every series analysed, according to the number of lags employed, up 
to 12 or more, but this has been shown to be an artefact of the 
addition of variables rather than a valid result (see Doornik and 
Hendry [1994], p. 307). In the course of testing, the results proved 
to be insensitive to a wide range of higher lags selected for various 
purposes. To demonstrate the point, some comparative results for 
different lags are included in Table 11, furnished as an appendix to 
this chapter.
4) Shifts
The 1988-1 Danish bond volume shift was also examined by simple 
auxiliary testing, as follows. It is known that a shift can cause 
stationary (1(0)) variables to test 1(1) in Dickey-Fuller tests (see 
Doornik and Hendry [1994], p. 93). The series were therefore spliced 
at the known join point and the results retested. The data were not, 
of course, used for any other purpose in this form.
Figure 10 shows the (logarithmic) data re-presented with the shifts 
spliced out by calculating separate intercept terms for the earlier 
and later items and subtracting the difference from the later subset. 
Visual examination of the spliced series permits the suspicion of a 
non-linear trend in the logarithmic series to be entertained. On the 
other hand the ’episodic’ nature of the growth and stagnation pattern 
in both markets dissuades any atttempt to establish such a growth 
pattern.
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Figure 10. LOGARITHMIC SERIES WITH SHIFTS SPLICED OUT
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Test results for the spliced data were practically identical to those 
for the untreated data, as shown below:
TABLE 1.: TESTS OF SPLICED BOND VOLUME AND SHARE TURNOVER STATISTICS
Augmented Dickey- 
Fuller tests at 
shown (bracketed) 
lags on monthly 
data
(**= H rejected 
at 1%)
ADF (2) 
on logs 
spliced
ADF (2) 
on logs 
unspliced
ADF (1) 
on 1st 
diffs of 
logs 
spliced
ADF (1) on 
1st diffs 
of logs 
unspliced
Danish bond 
volume
2.202 2.623 -16.76** -15.8**
Austrian share 
turnover
0.9104 1.15 -15.24** -15.26**
5) Seasonality
Initially suspected seasonal effects were removed by differencing the 
logarithms of variables over a one-year period rather than by the use 
of dummy variables. This may be justified by observing that seasonal 
effects in financial markets are not pronounced, particularly as 
compared with the magnitude of shocks and there is no case for 
treating seasonal volume changes, for which there is no obvious 
'trading out' incentive, in a different way to any other kind of 
shock. Thus, in assuming stochastic seasonality as opposed to 
deterministic seasonality (as would be the case if seasonal dummies 
were employed) it was assumed that all shocks to the system are 
permanently incorporated in the stochastic process and do not die out, 
as would otherwise be the case (see Charemza and Deadman [1992], p. 
140). Seasonal differencing also provided a first oppportunity to 
eliminate the log-linear growth trend and test for stationarity of the 
series, with recourse to further differencing only if stationarity
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could not be established. This was not in fact necessary, reflecting 
the effective linearisation of the growth trend as a result of taking 
logarithms and the additive (rather than multiplicative) nature of the 
seasonal factors, if any. On the other hand the data revealed a 
conflict between tests in that first differences were as successful as 
seasonal differences in producing a stationary series. Detailed 
examination of the test and single equation model results reported 
below led to the conclusion that non-seasonal differencing should in 
fact be retained for all differenced variables.
Volume and turnover data were formally tested for stationarity in the 
presence of possible seasonality by use of the modified Dickey-Hasza- 
Fuller test (Dickey, Hasza and Fuller, [1984] as modified by Osborn et 
al. [1988], p.365). In this test the data in seasonal differences, in 
this case 12 times per year, is first regressed on its past values for 
a chosen number of lags. The number of lags selected proved to be 
arbitrary above 2 in the present sample(s), as discussed above, except 
for the construction of the 12 month seasonal test variable. The 
coefficients of a 12-lag regression model in seasonal differences with 
no intercept term were used to construct the artificial variable z, 
formed by summing the lagged values of the data in (logarithms of) 
levels, transformed by the coefficients of the 12-lag model, into a 
single term.
12
z=egto-'V P ^ e g t O t - i
(1)
in this case for the variable egto, meaning monthly equity turnover in 
logs (see Charemza and Deadman [1992] p.137). On re-estimating the
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model in seasonal differences with the artificial variable z added as 
a regressor, the t-value obtained for the coefficient on z may be 
interpreted as a test of the null hypothesis (existence of a 
seasonally integrated process capable of being removed by seasonal 
differencing). This test, performed on the variables from all three 
samples and requiring 'significant' negative t-values in order to 
reject the null hypothesis, gave positive values in all cases, not 
allowing Hq to be rejected. A parallel test of the data in first 
differences, rather than seasonal differences, however produced 
similar results, placing in doubt the real existence of seasonal 
trends and leaving the final interpretation a matter of judgement 
based on the relative strength of the t-values and other parameters 
reported. For this and other reasons given earlier, the data were 
eventually treated as being non-seasonal in nature.
6) Order of integration
A time series is said to be stationary if its key distributional 
characteristics remain stable over time. Here we consider only weak or 
second order stationarity, denoted by stable means, variances and 
covariances (see Spanos [1986], pp.137-140). The number of 
differencing operations d required to produce a stationary series is 
said to reflect its order of integration l{d). The differenced series 
A*^y^ is thus 1(0). Stationarity is not a necessary condition for a 
series to be 1(0) - see Hendry [1986] and not all series can be 
rendered stationary. Having established the validity of differencing 
to remove trend and, where appropriate (but not in the present case) 
seasonality, the volume data therefore now offered themselves for 
further testing for stationarity against a new null hypothesis: that
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they were integrated of order 1 and and stationary, requiring no 
further differencing. The alternative hypothesis is, conventionally, 
that further non-seasonal differencing is required (recourse to more 
than first seasonal differences rarely being justified, see Charemza 
and Deadman [1992], p.130). The relevant test is the augmented Dickey- 
Fuller test. In all three markets tested, negative t-values, 
representing significantly lower than lower-bound values of the 
published test statistic, obliged acceptance of the null hypothesis 
and allowed the data to be accepted as a series 81^(0,1) - that is 
stationary when differenced, with no further seasonal or non-seasonal 
differencing required. See Table 2.
An excursion was made into second and higher differences in the case 
of series which appeared visually to betray nonlinear characteristics 
in logs. The result of taking second, third and fourth differences of 
logs of bond volumes did not produce the expected reversal of ADF test 
results due to overdifferencing. The significance of the ADF test 
variable was merely driven higher. This result may be regarded as 
confirmation that the log series were in fact integrated 1(1) and the 
first difference series 1(0), (Charemza and Deadman [1992], p. 133).
After the volume data, bond yields and interest rates, nominal and as 
deflated by the consumer price index, were similarly tested for 
stationarity, prior to modelling. First differences of the levels of 
real and current long bond yields and short term (3-month) interest 
rates were examined. Slightly higher levels of autocorrelation among 
the residuals were found for up to five lags when real bond yields 
rather than the raw yields, were considered. This was taken to be due 
to a time lag in the adjustment of actual yields to arrivals of 
information about the inflation rate. Since this could be a factor
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influencing trading volume, real rather than recorded rates were used. 
Determining real bond yields is of course a complicated matter (for 
recent empirical research see, for example. Smith [1994]), It was not 
an intrinsic part of the present study to go beyond a satisfactory 
proxy for real yields.
TABLE 2: AUGMENTED DICKEY FULLER STATIONARITY TESTS FOR MONEY AND REAL 
YIELDS AND INTEREST RATES
ADF(2)
LBYD
(Lev)
ADF(2)
LBYD
(Dif)
ADF(5)
LBYD
(Dif)
ADF(2)
STRT
(Lev)
ADF(2)
STRT
(Dif)
ADF(5)
STRT
(Dif)
AUS
CURR 0.1844
1.063
AUS
REAL 0.7953 10.43** 9.037** 0.3516 8.398** 5.862**
DEN
CURR 0.4631
0.1636
DEN
REAL 0.8632 10.03** 7.099** 0.7404 9.917**
-6.465
GER
CURR 0.3507 0.6797
GER
REAL 0.6892 9.784** 7.693**
-1.295 -8.54**
6.018**
key: LBYD = Long bond yieldSTRT = Short (3 month) interest rates 
** = Hjj (autocorrelated residuals) rejected at 1% level,
(where negative, sign appears above numeral)
7) Associations between series
A fundamental difference between debt and equity markets is that bond 
yields are ultimately limited by the repayment of principal at par and 
real interest rates regress to a long run value, whereas equity values 
and their running returns, measured as dividend or earnings yield, can 
increase without definite limit as the worth and earning power of
195
underlying assets in real and monetary terms alike grow in line with 
economic activity (we do not consider the obvious converse case).
A number of apparently obvious relationships among variables, such as 
a connection between market activity levels and the yield gap, had to 
be rejected at an early stage on grounds of inadequate correlations 
among the differenced log or levels data and poor model results. 
Similarly some interesting correlations, such as those between short­
term interest rates in each country were able to be explained in 
general terms but could not be meaningfully incorporated in model 
formulations. This preliminary analysis involved systematic rejection, 
a pruning of variables in the spirit of a general-to-specific 
modelling approach, rather than a specification search. The variables 
eventually retained (equity turnover, bond volume, long bond yield and 
the share price index) represent the core data of any securities 
market.
Comparisons were made between trading volumes in Denmark and Austria 
and real long bond yield, yield gap, index and interest rate 
differences between these markets and Germany. Comparisons of first 
differences yielded negligible inter-country correlations, indicating 
that there was no discernable volume response, at the level of the 
monthly aggregates in Austria and Denmark, to changes in Germany or to 
changes in the bilateral gaps between countries. Comparisons in levels 
revealed exaggerated correlations based on trends present in the data 
as previously discussed. Although exchange rate movements were 
significant at times over the 22-year period, in examining the data in 
graphic form, including cross-plots of sub-periods, it was not 
considered likely that adjustment for the exchange rate factor would 
have improved the chances of detecting meaningful relationships. This
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is particularly true in bond markets, which are international in 
character and may be expected to move in response to other, third- 
country developments as well as those in the group of countries 
studied (for methods of tackling this problem see Smith [1994]). The 
results of these unsuccesful explorations of the data are not reported 
in detail.
Of considerably more interest was a temporal comparison of the two 
'halves' of the sample period, before and after the marked apparent 
change in behaviour to be seen in the data in levels. The sample was 
split for the purpose into the period 1971-1 to 1981-12 and 1982-1 to 
1993-12.
Some of the static relationships in the form of simple correlation 
coefficients among the data in first differences over the two halves 
of the sample period proved to be revealing. Volume data and stock 
market indices were differenced from logs of levels, rates and yields 
were differenced from their real values in levels. German values in 
the tables are for purposes of comparison and assessment of any 
possible rôle as exogenous variables affecting the Austrian and Danish 
markets, not for modelling the German market, which, as a large 
entity, is not the prime focus of this study (but see later modelling 
results). Simple correlations of course conceal relationships which 
emerge only with lags. It is not considered likely however that most 
of the relationships examined below, consisting, as they mainly do, of 
inter-return and volume-return responses, would be likely to persist 
beyond the monthly periods aggregated in the present data, being 
formed essentially at the daily and intra-daily level. The last 
relation examined, that between equity turnover and bond volume, is 
much more significant however and motivated further analysis and
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modelling reported later. The following Tables 3 to 7 illustrate the 
results. Relationships indicated by lower case letters in square 
brackets are discussed in detail further below. In the whole of the 
rest of this section levels data are designated with variable names in 
upper case, logarithms in lower and differences commencing with letter 
D or d.
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Headed columns and rows are period 1971-1 to 1981-12, unheaded 
columns and rows (offset one across and one down and connected by 
letter for reference to text which follows) are period 1982-1 to 
1993-12
TABLE 3: CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS: Real short interest rates (RSIR)
and real long bond yields (LBYD) for (A)ustria, (D)enmark and 
(G)ermany
In levels: 
RSIR_A
RSIR_A
RSIR_D
RSIRjG
LBYD_A .8710 [e]
.8506
LBYD_D
LBYD_G
LBYD_A 
LBYD D
RSIR D
.7210 [f] 
-.1812
LBYD_G 
.0306 [c]
.3751
-.1365 [d]
RSIR_G 
.2995 [b]
.3281 
.3314 [a]
-.0374
.4897 [g]
.4702
LBYD G
.7259
In first differences: 
DRSIR_A
DRSIR_A 
DRSIR_D 
DRSIR G
.7042 [h]
.9002
DRSIR D
8242 [i]
.6052
DRSIR G
.6559 [j] 
.7541
The relationship between real short interest rates in Denmark and 
Germany broke down in the second half of the sample period [a] while 
those between Austria and Germany strengthened [b]. This is consistent 
with Denmark’s temporary macroeconomic divergence from Germany. Long 
bond yields on the other hand show markedly increased correlations [c] 
and [d].
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Empirical research has suggested that European markets are efficient 
in maintaining the structure of returns between different classes of 
risk and asset category. This is reflected in the very similar degree 
of correlation between long bond yields and and real short interest 
rates in each market over the two periods (.85 to .87 [e] in Austria 
against .49 to .47 [g] in Germany).
The long bond yield/short term interest rate relationship breaks down 
in Denmark [f], reflecting internationalisation of the bond market in 
the 1980s and greater economic volatility. In first differences 
however ([h], [i] and [j]) the short run relationship is maintained 
throughout both parts of the sample period.
TABLE 4: CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS: Real long bond yields and real 
index returns (RIXR)
In first differences:
DLBYD_A DLBYD_D DLBYD_G
DRIXR.A .8618 [k]
.0840
DRIXR_D .8557 [1]
.4363
DRIXR_G .1238 [m]
.0418
A strong association exists between movements in long bond yields and 
changes in returns on the share price index during the first half of 
the period in Austria and Denmark, but breaks down in the second ([k] 
and [1]). This is consistent with the further collapse of a similar 
but weaker relation in the German market [m], all reflecting greater 
awareness of and interest in equity as a 'local' national economic 
phenomenon as against increasingly uniform international bond markets.
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TABLE 5: CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS: Share price index (INDX) and equity
turnover (EQTO)
In first differences: 
dindx_a
dindx_a 
dindx d
deqto_a
deqto_d
deqto_g
.0572
.4047
dindx d
.2784
.3925
dindxjg
.1647 [n] 
.5662 
.1341 [g] 
.2650
.5560
.5299
Austrian/German share index movements become much more correlated [n], 
Danish/German movements less so [o]: the latter a reflection of the 
comparatively more international, especially Scandinavian, character 
of Danish as opposed to Austrian equity and the closer connection of 
the Austrian with the German economy.
TABLE 6 CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS: Long bond yield gap to index return
and equity turnover in first differences (eqto) and levels (LBYG):
LBYG A LBYG D LBYG G
deqto_a .0585 [p]
.3409
dqto_d
deqto__g
.0755 [q]
.0822
.4924 [r]
.4862
There appears to be no pattern of response of equity turnover to 
changes (both variables expressed in first differences) in the yield 
gap between long bond yield and index returns in each market ([p], 
[q], [r]).
201
TABLE 7: CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS: Bond volume and equity turnover 
In first differences:
dbvol_a dbvol_d dbvol g
deqto_a .2752 [s]
.2058
deqto_d .2792 [t]
.2971
deqto_g .3591 [u]
.5246
On the other hand the relationship between equity turnover and bond 
volume in each market, while weak, is remarkably consistent both over 
time and in each market ([s], [t], [u]). This constitutes the most 
interesting result of the static analysis and forms the basis fof much 
more detailed examination in the next section.
Section 6.3: The evolution of trading volume
6.3.1: Single variable models
Given that the data generating process of transactions volume in 
financial markets is generally admitted to be complex and largely 
unknown for the individual series, a realisation is assumed of a 
discrete (see Spanos [1986] p. 133) stochastic process of the form
(2)
in each time series analysed separately. That is to say, an 
autoregressive process (AR) (see, for example, Johnson [1991] p. 306, 
Judge et al [1988]and others) links present with past values of the 
variable y^  of an order p, with p (the number of lags to be chosen) to 
be determined by examining the autocorrelations generated by orders 1 
to k, k>py for the rate at which their influence on y^  declines, as 
well as the size of the partial autocorrelations (the coefficients of
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a regression of the variable under examination on its own lagged 
values) up to the same order, which emerge. The tendency of financial 
market variables to be extensively influenced by their own past 
history suggests that the determination of the order p of the process 
AR(p) will not be simple, creating the problem of devising a 
parsimonious representation with the fewest lags possible, consistent 
with efficient estimation. It therefore appeared appropriate to 
consider not only past values of the y^  but of the e^  also, extending 
the model to the form
n=0iXt-i+ • ■ ■ +0pyt-p+et+Pie,_i+...
(3)
where we are considering some weighted, moving average (MA) 
representation. This would be an ARMA(p,q) model (see references to 
Johnson and Judge et al. above) of the past q values of the random 
errors e^  as well as the y^  themselves. Finally, as has already been 
indicated, the data are expected to be stationary only when 
differenced, hence integrated (of order 1).
An appropriate model of the whole data generating process for prices 
and volumes might well therefore be an autoregressive integrated 
moving average model of appropriate order, designated ARIMA(p,d,q) for 
single dependent variables explained in terms of their own previous 
behaviour.
The terms within the bracket above should not be taken as implying 
that a rapid solution was possible however. Underlying growth and 
other exogenous low frequency economic influences may be expected to 
complicate the picture. The same is true of heterogenous random shocks 
applied to the system by the arrival of information, including
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information about prices and other endogenous variables such as dealer 
inventories as well as factors such as returns in other markets (here 
the bond and equity markets respectively within the same national 
financial market). These influences have all been identified in the 
literature as significant for the operation of financial markets, 
where the existence of market clearing prices does not signify 
equilibrium in the the overall process but rather supplies fresh 
information to fuel further trading rounds.
Examining the structure of autocorrelations and partial 
autocorrelations, formulating appropriate single equation models, 
testing their performance and analysing the residuals of surviving 
candidates were all required before a final choice could be made as to 
the best parsimonious representation of the likely data generating 
process of all the individual series considered. In doing so, 
guidelines set out in Cuthbertson, Hall and Taylor [1992], p.96 and 
Judge et al. [1988], p. 696 were found useful as well as model 
parameterisat ions suggested by Doornik and Hendry [1994], p. 166. The 
order (1,1,1) was eventually selected for bond volume and equity 
turnover modelling after testing other formulations, particularly 
ARIMA(2,1,2).
Stationarity has already been defined above as 'weak sense' 
stationarity, restricted to unchanging means, variances and 
covariances among the errors of a process. The covariances among the 
e^  between periods in such a process depends of course only on the 
time difference between the periods and not upon their location in 
time within the seunple. Covariances are accordingly expected to 
decline with separation in time, reflecting attenuation of 
intertemporal influences. Stationarity demands (but is not
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sufficiently described by) the arithmetical requirement of 
coefficients on the that sum to less than one: otherwise the x^ , 
x^ j^... would grow explosively. Similar reasoning constrains the 
coefficients on the e^ , in addition to the requirement for a 
geometrically declining progression reflecting the attenuation 
referred to above. These expected features are therefore among those 
tested for in the output of the models developed to describe the 
evolution of equity turnover and bond trading volume.
In the three equity markets an ARIMA(1,1,1) model was able to be found 
by non-linear least square methods (see Judge et al. [1988] p.697). 
Results are reported in Tables 8 and 9 below. The models for each 
market are remarkable for the similarity of their coefficients (see 
equations cited opposite country name in the tables) but nevertheless 
fail to improve on the performance of the simpler AR(1) model 
regressing equity turnover on its immediately preceding lagged value. 
In general the misspecification tests reported show that 
autocorrelation is not removed and the residuals from both approaches 
are distributed significantly differently from normal over the first 
four moments. In the bond markets only the Danish market, with its 
international characteristics, produced a stable ARIMA(1,1,1) model. 
When refitted to the data, autocorrelation was removed but residuals 
were not normal and the functional misspecification F-Test (see 
Doornik and Hendry [1994] p. 395.) indicated a serious problem with 
this model.
Chi-squared tests of all model specifications were satisfactory, as 
were all F-Tests other than the one reported above. It was concluded 
that either a time-dependent variance structure was present in the 
error terms of the single-variable lagged models or other variables
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were responsible for the evolution of volume data in both bonds and 
equities in all three markets. Attention therefore focussed on 
developing models with the appropriate features. In the single­
variable series it was considered that distributed lags would be 
unlikely to occur, given the rapid-response nature of financial 
markets. The possibility of conditional variance (the size of the 
variance of observed results being influenced by previous variability) 
was therefore explored before moving on to models incorporating other 
explanatory variables. ARCH tests performed on the residuals from 
modelling equity turnover, bond volume and market indices separately 
on their own lags failed to produce any evidence of time-dependent 
variance however.
TABLE 8: COMPARISON OF AR AND ARMA MODELS FOR EQUITY TURNOVER 
(MISSPECIFICATION TESTS)
AR(1) ARMA(1,1)
AUSTRIA (ARMA(1,1) equation:
0.21359*lag(deqto,l)-0.58419*lag(residual,1)
AR 1- 7F( 7,251) = 3.5475 [0.0012] ** ( 7,250) = 2.4334
^  [0.0199] *
ARCH 7 F( 7,244) = 1.2502 [0.2760] ( 7,243) = 1.3354
[0.2341]
Normality Chi=(2)= 13.539 [0.0011] ** 9.7343
^  [0.0077] **
DENMARK (ARMA(1,1) equation:
0.24583*lag(deqto,l)-0.53275*lag(residual,1)
AR 1- 7F( 7,251) = 2.4495 [0.0191] * ( 7,250) = 4.5943
[0.0001] **
ARCH 7 F( 7,244) = 0.2698 [0.9651] ( 7,243) = 0.35725
[0.9261]
Normality Chi=(2)= 14.552 [0.0007] ** 14.959
^  [0.0006] **
GERMANY (ARMA(1,1) equation:
0.34677*lag(deqto,l)-0.70852*lag(residual,1)
AR 1- 7F( 7,241) = 5.5662 [0.0000] ** ( 7,240) = 2.9603
[0.0054] **
ARCH 7 F( 7,234) = 0.22863 [0.9782] ( 7,233) = 0.15325
[0.9934]
Normality Chi=(2)= 2.0396 [0.3607] 1.7832
^  [0.4100]
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TABLE 9: COMPARISON OF AR AND ARMA MODELS FOR BOND VOLUME 
(MISSPECIFICATION TESTS)
AR(1) ARMA(1,1)
AUSTRIA (ARMA model failed to converge on a stable value)
AR 1- 7F( 7,240) = 5.4389 [0.0000] **
ARCH 7 F( 7,233) = 0.8316 [0.5620]
Normality Chi=(2)= 1.8032 [0.4059]
DENMARK (ARMA(1,1) equation:
0.019071*lag(dbvol,l)-0.40001*lag(residual,1)
AR 1- 7F( 7,254) = 2.5882 [0.0135] * ( 7,253) = 1.3513
[0.2267]
ARCH 7 F( 7,247) = 0.26315 [0.9675] ( 7,246) = 0.40805
[0.8969]
Normality Chi=(2)= 75.114 [0.0000] ** 73.275
[0.0000] **
RESET F( 1,260) = 3.0034 [0.0843] ( 1,259) = 4.9155
[0.0275] *
GERMANY (ARMA model failed to converge on a stable value)
AR 1- 7F( 7,240) = 4.9494 [0.0000] **
ARCH 7 F( 7,233) = 1.5418 [0.1540]
Normality Chi=(2)= 5.6784 [0.0585]
The results obtained to this point therefore lead to the general 
conclusion that modelling the single variables exclusively on the 
basis of their own past values is unlikely to lead to stable models 
capable of forecasting efficiently. On the other hand much of the 
behaviour exhibited is strongly suggestive of autoregressive effects, 
including time-varying levels of variability. This is borne in mind 
during the course of the work to model equity turnover, described in 
the next section, where it was considered useful to model turnover in 
the presence of other market variables, notably bond trading volume 
and the share price index, as well as its own past values.
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6.3.2: Modelling equity turnover
What follows is a brief discussion of the motivation for the specific 
modelling strategy employed at this stage.
Observed co-movement of bond transaction volumes and turnover in 
equity within each country examined is strongly suggestive of a medium 
to long term relationship between the variables. We hypothesise that:
(a) trading activity is required to adjust portfolio relationships 
in response to economic events, in particular to prospective 
growth and inflation. It affects both markets and accounts for 
simultaneous or near-simultaneous changes in trading volume.
(b) the share market is more likely than the bond market to delay 
the adjustment of portfolios because of short-run influences 
such as over-reaction to news, 'dead' periods ahead of 
announcements and so on. The bond market is less sensitive to 
economic news affecting corporate earnings and other sectoral 
developments and tends to move en bloc in response to its own 
stimuli.
(c) volume in the two markets is co-ordinated in the longer term by 
joint factors underlying growth in bond volume, equity market 
value and lower transactions costs, particularly in respect of 
the information component of transactions costs discussed 
elsewhere.
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(d) any long term relation identified would comprise a component for 
economic growth, net of purchasing power changes, and a 
residual, being the relationship defined at (c) above»
(e) since the variables in levels display exponential growth and 
cannot therefore remain in a constant relationship to each other 
at every point in time, that a correcting influence exists, 
tending to restore the long run relationship after short run 
excursions and results in the maintenance of an observable 
stable long term relationship between bond and share trading 
levels.
No attempt is made to establish causation (share trading causes bond 
trading or vice versa). On the other hand, the equity markets studied 
are much smaller than the corresponding bond markets and are likely to 
be separately influenced by stock price index movements. We therefore 
establish an initial model in which the dependent variable is the 
volume of equity trading, explained by the volume of bond trading, 
index movements and any other variables initially considered likely to 
influence the course of events. Into the last category fall long bond 
yields, a general price index and a broad measure of money growth, all 
as defined earlier. In a separate exercise, discussed later, the 
variables were examined for further evidence of cointegration in a 
general multivariate environment. A general-to-specific methodology 
was employed, proceeding from a broadly specified model in levels with 
the key variables - bond volume, equity turnover and the stock price 
index measured in logarithms - by a process of progressive, tested 
restrictions and transformations to produce a parsimonious 
representation of the hypothesised data generation process.
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We now turn to the modelling process itself. The first model 
considered employed 2 lags on all the chosen variables in line with 
the previous finding that 12 lags were rarely significant in the 
evolution of the single variable series (a twelve-lag model for each 
market was in fact formulated and tested but the results supported the 
above supposition and were of insufficient interest to report in 
detail: the same applies to the inclusion of the broad money measure 
which was dropped at an early stage). For each of the two markets 
studied (Vienna and Copenhagen) the equation
egtOj. = pj^cons + p ^ +p ^
+pjjbvoi Psivoi +P^bvol
+P,inci!xj+Paij:ciXt.-].+PjiJ2<ift-2
+P„Ii)ydt+p2iIi3ydj.i+Pijii5yd^.2+e^
(4)
was tested for validity and explanatory power with and without 
restrictions and for forecasting ability over the last 12 months of 
the sample period in the restricted form. Dropping Ibyd, the real bond 
yield and its lags, entailed no significant loss of information, as 
measured by the F-Test on this reduction in either market. Further 
reductions of the remaining variables or any of their lags produced an 
F-Test rejection in all cases (marginally for all lags=l in the case 
of the Danish market). The model in this form
egrtOj. = Picons +P2eqtOj._^+PjeqtOf._2 
+ P  b^vol t + P  b^vol t  + P  b^vol t _ 2  
+ p7 2J]Cbfc + Pg2Z2Cbf(.-l + P9-ij]Cbfc-2
(5)
yielded the results illustrated in the accompanying Figures 11 and 12
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Figure 11. MODEL 1. AUSTRIA EQUITY TURNOVER
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Figure 12. MODEL 1. DENMARK EQUITY TURNOVER
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The wide standard error bands and clear time-dependent relationships 
indicated in the grouping of the actual and fitted crossplots as well 
as the generally unsatisfactory visual fit, with forecasts lagging 
reality, all confirm the theoretical expectation already established 
for the individual data time series, that the model is unsuitable in 
its present form by virtue of nonstationarity, in spite of 
uncorrelated and fairly normally distributed residuals.
A model in seasonal differences
+ P 3 A ^ ^bvol t + P 4 A ^ ^bvol 
+ Pg A in d X j .+ p7 A +pgA^^ indx^.^
(6)
and one in first differences
L^eqto^. = Pj^A^egtOt.j^+PjA^egrtOt.a 
+ P 3  A ^ bvol t + P 4  A ^ bvol + p 5  A v 'o i  j. _ 2  
+ pg A + p7 A ndx-j.»!+ p  8 A ^ ind x-j..2
(7)
were next constructed, adopting the same approach. It is not viewed as 
credible that the short run dynamics of a securities market are 
capable of being modelled in seasonal differences, involving as they 
do an inherent 12-month lag, but as already pointed out, the 
impounding of 12 months data into the model produces an outrageously 
good fit. This is to be compared with the fact that the model in first 
differences fits poorly. Graphic results from both models are 
reproduced in the accompanying Figures 13-16.
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Figure 13. AUSTRIA EQUITY TURNOVER MODELLED IN SEASONAL DIFFERENCES
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Figure 14. DENMARK EQUITY TURNOVER MODELLED IN SEASONAL DIFFERENCES
Fitted D12LV11 CxMiss-plot 
SAMple is 1972 0 >  to 1993 (12)
D12LU11=_ 
Fopecjts t=.
2.8
2.1
♦ +
1.4
1.4
.9 a .9 1.8 2.7 3.6
2
1.5
1
.5
0
.5
1992 1993 1994
Co nr* 1 osri**M 
D12LV11=____
Freguency
D12LW11=_
1
.8
6
4
2
a
2
4
6
8
1
5 10 15
15
12
09
06
03
a
4 2 a
215
Figure 15. AUSTRIA EQUITY MODELLED IN FIRST DIFFERENCES
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Figure 16. DENMARK EQUITY MODELLED IN FIRST DIFFERENCES
Fitted DlLUll CxK>ss-plot 
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The only statistical result of interest as between the two forms is on 
the point of whether both forms of differencing induce stationarity, 
as was the case with the single variables. This is evident from the 
correlogram as well as from the underlying statistics not reported 
here.
To summarise progress to date therefore, a model in logarithms of 
levels looks attractive and appears to forecast well, albeit within 
wide error bounds, but is likely to be forecasting only the 
continuation of an established linear trend. In seasonal differences 
the moving average effect of twelve month data produces equally 
attractive-looking fit and forecast but cannot be theoretically 
justified. A model in first differences has neither fit nor forecast 
to recommend it, but should, a priori, better represent the presumed 
data generation process that produces the apparent observed 
cointegrated drift in equity turnover and bond volume. Therefore, in 
order to improve the explanatory power of the last model form cast in 
first differences, recourse was made to an error correction mechanism 
capable of reconciling the postulated long and short run dynamics 
involved.
It has been shown in empirical studies broadly relevant to the present 
study (Hendry and Mizon [1978], Hendry [1980], Baba et al [1983) and 
Cuthbertson Hall and Taylor [1992], pp. 103-106), that economic agents 
do indeed appear to act to adjust short term to long term 
relationship. The model is grounded theoretically in the idea of a 
motivation to adjust a (costly) out-of-equilibrium position on the 
part of agents upon detecting their situation in information emanating 
from the relevant environment (Hendry and von Ungern-Sternberg 
[1981]). The situation often modelled for example is that of consumers
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adjusting their consumption to long run income prospects. The 
information on which to base decisions there is poor and the effects 
slow to appear. In financial markets the much greater supply of 
immediate, relevant and relatively accurate information, plus the 
motivation to maximise returns from a balanced portfolio to match 
current or expected equilibrium conditions, a more rapid rate of 
adjustment is to be anticipated. Trading volume is of course already 
widely accepted as a proxy for the extent of any out-of-equilibrium 
position.
If the long run relation
EQUITY TURNOVER 
BOND VOLUME
(8)
is to be maintained constant, that is TURNOVER^ = K.VOLUME^ where K is 
some constant we should expect signs of an attempt to return to it in 
every period, acting against the tendency of the individual growth 
variables to follow diverging underlying paths. A similar relation
EQUITY TURNOVER 
MARKET INDEX
(9)
may also be present. With data expressed in logarithms (8) and (9) may 
be restated in the form of an error correction mechanism
ECM=eqto^_^-bvol^_^
(10)
or, in the presence of both factors
ECM=eqto^_^ -bvol
(11)
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Adding an expression of this form to the model in differences, with 
the expectation that its coefficient will be negative to offset the 
hypothesised short-run divergence from long-run congruence, would be 
expected to improve its stability and forecasting performance.
The error correction model form thus arrived at is either
A^egtOj. = Pi + PaA^jbvoIt+PaA^indXt 
+ p 4  {eq to -b vo l- in d x )
(12)
where both the price index and bond volume enter the error correction, 
or
A^eqtOf. = P i  + p jA ^ jb v o ij .  + p^ {eq to-hvol)  ^ . i  + p ^ l j b v o i t - i
where bond volume alone enters, or 
A^eqtOf. = P i  + p^A ^iiidx -j. + p^{eqto-indx)  ^ .i  +
(13)
(14)
where the index alone is instrumental in correcting the long run 
relation.
In all cases the long run solution represents a correction to be 
applied to the short run model to account for the tendency of agents 
to attempt to restore by trading the desired long run relation between 
their bond and equity holdings as they react to short run events.
Long run solutions for each market for each version of the error 
correction mechanism above are reported in the following table:
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TABLE 10: LONG RUN ERROR CORRECTION MODELS
DECMAUS=D1LV10-(.2955*D1LV1)-(2.8100*D1LV13)+(.3018*LV100113 
+(.17340*LV1)-(.4925*LV13) +3.2500;
DECVAUS=D1LV10-(.3296*D1LV1) +(.07702*LV1001) -(.0286*LV1)
+ .3837;
DECXAUS=D1LV10 -(2.9320*D1LV13)+(.2142*LV1013)-(.5403*LV13)
+2.5150;
DECMDEN=D1LV11-(.2855*D1LV2)-(1.5630*D1LV14)+(.2887*LV110214
+(.1509*LV2)+(.001869*LV14)+.6098;
DECVDEN=D1LV11-(.3302*D1LV2) +(.1701*LV1102) +(.03351*LV2)
+.1452;
DECXDEN=D1LV11-(1.9980*D1LV14)+(.1079*LV1114)
-(.1305*LV14) + .3061;
DECMGER=D1LV12-(.2818*D1LV3)-(4.5540*D1LV15)+(.5683*LV120315 
+(.42660*LV3) -(.4902+LV15) +3.6060;
DECVGER=D1LV12-(.3880*D1LV3)+(.2127*LV1203)
+(.04106*LV3) - .3985;
DECXGER=D1LV12 -(4.9400*D1LV15)+(.5068*LV1215)
-(.8119*LV15) +4.7240;
12a)
13a)
14a)
12d)
13d)
14d)
12g)
13g)
14g)
LEGEND: DECV,X,M/AUS,DEN,GER = Error correction variable in 
differences for bond (V)olume, Share Price Inde(X) or (M)ultiple in 
Austria, DENmark or GERmany.
For each country respectively:
D1LV1..3 = First differences of bond volume at time t.
D1LV10..12 = First differences of log of share turnover at time t 
D1LV13..15 = First differences of share price index at time t. 
LVIOOI etc log share turnover - log of bond volume, all at time t-1 
LV1013 etc log share turnover - log of index, all at time t-1 
LV100113 etc both above, see equation (11)
These results are the long-run solution of models based on an error 
correction model paramaterisation proposed by Doornik and Hendry 
[1994] p. 166.
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The final form of the error correcting model thus becomes (using (12) 
above)
A^egtOj. = Pi + pjA^ jbvoij. +
(15)
This model was tested, with the results presented graphically in 
Figures 17. and 18.
It is immediately evident that a dramatically improved fit has been 
achieved. On the other hand both standard test results and the 
correlogram show evidence of serial correlation. This is confirmed 
visually by graphing the residuals which show clear evidence of a 
random walk that centres on zero but takes values far from this mean 
over relatively long periods. Figures 19. and 20. summarise the 
results so far for the Austrian and Danish markets exhibiting, in 
order, the three variables in logs and differences, followed by the 
error correcting factors and the residuals from the whole model. It 
continues to be noteworthy that the same model sustains the same 
conclusions in both markets so far. Logs of the variables are seen to 
be stationary in differences, as are the three candidates for an error 
correcting mechanism. Only the residuals exhibit a clear random walk, 
producing the serial correlation evident in the correlogram of Figures 
17. and 18.
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Figure 17. AUSTRIA ERROR CORRECTION MODEL
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Figure 18. DENMARK ERROR CORRECTION MODEL
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Figure 19. AUSTRIA VARIABLE TRANSFORMATIONS AND RESIDUALS
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Figure 20. DENMARK VARIABLE TRANSFORMATIONS AND RESIDUALS
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The further possibility arises however that agents would seek to 
counter random shocks affecting the bond market in the same way they 
would respond to deterministic shifts or short term trends. That 
amounts to stating that the variance of equity turnover is itself 
likely to vary, demonstrating autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity (ARCH) characteristics. The phenomenon had 
previously been tested for in the single variables comprising the 
models developed so far and not found. It was. provisionally accounted 
for by the addition of the residuals from the previous result, lagged 
one period, as a further regressor to the existing model, which was 
then re-estimated.
The results of estimating the equation 
A^egtOt *= Pi + pjA^ jbv'oij. +
(16)
are much more satisfactory. The correspondence of actual and fitted is 
much closer, forecasts remain well within narrow standard error bounds 
and tests of model specification and stability are acceptable, as 
shown in the table of final results. Residuals are close to 'white 
noise' although there is some evidence of long period wandering around 
the mean, particularly in the Austrian case. The possibility of ARCH 
residuals was nevertheless not neglected (see further below).
Figures 21-22 for Austria and 23-24 for Denmark, show the fit and 
white noise appearance of the residuals, together with a correlogram 
with little evidence of serial correlation and a close-to-normal 
appearance for the distribution of the residuals.
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Figure 21. AUSTRIA ARCH MODEL RESIDUALS (TWO ERROR CORRECTION TERMS)
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Figure 22. AUSTRIA ARCH FORECAST AND OUTCOME
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Figure 23. DENMARK ARCH MODEL RESIDUALS (TWO ERROR CORRECTION TERMS)
Fitted DlLVll Cx*oss—plot 
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Figure 24. DENMARK ARCH FORECAST AND OUTCOME
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Figures 22 and 24 in particular show the efficiency of the forecasts 
achieved. With the forecast period extended to 24 periods there are no 
forecasts outside the error bounds and little evidence of lagging or 
failing to accommodate turning points.
It is possible to observe continued random-walk-like wandering in the 
residuals from the Austrian model however, together with consistent 
positive, if small, residual serial correlation and a less 
satisfactory distribution of the residuals. This gives rise to the 
suspicion that cross-equation linkages are present in an error 
correction with two terms. Recasting the model with a single error 
correction term - on bond volume rather than bond volume plus the 
index - a better fit and all-round better results are obtained. The 
results are exhibited in Figures 25 and 26.
At this point the two markets evidently begin to differ in the details 
of their responses. Austrian equity turnover appears to be less 
influenced by the share price index. This is consistent with the 
evidence of market structure already presented, trading activity 
reflecting the behaviour of banks suiting their own convenience as 
well as maintaining step with Germany to a greater degree than 
Denmark. It remains an open question whether modelling equity turnover 
on bond volume alone is the best representation of the data generating 
process overall.
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Figure 25. AUSTRIA ARCH MODEL RESIDUALS (ONE ERROR CORRECTION TERM)
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Figure 26. AUSTRIA ARCH MODEL FINAL FORECAST AND OUTCOME
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Evidence of autoregressive heteroscedasticity remained a suspect in 
the residuals from the (purposes of comparison) model of the German 
market, despite earlier testing for ARCH moments in the individual 
data series used. A Generalised Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model (see Engle [1982]) was therefore 
developed for all three markets, replacing the simpler procedure of 
adding the untreated residuals to the regression, equivalent to an 
ARCH slope coefficient of unity.
For the Austrian market the best ARCH equation failed to improve on 
the performance of the earlier model. For the Danish market no 
convergence could be found in the non-linear least squares 
minimisation. Both of these results would seem to suggest slope 
coefficients close to unity in the putative ARCH model. The detailed 
results are not reported.
In the case of the German market, using the optimised ARCH model
produced much improved overall results and forecasting performance, to 
a level comparable with the other two markets on the basis of their 
simpler treatment. This is of sufficient interest to report in detail, 
in spite of the fact that modelling the German market was not a prime
goal. The results are displayed in Figures 27 and 28. Figure 29 shows
the conditional and unexpected components of variance, which are in 
accordance with the hypothesis that major shocks to the trading system 
produce a decaying train of variability in equity trading volume. The 
remaining, unanticipated variance is small and stable.
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Figure 27. GERMANY ARCH MODEL RESIDUALS
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Figure 28. GERMANY ARCH FORECAST
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Figure 29. GERMANY CONDITIONAL VARIANCE OF EQUITY TURNOVER
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The full model for the German market is based on the equation 
A^eqtOf. = Pi + pjA^jbv'oit + p^ercnif.+p^arch^
(17)
where arch = (sign preserved) sqrt(.6762u^_j) and ercm is error 
correction function number (13g) from Table 11.
The (passed) functional misspecification tests from PC-GIVE version 
8.0 on the final model for the German market are shown below.
AR 1- 7F( 7,238) = 2.026 [0.0526]
ARCH 7 F( 7,231) = 1.4372 [0.1912]
Normality Chi=(2)= 0.30787 [0.8573]
Xi* F( 6,238) = 2.0822 [0.0560]
Xi*Xj F( 9,235) = 1.8077 [0.0677]
RESET F( 1,244) = 1.9147 [0.1677]
The conclusion drawn is that the expected value of variance in equity
turnover in all three markets is affected by the degree of variability 
in previous bond volume and share price index movements. This can only 
be demonstrated in the case of the German market, probably for reasons 
of larger size and lower general volatility. A direction is indicated 
for further, future research on the other two markets, together with 
any other suitable candidates for a similar approach, to determine the 
precise nature of this aspect of their dynamic behaviour. Figure 30 
shows the conditional and unanticipated variance of equity turnover in 
the Austrian market for example, where, although not able to pass 
misspecification tests in the present parameterisat ion of the model, 
there would appear to be scope for further detailed investigation.
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Figure 30. AUSTRIA: CANDIDATE COINTEGRATING VECTORS FOR VAR MODEL
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Further avenues for research, possibly using higher frequency data, 
are suggested to establish a more exact model in a multivariate 
context. A further future study suggests itself into the possibility 
that the German market behaves more like a small regional market, or a 
collection of such markets (as it is in fact organised) than a large 
international centre. The proposition is supported by much anecdotal 
evidence.
As an appendix to the present investigation, an unrestricted reduced 
form model was run to test for cointegrating relations in a vector 
autoregression (VAR). Cointegration was used to verify the results 
obtained from general-to-specific modelling rather than as a modelling 
strategy, based as it is on an essentially different econometric 
methodology. Further investigation of the restrictions required to 
establish the exact parameters of the cointegrating vectors and to 
base a satisfactory model upon them constitutes an opportunity to re­
examine the present or higher frequency data (unlikely to be available 
for the whole of the sample period considered here). This is 
considered more appropriate as a separate future activity based on the 
rather different VAR methodology. Figure 30 shows two satisfactory and 
one unsatisfactory candidate for cointegrating vectors for the Danish 
market using this approach, together with their fit and plots of the 
variables entering into them.
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CONCLUSION
The overall conclusion drawn from all the analysis and modelling work 
described above is that the three markets share strong structural and 
dynamic features which produce models of their data generation 
process, particularly equity turnover and bond trading volume, that 
are remarkably similar in character, if not in detail. The 
similarities do not appear to be based on spatial factors, since the 
markets are differently organised and possess different trading 
instruments and practices, as well as exhibiting only the degree of 
connectedness that one would expect from co-habiting a highly 
integrated economic region. Direct correlations between the data from 
different markets are weak and models were improved by the progressive 
exclusion of candidate independent variables from among the data of 
other markets. The effects of different trading practices on markets 
are discussed in detail in Section 5.2.3 and the actual setups and 
instruments are compared in the Introduction to Part II, more detailed 
description on each market being furnished in Chapters 7-10.
The underlying reason for the observed relationship between bond 
trading volume and equity turnover is, it may be concluded, that the 
markets in question are heavily dominated by bond trading and conduct 
equity trading on the basis of what is necessary to rebalance 
portfolios in consequence of changes in bond holdings. This 
conclusion, reinforced by the dominance of the bond market in simple 
size terms, allows the further surmise that causation runs from the 
bond market to the equity market rather than the other way round. 
Needless to say, economic factors such as unanticipated government 
borrowing requirements and changes in prospective inflation (both 
operating on long term interest rates) affect both markets as joint 
influences. In markets such as the United Kingdom, where attention to
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equity predominates irrespective of market size, the influence of the 
economic factors is felt there directly. A good example was the 
revelation of a large, unanticipated extra UK government borrowing 
need on September 18th 1995, which produced a fall of 31 points 
(0.87%) in the FT-SE 100, not reflected in other indices, and 
generated considerable equity trading volume. The results of this part 
of the survey are therefore mainly applicable to the study of bond- 
dominated markets, but should be relevant to the newer markets that 
are developing as this feature evolves and relevant data accumulates.
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APPENDIX 
TEST RESULTS
The following table 11 exhibits the standard test results obtained by 
modelling each variable in turn at the lags shown on its own previous 
values, without further treatment, as discussed in Section 6.2. 
Results are grouped in threes, representing the three countries, 
Austria, Denmark and Germany, in that order. A single star alongside 
represents significance at the 5% level, two stars represents the 1% 
confidence level. Of interest is the close grouping as between 
countries in many cases.
The tests are identified as follows and are output from PC-GIVE 
Version 8.0. (Doornik and Hendry [1994]): R^2 = R Squared 
DW = Durbin-Watson DF = Dickey-Fuller
ADF = Augmented Dickey-Fuller DHF = Dickey-Hasza-Fuller
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Table 11.
R^ '2 DW DW(ÜR) DF ADF DHF
SEQTO 1.98 1.35 -10.52** -3.28**
2.05 .29 -2.69** —.04**
1.88 .90 -7.51 —.19**
seqto_2 .65 2.03 .45 -5.37** -3.81**
.73 2.02 .34 -4.35** -3.35**
.52 2.06 .62 —6.40** -3.78**
seqto_12 .72 1.79 .44 -5.39** -4.20** 4.76
.77 1.80 .35 -4.73** —4.14** 5.87
.64 1.76 .60 -6.30** -4.13** 3.87
bvol_12 .08 .58 3.63
.02 1.38 2.35
.06 .40 2.55
dbvol_2 2.19 1.13 -8.45** -4.67**
bvol_12 1.84 2.55 -21.22** -4.72**
2.61 -21.38** -3.82**
2.53 -20.64** —5.64**
sbvol_12 .45 1.85 1.16 -8.59 -3.24 5.92
.76 1.70 .45 -4.62 -2.88 6.86
.48 1.79 .85 -7.24 -3.12 6.39
INDX_12 1.50 .02 .25 -.19
2.00 .01 1.18 .82
2.01 .01 1.13 .57
indx_12 1.98 .01 1.70 .86
1.99 .00 2.42 1.28
2.00 .01 1.85 1.09
dindx_12 1.98 1.41 -11.67** -3.20**
2.01 1.84 -14.21** -4.30**
2.00 1.45 -11.49** —3.64**
sindx_12 .95 2.01 .08 -2.26** -2.81** 2.65
.95 2.08 .08 -2.74** -2.79** 3.78
.94 2.09 .09 -2.29** -2.60** 2.85
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CHAPTER 7: THE COPENHAGEN STOCK EXCHANGE AND DANISH SECURITIES MARKET 
INTRODUCTION
The Danish market closely resembles one of two alternative models 
frequently cited as desirable, if not yet attainable, for the emergent 
economies of eastern Europe. Based on a deep and liquid bond market, 
the sole exchange, Copenhagen, is efficiently organised on the basis 
of electronic trading, automated settlement and dematerialised custody 
and possesses a varied fauna of participants. The alternative, a 
'presence' bourse with trading floor and printed securities, has 
already been eschewed by most newly formed and reforming exchanges.
The case for the Danish model is supported by the high turnover which 
followed immediately on its inception and increases in volume after 
every successive subsequent fiscal and market reform on the way to the 
present market configuration. The development of trading volume in 
this market has already been analysed in Chapter 6.
In this chapter, institutional and other factors are examined on the 
basis of questionnaire-based formal interviews with market 
participants, published evidence from the market authorities, various 
independent authors and contemporary press and periodical literature. 
The structure of this and subsequent chapters in Part II follows a 
sequence beginning with a historical overview (Section 7.1), followed 
by discussion of contemporary issues (7.2); an exposition of the 
market's structure (7.3); discussion of regulatory issues (7.4); the 
influence of information expansion (7.5) and a synthesis of the survey 
results (7.6). Conclusions are based on the relation between the 
evidence gathered and the six basic hypotheses set out in Chapter 1. 
Since the issues addressed by the hypotheses are closely 
interconnected, an explicit one-to-one form of analysis is not
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possible: the hypotheses are best considered jointly as the set of
parameters to which the arguments presented relate. They were, it will
be recalled:
1. that economic benefits are available from improvements in business 
infrastructure and information expansion as a result of the 
operation of a viable and valid securities market,
2. that wherever market power is in a small number of hands, 
opportunities exist to improve market structure and performance, 
especially volume generation, by distributing market power,
3. that similar benefits follow upon the lowering of entry barriers 
and promotion of a balanced fauna of market participants,
4. that reform increases turnover and continued reform continues to 
produce a similar response,
5. that spatial perceptions on the part of equity issuers and 
investors work in the interest of national and regional markets,
6. that the direction of development in small national securities 
markets tends to replace institutions and their rules with market 
processes and products.
The next-following brief overview serves to identify factors in the 
early and more recent history of the Danish market as they bear on the 
present-day evolution and future potential of Copenhagen as a 
financial centre.
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Section 7.1: Historical background
Denmark’s first bourse was established during the reign of the 
mercantilist King Christian IV (1597-1648). He also ruled Norway, 
maintaining a commercial culture that was Nordic or Scandinavian as 
much as it was Danish. Denmark’s prosperity has always been based on 
trade rather than domestic industry, as symbolised by the original, 
imposing, 1625 Bourse building still standing directly on the 
Copenhagen waterfront. Equity trading is known to have been 
established as early as 1684. The Copenhagen exchange therefore shares 
the same liberal commercial culture as Amsterdam, Lisbon and London 
and is to be differentiated from, for example, the closed Viennese 
tradition of trading mainly in government securities. The Copenhagen 
market subsequently shared in the general pattern of European stock 
exchange development characterised by speculative bubbles and 
sequences of trading, industrial and railway booms, interspersed by 
crises, collapses, periods of stagnation and reform. In the present 
context this history is best seen as contributing to forming in 
Denmark, as elsewhere, a general public view, a cultural concept, of a 
national stock market, imagined as a part-respectable, part- 
scandalous, mysteriously moving, but essential economic and business 
institution with a profile varying from front page news to semi­
obscurity according to the scale of contemporary events surrounding 
it. Except for noting that this long tradition puts Denmark in the 
ranks of those countries possessing a consciously established and 
reputable stock market, it is not considered useful to report it in 
great detail here.
In 1919 the Danish Parliament replaced self-administration with a 
formal regulatory structure, but without significantly reducing the
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independence of the Bourse. The market itself moved into 
undistinguished office premises in the Nikolai Plads in 1974. A major 
market reform was undertaken in 1986 with a view to moving away from 
the traditional open outcry system. Copenhagen was not the first 
Scandinavian bourse to take this step, Stockholm having done so a 
decade earlier, in the early 1970s, as the world's first electronic 
bourse. From 1988 the Copenhagen exchange was completely 
dematerialised with the advent of the 'ELECTRA' electronic trading and 
associated settlement and custody systems.
During the 1980s there was a strong increase in trading volume in all 
sectors, accompanied by upward price movements with marked surges at 
the time of reforms and introduction of new trading systems. The total 
equity index had moved from its base of 100 at January 1st 1983 to 360 
by early 1990, stagnating somewhat thereafter.
During the period, the growth of the small, open Danish economy was 
led by foreign rather than domestic demand as corporate earnings grew 
strongly. A buoyant property market up to 1986 and an increased public 
sector deficit thereafter produceed a parallel increase in bond issues 
and corresponding growth in levels of trading volume. An increase in 
the size of the overall investor community occurred, consisting mainly 
of domestic and foreign institutions rather than private investors and 
small savers.
From about 1976 foreign investors had begun to discover both the 
quality of the main bond instruments traded and an interest rate 
differential of up to 1.5 % maintained with other markets, notably 
Germany. This, together with the fact that withholding tax was not 
charged on interest payments abroad, led to a sustained increase in
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bond trading volume and the internationalisation of the market. A 
further unexpectedly large impulse was given by the introduction of 
electronic trading in 1988, itself a response to high volumes and 
consciousness on the part of the market authorities of the need to 
ensure that this manna was not lost to other, competing exchanges, 
notably Stockholm and London. The 1988 volume increase was also to a 
great extent the result of previously unreported trade becoming 
visible. Before 1988 only about 10% of securities trading was done 
through the CSE and off-exchange trading was not reported. On the 
other hand, interview respondents for this research asserted that the 
visibility of the market, both in terms of reporting and detailed 
information concerning individual securities' movements in the daily 
list, had heightened the general perception of liquidity, leading in 
turn to substantial real increases in trading volume.
It is an open question whether a market as efficient and well- 
exploited as the Danish bond market can expect to generate greater 
volumes of trading in the longer term. On the other hand, the country 
shares a Europe-wide imbalance between equity and loan finance in 
corporate balance sheets and, as a member of the European Union, hence 
of the Single Market, it faces competitive pressures for improved 
corporate commercial performance.
On the supply side of the corporate finance market, a large increase 
in privately funded pension schemes is expected, in response to the 
demographic and fiscal changes common to all the developed countries 
of Europe. The exchange is well-adapted to process-oriented rather 
than institution-oriented trading in the event that increased equity 
trading activity follows the NASDAQ model. Copenhagen also possesses a 
rich supply of younger, well-educated, local-market-trained personnel
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in established financial institutions. They are available to found 
new, specialist firms as required. Elements of the 'calving cycle' of 
new firm formation are clearly in evidence, three of the broking firms 
visited falling into this category.
Total equity market capitalisation has traditionally always been 
small, most shares being held privately on a long term basis. Fiscal 
factors have since 1986 become favourable to equity market growth 
following the relaxation of capital gains taxation rules, although 
these still favour institutions rather than individuals. A more 
important factor for the equity market has however been the narrow 
base for trading. In the three-tier market. Tier I, the main market, 
accounts for about 98% of market capitalisation. Of the 195 companies 
quoted, the ten largest account for 52% of market value and 50% of 
trading volume. The size of these companies renders it difficult to 
move the price of any one of their shares by manipulative trading 
activity. The market may therefore be considered valid. On the other 
hand the size of deal for which the market is able to supply immediacy 
is open to question. A consensus among the brokers interviewed in 
Copenhagen was that approximately 15 issues were liquid enough to be 
considered for actively traded institutional portfolios. The equity 
market can therefore be regarded as only marginally viable for foreign 
and domestic institutional investors other than banks.
Banks enjoy a number of advantages of market position, access to 
information and possession of portfolios whose short-term performance 
is not closely scrutinised by clients and shareholders, allowing them 
to trade when it suits them. On the other hand the excellent 
infrastructure, and the capability of that infrastructure to respond 
to future opportunities, renders Copenhagen's potential very great.
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Section 7.2: Contemporary issues
There are problems associated with adopting the Danish model as the 
basis for other, newer exchanges. First, the Danish market has 
developed organically, deriving its base of confidence and general 
acceptability from a long historical background embedded in Danish, 
Nordic and general European commercial culture. It is questionable 
whether its development trajectory could be duplicated from a 
different starting point within a practical timescale in the radically 
different material circumstances to be found, for example, in eastern 
Europe. Denmark's large bond market alone is the product of a distinct 
financial tradition, namely the issue of property-backed loans which 
owed their enormous growth to tax advantages that no longer obtain and 
to a form of collateral, property, that has lost some of its 
credibility.
Second, the Copenhagen market is not without contemporary 
difficulties, as recognised by a majority of the participants in their 
responses to interview questions. Among them may be cited failure to 
offer an adequate source of risk capital for small and medium, even 
large-scale, businesses, a long period of stagnation in the equity 
sector and market ’management', if not actual manipulation, by large 
institutions in the bond market. The survival of smaller participants 
cannot be guaranteed, and, for reasons not connected with the stock 
market, many of its larger banking institutions have a recent and 
ongoing history of severe instability. One bank whose stockbroking arm 
was interviewed as part of this research had been reorganised only 
shortly before the interview date, and has since filed for bankruptcy. 
Others are suffering well-publicised difficulties.
253
Three specific observations emerge from the research, that are 
relevant to other markets hoping to generate a similar architecture.
To begin: the Danish market has survived the partial demise of the 
tax-exempt status of property-secured loans, these instruments having 
been progressively replaced by other offerings without loss of 
turnover volume, although property-based bonds still account for two- 
thirds of the nominal value remaining in issue. The phenomenon of a 
market continuing to develop after its original raison d'etre has 
departed, where participants stay on after their original incentive to 
enter has been removed, is shown elsewhere in this study to be an 
important characteristic of market development.
Second: international interest in Danish securities, the basis for 
high liquidity levels, has created a pool of foreign holdings, mainly 
in London. A fear expressed by several Copenhagen respondents was that 
this pool was becoming large enough, by mid-1992, to form the basis 
for a separate market conducted entirely in London, perhaps also in 
Stockholm, based on a circle of institutions known to each other and 
linked by specialist brokers in the foreign centre. The ease with 
which such arrangements can come into existence is demonstrated 
elsewhere (see the case of Austrian bond specialists in London,
Chapter 8). In the Danish market, 'diversion by drift' applies largely 
to fixed interest securities and was not regarded as a serious problem 
in equities. From the tenor of their replies, respondents' mainly 
relaxed attitude to the development was based on a sense of Nordic 
solidarity, of knowing and being on friendly terms with all the 
institutions concerned and being represented themselves in Stockholm 
and London. These circumstances would almost certainly not apply to 
many other centres.
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Third: turnover volume in Copenhagen has undergone a quantum increase, 
clearly shown in the long run statistics analysed in Chapter 6. This 
would appear to represent an opportunity for other exchanges to 
benefit by following suit and increasing their turnover volume. 
Detailed discussion with market participants revealed further 
necessary conditions for volumes to increase by whole orders of 
magnitude however. For example a relatively large starting size of 
order flows is required for there to be profit in trading relatively 
small differences in prices and yields. An already large order flow 
can often be increased without difficulty - 'trades beget trades'. A 
small flow will not always afford profitable new trading opportunities 
if spreads are small. Further, market participants must possess a 
relatively high degree of control over the portfolios whose 
composition is changed by their trading activity. Finally, 
participants must face general competitive pressure for performance 
inside or outside the securities market. All these conditions are 
fulfilled in Copenhagen, both because of the large size of banks' own 
and managed portfolios and because there is competition among 
themselves on a number of fronts, not only in bond markets.
Section 7.3: The structure of the Danish market
The Copenhagen Stock Exchange is one of three institutions which 
together control and operate the Danish securities market as a whole. 
The others are the Guarantee Fund for Futures and Options and the 
Securities Registration Centre. Three key features of a small, modern, 
national securities market are thus integrated: securities trading, 
derivatives trading and settlement and custody. Since research 
fieldwork was completed a further institution has been announced, the 
Copenhagen Stock Exchange International (COSI) providing a trading
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system for international securities not listed on the CSE. This 
innovation is rather more than a defensive measure against trade 
diversion, being oriented essentially to the capture of trading volume 
in regionally important securities, including German, Norwegian and 
Swedish share and bond issues. It represents an attempt to increase 
the range of equities and scale of bargain for which immediacy can be 
provided, by going beyond the limited equity base of Danish registered 
companies alone.
In the bond market approximately 36% of issues are made by the Danish 
government, and 63% by mortgage credit institutions. Three main 
instruments are issued. Bullet loans (so called because the principal 
falls due for payment in its entirety on the maturity date, rather 
than being scheduled or ballotted for progressive repayment) form 
about 41% of the bond market. Serial loans, repaid by declining 
instalments that include the interest due at each instalment date, are 
responsible for about 9% of issue volume. The commonest instrument 
however is the annuity loan at 46% of issue volume, repaid in equal 
instalments, interest predominating in the early years. This form of 
repayment would be familiar to a British private mortgagor. No 
turnover tax is paid on bond market trading. The tax is however 
payable at a rate of 1% on share dealings: a factor which interviewees 
held partly to blame for poor market participation by small savers. A 
stronger disincentive in their view however was capital gains tax at 
50-68% on gains realised within three years by residents. Institutions 
could avoid capital gains by trading tactics that involved buy-back 
deals to bridge the three-year limit. They could also deal with non­
residents to whom the impost did not apply. Tax arrangements in the 
equity market therefore work against direct participation by investors 
who do not possess knowledge, trading skills and connections.
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It was considered unlikely by all respondents that the situation would 
change in the near future, mainly because resultant losses of 
government revenue would accrue at a time when it was already 
difficult to control the public sector budget deficit.
The continuous auction trading system requires no trading floor and no 
personal presence by members or their representatives at the 
Copenhagen exchange. It is thus an entirely electronic system operated 
from brokers' offices. Five subsystems are operated of which one, the 
Information System, is an integral part of the others. The Match 
System continually matches round-lot bids and offers whenever a new 
bid or offer is made at the same or a better price with respect to the 
direction of the desired transaction. The Accept System is in effect 
an electronic notice board, like those on the NASDAQ or SEAQ systems. 
It allows brokers to see all bids and offers relating to a particular 
issue and to accept one of them as required, after which the item is 
deleted from the system. The Trade Support System allows interest to 
be registered in trading large blocks of securities without revealing 
a price. This system is available to a restricted group of subscribing 
institutions involve in block trades. Finally, the Reporting System 
registers deals made outside the electronic trading system, since its 
direct use is not obligatory. These transaction must be entered within 
90 seconds of completion, or at start of trading if the bargain is 
made out of hours.
Section 7.4: Regulatory issues
Copenhagen shares the subtler difficulties faced by smaller countries 
in attempting to square light regulation for competitive reasons with 
the tighter control required to avoid manipulation of narrow markets,
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particularly the equity market. A new set of Rules of Ethics and 
Information Obligations came into effect on January 1st 1992 to 
"reflect the increased demands .. made of listed companies by 
shareholders, investors and other market participants (but) without 
imposing undue restrictions on issuers" (CSE Annual Report, 1991). As 
a major example of the difficulty of pursuing an even-handed approach 
in a small economy, the events which followed are instructive. 
Political pressure obliged the CSE to propose in March 1992 that the 
major shipping lines' former exemption from half-yearly reporting, 
reinforced for other companies by the new regulations, be withdrawn. A 
P Mol1er, Denmark's largest firm and a group that avoids being treated 
as such for reporting purposes, however were in a position to exert 
heavy pressure to frustrate the regulatory intention.
Trading rules introduced to control insider trading in Denmark were 
cited by three brokers and two banks as 'stupid'. The szune term was 
used by all respondents, reinforcing an impression gained elsewhere 
that views were highly concerted as a result of frequent contact and 
discussion among market participants. On being asked to elaborate, 
most respondents cited inability to trade intelligently in equities on 
the basis of researched fundamentals, without using information that 
could be construed as privileged. This objection is frequently 
encountered in other markets and in contemporary press and 
professional commentaries. It may be that strict definition of insider 
trading sets a finite limit to the informational efficiency of 
markets.
Listings in the Copenhagen market were made conformable to EC rules 
for admission and prospectus requirements from June 1991. EC Directive 
80/390 and later amendments, which cater for mutual recognition by all
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EC countries of a prospectus for securities listed on the exchanges of 
any member state, were implemented in October 1990.
The CSE was the initiator of the proposed Nordic Exchange, still under 
discussion but considered by Danish and Swedish brokers unlikely to go 
forward. The less formal 'Nordquote' information network has been 
established and is considered sufficient to co-ordinate and raise the 
investment profile of the five Nordic exchanges.
Section 7.5: Information expansion
Since 1988 the CSE has actively marketed the information produced as a 
byproduct of its electronic trading operations. The revenue, along 
with reported cost reductions from the adoption of computer-based 
trading systems, has contributed to financial stability and permitted 
further development investment. From 1991, increased availability of 
real-time information has led to its use by international information 
reprocessors and vendors to deliver value-added services to 
international investors. This development in turn has led to increased 
awareness and active trading interest from abroad (CSE Annual Report, 
1991).
The views of all interview respondents were sought on the extent to 
which publicly available, market-related information had improved in 
recent years, the reference year being 1986, prior to the reforms and 
trading upsurges. The summary judgement asked for was a 
characterisation as 'some', 'great', or 'explosive' expansion.
The consensus was that there had been a great expansion in the last 
ten years, particularly in the area of exchange reporting. The daily
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list had grown from one to ten or more pages and much-expanded 
statistical and other services were now available. The 1993 list of 
such services runs to three full A4 pages. Bloomberg screen-based 
market information services were introduced in 1989 with 20 
subscribers. The number was, at end-1993, over 100 and the main 
competition, Reuters, is often only retained out of necessity. 
Improvements in the Reuters service had been noted as a result of 
Bloomberg's arrival.
The market is also served by a specialist publication "Monday Morning" 
-literally the result of weekend analysis by investment journalists 
and regarded as essential reading. The newspaper "Borsen" expanded to 
a general readership paper in order to maintain circulation. One 
unanticipated positive result has been wider public awareness of 
market matters. On the other hand a number of financial scandals, 
particularly the 'Northern Feather Company' affair and several 
property crashes, as well as the well-publicised difficulties of the 
major banks, have had an inhibiting effect on small savers’ 
willingness to consider equity investment. There is equal reluctance 
on the part of companies to release information about their activities 
in spite of the previously identified regulatory changes designed to 
standardise and render more frequent their announcements and interim 
reports.
Section 7.6: Survey results
Interview questions were identical in all European centres, apart from 
supplementaries and the discussion of information expansion. Questions
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were administered after allowing respondents to say anything they 
wished by way of introductory remarks about themselves, their 
organisation, clientèles and markets, but reserving rejoinders and 
general discussion until after the structured interview was complete. 
Supplementary questions were added and clarifications requested as the 
interviews proceeded. The ensuing discussion tended to focus on 
questions already asked rather than raising new issues. Sessions were 
often of 90 minutes or more and accompanied by discussion with 
respondents' colleagues and visits to dealing rooms. The interviews 
conducted in Copenhagen were directed chiefly towards establishing the 
rôles of, and competitive relationships between, banks and market- 
dependent brokers in the Copenhagen market, both dynamically and as 
regards the effects of possible structural change on the health of the 
market: its validity, viability and potential, as defined elsewhere.
A very large number of points was raised by respondents in reply to 
questions about the relative strengths of market institutions. Many of 
these points have been incorporated into arguments elsewhere, but are 
here synthesised into a 'picture' of the market as observed by its 
inhabitants. The respondents were all involved in broking. For 
simplicity of identification of the actors, 'banks' are the broking 
arms of banks and 'large broker' means a large non-bank securities 
trading institution. Small brokers are those normally described as 
'independent' but for whom the term 'market-dependent' is reserved 
here.
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Figure 1. COPENHAGEN MARKET MEMBERSHIP
COPENHAGEN MARKET MEMBERSHIP 
O v n e r t h i p  s t r u c t u r e  1987-1992
NO. 30 
OF
FIRMS
1 BROKERS
2  BANKS
3 FOREIGN OWNED
1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2 3
1 9 8 7 /3 1 9 8 7 /7 1989 1992
source: Copenhagen Stock Exchange
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Because of the centre’s small size and close-knit structure, it is 
often difficult to avoid identification of an individual organisation 
in reporting views. This problem has been handled in some cases by 
suppressing comment that was both contentious and easily traceable to 
source. In others it is dealt with by omitting a detailed 
characterisation of the respondents’ organisation.
Bankers stressed that their main trading objective was commission 
income and that competition was fair and based on commission levels. 
The decline in broker numbers (see Figure 1) was attributed to the 
need for a technological base for electronic trading and for high- 
quality client advice, research and information services; all of which 
could only be supported by high turnover.
The brokers all regarded commission levels as too low and spreads as 
too small ’to live on’: this phrase was used repeatedly. All brokers 
and one medium-sized bank went on to claim that the larger banks were 
mainly interested in capturing market share. Methods mentioned were 
shaving commissions and recouping profit on the spread; using own 
security stocks and crossing orders in large volume to maintain a 
price differential to the market; having house rules that required a 
profit on every trade; maintaining spreads at levels that were too 
narrow to arbitrage, given transaction costs, but wider than would 
obtain in a free market. Two banks were named as offenders, one much 
more frequently than the other. On the other hand, two other bankers 
claimed that banks’ shareholders - ’a sophisticated group’ - were 
unhappy about the policy of chasing market share without gain and to 
the detriment of the market. They would act as a curb on the worst 
practices. One small broker professed to be unmoved by market problems 
and pressure on the independents, stating merely that "while there are
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(market) waves, we live!". This view was identical to that expressed 
by independent brokers in other centres and, given declining broker 
numbers, would appear to be evidence for the starvation process (see 
Chapter 5). With only 10-15 liquid equities it was considered too easy 
to move the price on the rest, rendering anything other than retail 
commission broking hazardous.
The structure of mutual relationships between mârket participants 
emerged as complex, with smaller banks reporting views that resembled 
those of the independent brokers, while one large, foreign-owned 
broker exhibited some of the concerns of both. The issue on which 
positions most clearly diverged in a contentious manner was 
competition, based on capture of the order flow and maintenance of 
spread and commission income from turnover volume, mainly in the large 
bond market.
There were equally wide differences between the two main camps, 
brokers and large banks, with regard to equity and corporate finance 
as well as, to some extent, private portfolio management. These 
differences however reflected the normal commercial stance of 
competing bankers and brokers that would be expected and recognised as 
such by clients in any financial market. Indeed similar views were 
expressed in every centre researched. Bankers, it was alleged, abused 
their privileged position as (often the sole) financial advisers of 
their smaller corporate clients by almost never recommending equity 
issues as an alternative to bank borrowing. When asked in return why 
brokers did not attempt to promote equity flotation among companies 
themselves, the reply (again, interestingly, in every case), was that 
such an initiative would be a matter for the Stock Exchange. The banks 
and their clients also regarded the whole question of corporate
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finance as a matter between themselves, rendering the new issue market 
impenetrable.
Two brokers with extensive corporate clientèles gave more complicated 
answers, based on their own practice of arranging mixed financial 
packages with elements of venture capital provision, private 
placements by 'angels' (private individuals and corporations prepared 
to put up equity) and off-balance sheet techniques such as factoring. 
Foreign venture capital and domestic venture capital specialists are
largely absent from the Danish market. The corporate specialist
brokers were unable to square a generally agreed need for a greater 
proportion of equity finance on company balance sheets, as well as for 
readier access to the stock market, with the equally general absence 
of any initiatives leading in that direction. They instead made rather 
vague reference to a change of position later when market prospects in 
general picked up. This stance was, again, common to all centres and
taken to be an implicit reference to the worldwide tendency for IPOs
(initial public offerings) to be heavily bunched near the top, towards 
the end of a bull market. Issuers and their advisers generally exhibit 
a better sense of timing than investors in extracting the maximum cash 
from a given issue. They could hardly be expected to dwell on the fact 
when discussing it with a researcher. All respondents agreed that 
there was no equity culture among private individuals despite sporadic 
share booms in recent decades.
A large foreign-owned broker claimed that there were not too few 
independent brokers for the size of the market, but rather too many 
bank-based brokers. The main disadvantage they conferred was inability 
to deal other than at a profit to themselves on every deal, and the 
preferring of bad advice, readily accepted by clients who
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automatically accepted bank advice as good advice. Outside Copenhagen 
the situation was particularly bad, with all advice coming from a 
single generalist within a local branch. Independent smaller brokers 
could not generate enough business to afford promotion that would 
raise their profile.
Several brokers alluded to the ability of two, named banks to net out 
the stock exchange system by crossing orders internally, using 
securities from their own stocks to maintain a price differential to 
the main market, recouping in their own 'managed' spread what they
gave away in shaving commissions to gain original order flow in the
first place.
One of the large banks described this situation as 'normal 
competition' but then went on to describe the other large player, 
blamed for unfair competitive practices, as "the match-box", cornering 
as much order flow as possible, so as to match orders internally 
without exposing them to the market. The respondent's own organisation 
was described by its competitor in turn as promoting a second market 
in fixed interest securities and influencing the price of the main 
market as a result. The CSE confirmed later, in answer to written 
questions, that:
(1) unreported trading occurred between institutions that had 
exchange members as subsidiaries and departments although
(2) orders crossed within exchange-member institutions counted 
as trades and
(3) that only non-member, non-bank institutions were permitted
to trade without reporting the trades to the market within
the stipulated 90 seconds (or, out of hours, at the start
of next day's trading.
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while it was considered by the Exchange authorities unlikely that 
these practices could lead to the tacit establishment of a separate 
market with its own price structure they responded that it "most 
certainly" materially affected prices, that it "probably" affected the 
competitive position of market-dependent brokers. To an enquiry about 
whether the overall health of the market was adversely affected, the 
cautious reply was, "we expect so".
There were, on the other hand, no plans to change reporting 
arrangements or the status of the financial institutions involved. A 
majority of the market-dependent brokers felt that a de facto separate 
market among the banks existed already.
The two major banks also revealed different attitudes to privileged 
information. One held that all dealings between the bank and its 
securities arm was "on market terms" with no information being 
released that might allow trading gains to be made or risks to be 
avoided. The other maintained that "provided one went high enough", 
any information about companies could be obtained by the securities 
trading arm and that this was not infrequently done.
CONCLUSION
Analysis of recent evolution in the membership of the Copenhagen Stock 
Exchange (Figure 1), plus the evidence of interviews reported above 
and other material, shows a continuing flux that cannot be explained 
by the market reforms and technological developments of 1985-88. In 
particular the increase in trading volume has not been reflected in 
the number, or indeed the operational size of broking firms. The
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general thrust of change, as elsewhere, is towards the absorption of 
small broking firms into larger institutions, either banks or major 
securities trading, investment management and/or investment banking 
firms. This trend is balanced in Denmark by the creation of new firms 
based on one of two groups of opportunities: either specialist 
commission-based trading in blocks of securities of particular 
interest to larger institutions and a few private clients, or 
suppliers of a range of corporate finance and portfolio management 
services to the corporate sector and, again, private clients.
The first of these trends, absorption of brokers by banks, may be 
characterised as potentially unhealthy for the future of the market as 
a whole, leading as it does to increased concentration in the 
securities 'industry' and to the loss of specialist skills in small 
market niches which large market-independent institutions tend to 
ignore or to neglect. The second trend, new firm creation, while being 
too weak to counterbalance the first, offers evidence for the 
existence in Denmark of a natural cycle in the evolution of the 
broking population. A model of this process has been described in 
detail in Chapter 5. To maintain a fauna of market participants 
sufficient to guarantee the long-term viability of the market, a 
sensitive balance has to be maintained between the competitive 
position of market dependent and market-independent securities broking 
firms. To the same end the enforcement of a high level of 
transparency, particularly with regard to information about the order 
flow, is essential.
In the Copenhagen market, order flow has largely been captured by 
market-independent institutions, in particular two of the major banks. 
They have used their position to exclude market-dependent firms by
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narrowing the bid-ask spread (except where they are in a position to 
maintain it by internal trading) and lowering commissions, partly as a 
consequence of further competition for volume between themselves. All 
the market-dependent brokers described the spread as inadequate to 
make trading at any other than very large volume profitable and 
commission levels as too low. Those brokers who depended on specialist 
trading rather than corporate services nevertheless betrayed short­
term optimism of a kind noted in other centres. Their optimism 
appeared directly to contradict their previous assertions about the 
health of the market. Although analysis of CSE membership was not to 
hand at the time of the interviews, the loss of small firms by 
cessation of business, as opposed to absorption by banks, would appear 
to create the right circumstances for the 'starving population' effect 
also described and modelled in Chapter 5.
The Danish market would appear to be well placed to allow the 
formation of new, small broking firms by 'calving' out of larger 
financial institutions. Transparency is greater than in other centres 
examined and relatively small regulatory changes would be required to 
increase it still further to deal with the distortions described 
above. The market authorities do not appear to be unduly influenced 
by the large banks. Market reform and innovation is not a topic that 
has to be avoided. Although the derivatives market in Denmark was not 
studied, its existence and active development clearly shows that the 
Danish authorities are aware of the close relationship between the 
provision of immediacy and information demanded by institutional 
investors and the health of the market for the underlying securities. 
Initiatives specifically discussed included a Nordic Exchange, a 
European regional exchange, new investment trusts to cater for the 
expansion of privately funded pension arrangements, the promotion of
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equity investment to small savers and extension of the electronic 
trading system.
In summary there is little reason to question the validity and 
viability of the Danish model. The only remaining area of development 
potential, aside from derivatives, is the increased use of the market 
for domestic equity issue and trading. This possibility is, however, 
highly dependent on the attitudes of corporate finance executives and 
private investors to equity, as well as upon general business 
conditions in the medium term.
It is to be doubted whether the overall form of the CSE could be 
easily replicated in an emerging market without benefit of the 
underpinning large bond volume, not least because of the resources 
required to generate and enforce the regulatory regime and create 
trading systems that actively promote increased and sustained turnover 
volume. Those resources are available to the Danish exchange 
authorities in the form of the surplus from the operation of their 
information and trading 'business'. They are therefore firmly 
established in a virtuous circle which others may seek to emulate but 
which is intrinsically difficult to establish.
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CHAPTER 8: THE LISBON AND OPORTO EXCHANGES AND PORTUGUESE SECURITIES
MARKET
INTRODUCTION
In this century Portugal has suffered the loss of a colonial empire 
and the trauma of an officer-led revolution in April 1974 following 
many years of slow impoverishment under the right-wing dictatorship of 
Dr. Salazar. Conventional socialist governments followed and the 
country was able to take the road towards integration with its 
accession to the then EC in 1986. These events have each marked the 
character and evolution of its securities market, based on the twin 
exchanges of Lisbon and Oporto, in distinctive ways. The history of 
the market is briefly reviewed in the next section. A principal reason 
for studying the Portuguese securities market has been useful 
comparison with emergent smaller countries of central and eastern 
Europe. The World Bank, for example, has used Portugal as a benchmark 
for assessing the position and prospects of these countries (IVDC 
[1992]).
Problems facing the market relate to the maintenance of validity and 
viability in the face of increasing competition from other European 
financial centres. Contemporary issues are discussed in the section of 
that title, followed by a formal presentation of the structure of the 
Lisbon market. The Oporto market was not visited and was regarded as 
essentially a satellite exchange. Very recent developments (PINT 
[1995]/2) have again changed the relationship between the two centres. 
All securities trading will henceforth take place in Lisbon, with 
derivatives trading in Oporto. This change, too recent to analyse 
here, can, it may be conjectured, hardly encourage hope for the longer 
term future of Oporto. In the final two sections the results of a 
survey based on structured interviews with brokers, bankers and the
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market authorities carried out in Lisbon in December 1992 are first 
presented and then analysed in the context of market dependent brokers 
on the Lisbon Stock Exchange.
Section 8.1: Historical Background
Portugal's overseas possessions were secured very early on in the 
colonial era, as a result of exploration and the search for trade 
opportunities, rather than in a fit of absence of mind or through 
competition for imperial power. In Portugal's case also, the long 
decline from loss of colonial power and wealth has yet to be fully 
compensated by substitution of the apparatus of a modern industrial 
economy. The country remains underdeveloped relative to the rest of 
Europe. One factor that has been held to be a cause of slow autonomous 
development was the notorious 1903 Methuen Treaty with Britain, which 
regulated trade in textiles and port wine, hindered the development of 
a Portuguese woollen textile industry and led to widespread ownership 
and control of Portuguese firms by British interests. (Czerwensky 
[1978]). Only in 1973, for example, did the telephone system revert 
from British to Portuguese ownership. Economic development was 
interrupted by the officers' revolution of April 1974 to such an 
extent that the Bourse did not reopen until 1976 for bonds and 
(February) 1977 for equities. Even then, the low prices that were 
quoted for securities issued under pressure in chaotic conditions 
shortly before closure in 1973 were the cause of an immediate crisis 
and low levels of public confidence for a long period thereafter. The 
site, until very recently, of the Lisbon Bolsa de Valores on the 
harbour front in the Praca do Commercio echoes its position in the 
history of a formerly prosperous trading nation. The removal of the 
exchange to a technologically advanced but much less resonant out-of- 
town centre fortunately occurred after the fieldwork visit in 1992.
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The need for fundamental economic reconstruction for which neither 
domestic capital nor foreign investment was available made 
liberalisation a slow process. Bank assets were effectively 
nationalised and only in 1994 did traditional banking families 
reappear to reclaim their patrimony following re-privatisation, begun 
in 1989.
The bourse was "able to restart from zero" (IVDC [1992]) after steps 
toward further liberalisation were taken in 1985 prior to EC entry. 
Between that date and 1992 most trading was in short (by continental 
European standards) bonds of 5-7 years' duration at most. Exacting 
IMF-imposed capital controls, first put in place in 1978, began to be 
loosened in 1989-90. At the time of the fieldwork visit longer term 
issues were planned and the equities market was expanding rapidly, 
accompanied by strong foreign interest in both bonds and equities: 
complete liberalisation of all markets had in fact formally occurred 
in the previous week.
Section 8.2: Contemporarv Issues
The establishment of a single nationwide market from 6th September 
1991 allowed dematerialisation of settlement and custody arrangements 
in the hands of a service company INTERBOLSA, which also manages the 
computer trading system TRADIS and the Securities Central Depositary. 
The existence of both bearer and registered stocks as well as a 
mixture of both paper and electronic issues (15 of the former and 13 
of the latter at the end of 1991) creates a particularly complicated 
mix for a small market. This has not prevented rapid growth of trading 
volume however, but led to a significant decline in OTC trading (60% 
of turnover in 1990 reducing to 24% by end-1991). The main consequence 
of reform was an immediate 69% increase in equity trading turnover and 
270% growth in bond volume. In the bond market two coincident factors
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obscure the relationship between this growth and any proximate cause 
in the form of lower transaction costs (including increased 
information supply). In 1991 extensive foreign interest swamped both 
the Spanish and Portuguese markets due to expectations of capital 
gains on bond holdings as interest rates in the two countries 
converged to the EC average: a development which did not, in the 
event, take place. Having only just been weaned from a policy of 
maintaining artificially high domestic interest rates, characteristic 
of developing countries until the 1980s (van Agtmael [1984]), the 
authorities were obliged to institute a system of prior approval for 
foreign purchases of index-linked bonds by the Bank of Portugal, in 
order to mitigate the effect of capital inflows on domestic money 
supply. Portugal was at the time suffering an inflation rate of 11.4% 
and overheating evidenced by historically very low unemployment at 
4.1%. This development was widely understood in the international 
investment community as a necessary response to excessive foreign 
speculative interest and does not subsequently appear to have affected 
the general status of the Lisbon market. Non-residents were allowed to 
buy floating rate government bonds (Fips) again from October 1992 and 
allowed to enter the domestic money market from the beginning of 1993 
(PINT [1992]/3). A second bond market factor linked to but obscuring 
the direct effect of exchange reform was the introduction of a new 
dealer category, the Treasury Bond Specialists, known as GEVTs 
(Operadores Especializados em Valores do Tesouro). This innovation was 
a direct response on the part of the government to the perceived lack 
of marketmaking experience and capacity in Lisbon (IVDC [1992]).
In the equity market a further factor making for difficulty in 
assessing the immediate impact of reform was the use made of the 
opportunity to conduct a number of privatisation issues. Five issues
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were handled in special bourse sessions devoted to their placement, 
turning over 137 bn Escudos, approximately 7% of all trading for the 
year 1991.
The volume of foreign direct investment into the Portuguese economy 
has had a large economic effect, but three interviewees, engaged in 
conversations on this topic outside the framework of the structured 
interviews, confessed their inability to assess the influence of the 
very large capital flows involved on the markets of the Lisbon and 
Oporto exchanges. FDI flows had risen over five years from USD 0.164 
bn in 1986 to USD 5.527 bn in 1991, sufficient to account for a 
proportion of the inflation, over-full employment (in the context of 
the region) and difficulty in controlling the money supply currently 
being experienced. The level of direct investment was subsequently 
noted to have fallen to USD 4.375 for 1992 however (PINT [1993]/1).
Section 8.3: The Structure of the Lisbon and Onorto Market 
Following the regulatory and organisational reforms of early 1991 the 
Official Market, creating a national quotation for securities formerly 
listed on either or both of the Lisbon and Oporto exchanges, was 
inaugurated on 23rd July of that year. The Second Market, for 
regional and small-to-medium size companies was not introduced until 
January 1992. In the meantime, in October 1991, the Market without 
Quotation took over from the old unofficial market and informal 
trading in these securities was banned from the exchange floors.
Two daily fixings now occur for all markets, one for the computer 
trading system and another for the open-outcry on the exchange floor. 
The price fixing is designed to maximise volume, clearing as many
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unfilled orders as possible. The 'automatic' fix is carried out by the 
screen trading system and a floor fixing occurs at 1300 hrs each day. 
Prices remained uniform between fixings, except that 'interest' may be 
expressed in securities by notifying the market supervisor without 
revealing either the quantity or the side of the market in which 
interest is expressed. In screen trading a five minute period is 
allowed for a decision to effect a trade, during which time the 
orders are exposed on-screen. Screens remain active until 1700 hrs 
each day. Bond trading volume accounts for over 70% of total market 
activity in money terms, and of that, public debt accounted for 84% of 
1991 turnover. All public debt is in bearer form, creating security 
and custodianship problems. Private debt is approximately 20% 
registered and 80% bearer (IVDC [1992]). In the equity markets bank 
shares accounted for 56% of turnover in 1991 (45% in 1990). The size 
of this sector and the large increase over the reform period is an 
indicator of the potential for a few large liquid issues accompanied 
by a rich information supply to generate very large trading volumes.
The settlement period was formerly three days but was increased to 
four days after large amounts of foreign interest began to be shown in 
the Lisbon exchange by foreign houses. The T+4 settlement period still 
limits risk-free short trading. Nearly all trading income is based on 
commission. A ministerial order of 6th June 1991 reduced nearly all of 
the transaction fees on Treasury bonds, but both of the two 
interviewees asked about this in some detail felt that the increase in 
volume resulting from all the changes of the eighteen month period to 
end-1992 left no doubt that the net effect on the health of the market 
and the income available from trading activity had been extremely 
beneficial. New equity issues in the previous year had declined by a 
quarter over the 1990 level (to 281 bn escudos) and further declines
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were expected to be reported for the year just ending. This was felt 
to have little to do with the state of the exchange however, 
reflecting instead a combination of uncertainty about the economic 
conjuncture and the well-known tendency of initial public offerings to 
be bunched around a forecast index peak. Some dissatisfaction was 
expressed with the structure of the first and second markets in 
equities. The fact that the second market was defined to be regional 
clashed with its vocation as a point of entry for smaller firms. As a 
result some firms obtained their first quotation in the national 
market. It was considered (IVDC [1992]) that the point of entry for 
all firms should have been a national second market, with no regional 
distinction, with promotion to the official market following in due 
course where appropriate. There was no similar problem with the 
unquoted market.On the electronic system brokers can see only the best 
six prices and are not aware of the volumes being traded among the 47 
securities on the system. A market supervisor is able to call a 
trading halt if conditions are judged to have become unstable. All 
orders must, in general, be brought to the exchange floor and exposed 
to the market. If not taken up they may then be crossed with others 
held by the house. Trades taking place outside the exchange are 
subject to turnover tax and must be reported.
Three stands on the exchange floor are divided by the markets they 
sustain. One disadvantage of this arrangement, admitted by the market 
authorities and mentioned by several interviewees, is the need to 
provide three representatives from each house on the exchange floor to 
cover all markets despite often thin trading.
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Section 8.4: Regulatory Issues
Consolidation and reform of the national market are recent innovations 
in Portugal. Contemporary developments have therefore to be assessed 
against two competing possibilities, namely the likelihood of long 
term significance against the immediate playing out of the after­
effects of reform as the system moves to a new position. The 
Securities Market Code was established only in April 1991 (Decree-Law 
142-A91) and although some of the measures it enshrined had already 
been incorporated into market operations the changes were sufficiently 
fundamental as to mark a break with much previous practice. The 
Securities Market Commission (Comissao do Mercado de Valores 
Mobilarios - or CMVM) assumed control of the supervision, regulation 
and - worthy of special note - promotion, of the Portuguese market 
from May 1991. At the Scime time a nationwide market was inaugurated, 
linking the Lisbon and Oporto exchanges in a single computer system to 
ensure identical prices and exposure and allow the adoption of 
continuous trading. In January 1992 the Lisbon and Oporto Stock 
Exchanges Association was set up as a private non-profit organisation 
to manage and run the Exchange. Recent developments in Oporto have 
since modified the position however.
The Central Securities Depositary was set up to ensure that 
registration and disclosure requirements could be met without the need 
for securities to pass into the hands of their owners. The need for 
reform was underlined by the flight from the country of a leading 
broker, Mr Pedro Caldeira, with debts of 400 mn Escudos in July 1992. 
Interviewees did not wish to discuss Mr Caldeira and showed evidence 
of sensitivity on the subject. The reason became clear later when the 
broker was successfully extradited from the US (PINT [1993]/2).
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Portugal remains a heavily regulated market. The classic tension 
between regulating an easily manipulated small market and offering an 
attractive environment for foreign investors remains. The former 
president of the CMVM, Mr. Fernando Costa Lima, said on his 
resignation in February 1995 that there remained open opposition from 
"vested interests, when they do not want the rule of law to prevail 
over the law of the market" (FINT [1995]/2). In his view the 
opportunity to liberalise lay in the globalisation and harmonisation 
of financial markets. It may be doubted whether this is the view of 
market participants however. Portugal has taken an active interest in 
a European level market but its only concrete manifestation, the 
Euroquote project, was finally cancelled at the Aalborg (Denmark) 
meeting on 5th July 1991 following disagreement among members of the 
Eurolist project. The continuing strength of the regional bourse 
movement and active national market reform programmes elsewhere in 
Europe provides evidence of continuing independence of mind among 
market participants themselves. That view was shared by most 
interviewees in Lisbon.
Section 8.5: Information Expansion
It was not possible to form an impression of the rate of expansion of 
publicly available information in Lisbon although newspaper purchases 
revealed a quantity of comment commensurate with that to be found in 
other European centres. As noted below there was considerable public 
activity at the Bourse, including uptake of the daily quotation 
bulletin, not seen elsewhere. The advantage of a conspicuous public 
position has now been lost by transfer of the exchange away from the 
city centre however.
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The events of 1974 were preceded by inflation in a narrow market, 
leading to a price explosion and collapse. This pattern was repeated 
in 1986-87. Private investors had stayed out of the market as a result 
in spite of Portugal's very high personal savings ratio. There had 
however recently been an explosion of funds and instruments, 
accompanied by large demand from the banks for database information 
supplied by the Exchange. The yield curve was incomplete and the 
possibilities of investment, and hence arbitrage, over a wide range of 
maturities were still limited (IVDC [1992]).
The author found the market authorities very willing to supply 
information, but unable to generate detailed information about trading 
volume and prices prior to 1985. This is consistent with the recent 
history of the Lisbon market as described above and information prior 
to 1985 is in any case unlikely to afford satisfactory comparisons 
with later periods. The Lisbon Exchange ran 5,586 hours of training 
courses in 1992 and a series of conferences and courses was promoted 
through universities and the Institute of Banking Studies (IVDC 
[1992]). Public interest was evident during the four day fieldwork 
visit, with the public gallery full at most times, especially at price 
fixing. The similarly laid out public facilities at the Brussels 
Bourse visited some months earlier were forlorn by comparison.
Section 8.6: Survev Results
Interviews were conducted with a total of eight individuals 
representing two broking firms, two banks and the Lisbon Stock 
Exchange. One interview was conducted jointly with two individuals, 
both principals of a prominent independent equities trading house. 
Because of the small number of participants in the market and the 
public discussion of reform that was taking place at the time of the
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interviews, it has not been considered appropriate to identify 
individual views with the type of organisation expressing them, apart 
from the market authorities themselves, although the source of an 
opinion may be inferred in some cases. Wherever a judgement is 
expressed in the following sections, and throughout, it has been 
informed by these interviews.
Section 8.7; The Position and Prospects of Market Dependent Brokers 
In January 1992 the number of brokers was raised to 20 (10 in each of 
Oporto and Lisbon) from the original four who had survived closure and 
remained in business after 1974. By end-1992 only 11 dealers and 6 
broking firms were left, one having become bankrupt and two others 
merged but retaining multiple seats. Of the remaining 17, most had 
also fallen under the control of banks, with only 2-3 considered by 
interviewees to have remained independent. A detailed analysis of the 
process of ownership change was supplied in confidence but is not 
reproduced here. The fact that Stock Exchange seats are sold and are 
now again in short supply has both advantages and dangers.
One advantage is that the possessor of a seat, who may be a small 
broker or a specialist at risk of being dominated by larger 
institutions, can maintain a position in the deliberations of the 
market authorities without fear. One organisation interviewed was 
currently withholding agreement to a reform proposal on changes to 
bond trading, promoted by the banks, as means of applying pressure for 
other changes which large institutional exchange members were not 
inclined to concede. As in other markets the large-scale presence of 
banks (whether they were larger or smaller banks did not appear to be 
an issue) was regarded as an actual problem by dealers and a potential 
problem by the market authorities. One interviewee offered an estimate
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of 65% of market capitalisation on the two exchanges taken together as 
being in the portfolios owned or managed by banking institutions. A 
recent IMF report had concluded that the Portuguese banking system was 
in fact underlent, indicating too great an emphasis on portfolio 
investment of banking funds as against commercial lending against 
security or otherwise. On the other hand the Portuguese securities 
market grew by 30% during 1992 and the market authorities were unable 
to say with any certainty that the financial sector as a whole would 
remain stable enough to be allowed to continue to develop naturally 
(IVDC [1992]). Subsequent developments may have encouraged greater 
optimism. In fact the Lisbon Exchange National Continuous Index (BVL- 
INC) rose by 53% during 1993 and a further 7.4% in 1994. Both rises 
were underpinned by volume increases in both bond and equity markets 
which, taken together, rose by 97% and 34% in each of the two years 
respectively (FINT [1995J/2). Another later development, whose outcome 
cannot be assessed here, is the decision to move straight to global 
equity issues in future privatisations. In May 1995 25% of Portugal 
Telecom was offered simultaneously in New York, London and Lisbon. 
Future similar issues are planned (FINT [1994]/2) with results likely 
to be significant for trading volume in the Lisbon market.
The chief disadvantage to small brokers cited in 1992 was the need to 
rely entirely on commission income for lack of capital to take 
positions. The financial institutions were able to take positions and 
not particularly concerned about commission levels. In Lisbon the 
market has therefore divided into a majority of market-independent 
agents as defined in this study and a pressurised minority of small 
market-dependent houses struggling to meet the needs of technology, 
increased specialisation and market segmentation.
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Another disadvantage is that once a seat passes into the hands of an 
institution it is likely to remain there. Private individuals and 
syndicates must both find the price and periodically risk losing seats 
on the retirement or incapacity of individuals or the breakup of a 
small firm. The London connection remained an important element of 
business for the independent houses.
Banks were also known to place orders through independents as a means 
of concealing their intentions and the size of the transactions 
involved from their rivals. The number of banks domiciled in Lisbon 
was well in excess of the number of exchange seats, let alone the 
number actually available for purchase at any one time. Independent 
houses were thus the only acceptable agencies available for executing 
the trades of many smaller banks.
Interviewees representing market-dependent brokers all mentioned the 
effect of withholding tax in suppressing overseas investor interest. 
Bank interviewees agreed with the proposition but did not mention it 
of their own volition or appear to consider it a problem. The 
Portuguese Ministry of Finance was not in fact to announce an end to 
the 20% withholding tax until October 14th 1993 (ECON [1993]/1) with 
the reform not taking effect until 1994. Many larger financial centres 
still retain a withholding tax, but this is usually coupled with the 
existence of large numbers of institutions and sufficient liquidity to 
avoid the impost. The practice of 'coupon-washing' (selling a bond 
before coupon date to a tax-exempt intitut ion while simultaneously 
arranging its repurchase) is one standard method of doing so. It may 
be supposed, but could not be confirmed, that Portuguese banks had 
access to methods of avoiding withholding tax that market-dependent 
houses were not able to offer.
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Recent reforms had worked in favour of market-dependent houses by 
reducing back office costs dramatically in the wake of 
dematerialisation. One broker had reduced staff from 30 at the last 
trading peak to 10 employees at the time of interview. It was stated 
that a large increase in trading volume would be required to prevent 
even this total declining further, particularly once it was no longer 
necessary to send up to three representatives to the exchange each day 
to cover floor trading. Dematerialisation had reduced both physical 
and information risk. At one time it had often been necessary, in the 
broking house just quoted, to keep up to $10 million equivalent in 
bearer securities in office safes overnight.
Another source of support for market-dependent firms was the direct 
participation of industrial groups providing both capital and a 'tied' 
source of client business. The chief concern of several interviewees 
remained however that, although many advantages could be cited for 
retaining an important role for independent houses in the Lisbon 
market, the intensity of ongoing demand for the small number of 
exchange seats available could wipe out the independents by accident, 
or reduce them to the kind of rump to be found in Vienna.
CONCLUSION
Changes which have occurred since the fieldwork was conducted do not 
appear to have invalidated the judgements expressed above. The 
Portuguese market continues to be affected by internal structural 
change and external turbulence. The failure of economic turbulence to 
create crises for the operation of the exchange is evidence for the 
strength of ongoing reform. On the other hand, even in the absence of 
external stress, structural weaknesses should be expected to express
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themselves only in the medium term and be measured by secular decline 
in volume. This is not observed at present and both the validity and 
the viability of the market seem to be beyond doubt. Development 
potential is restricted by relatively modest levels of wealth within 
Portugal and the small size and low international profile of the 
market. This fact is reflected in the decision to make global rather 
than purely national share issues for major privatisations. The 
reduction of the Oporto exchange to a derivatives market would seem to 
foretell its eventual closure, but this is an issue beyond the scope 
of the present study.
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CHAPTER 9: THE VIENNA STOCK EXCHANGE AND AUSTRIAN SECURITIES MARKET 
INTRODUCTION
Interest in studying the Austrian securities market lies in the 
apparent contradiction between a healthy economy and a securities 
market renowned for its closed and, by modern standards, unhealthy 
structure. Another focus is the relationship with the neighbouring 
German economy and its securities markets. This aspect has already 
been pursued in some detail in Chapter 6 during the examination of 
Vienna's trading volume. Austria is also at the geographical centre of 
events in the former 'eastern' Europe and strongly connected with the 
Budapest stock market (see Chapter 10 for details of the 
relationship). Not least, the Vienna market is simply the most 
interesting of all Europe's markets to study. It reflects the history
and culture of the country, as well as the economy as a whole, in
remaining efficient in spite of complex, one might almost say 
Byzantine, arrangements for the conduct of its affairs. Evidence for 
efficiency is to be found in the fact that the Austrian market 
(eventually) responds to all the demands made upon it and, as the 
econometric results of Chapter 6 show, has strong long-term
behavioural characteristics similar to the apparently much better
organised Danish market. How this comes to be the case is the question 
motivating the study.
Section 9.1: Historical background
Maria Theresia set up a Vienna Bourse in 1761 and again in 1771 on the 
advice of her President of the Court of Accounts, the not- 
inappropriately named Graf Zinzendorf, to restructure the finances of 
the state and restrict abuses in the interest of investors. It was,
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then, a government-instituted monopoly market for the exchange of 
government securities. Business was transacted with officially 
appointed brokers. The latter had an obligation of presence and were 
not allowed to trade for their own account. They were required to 
provide a daily price listing. None of these conditions is 
significantly different today. The Bourse grew on this basis and moved 
in 1802 to its own premises. War with Napoleon required money, which 
was obligingly printed, reducing the quoted value of some Austrian 
government securities to 12% of their face value by 1812. This was 
ascribed to the machinations of the market and led to market access 
being restricted and the appointment of a Bourse Commission, 
ultimately without effect. This result also remains unsurprising 
today.
Between 1818 and 1842 when a few railway companies began to be quoted, 
the only share available in Vienna was that of the Austrian National 
Bank. Today, bank shares continue to predominate. Closure occasioned 
by the revolutionary events of 1848 was followed by further 
recriminations and restrictions on entry which only served to drive 
trading onto the streets. The 1771 Imperial Patent was long out of 
date and a new Exchange Act finally came into force in 1855, with an 
18 member regulatory Chamber and a first measure of autonomy for the 
market.
Although the market was no longer a money-machine for the state, 
exaggerated expectations continued to plague its extension into 
private capital provision. The 1873 Vienna International Exhibition 
occasioned the last triumph of optimistic expectation over reality, to 
be followed by general collapse amid the contraction of bank credit. 
The Bourse closed amid violent scenes. To this day the Viennese remain
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suspicious of large-scale economic optimism and its expression in the 
form of grandiose exhibitions: the city, in a referendum in 1992, 
declined to celebrate the millenium with 'Expo 2000* at a time when 
the stock market was once again in disrepute.
By 1875 a new Stock and Commodity Exchange Act gave Vienna more 
autonomy within a framework of state sanctions and, until 1914, 
development was less crisis-ridden. The 1875 Act remained the basis 
for regulating the Austrian market until 1989, a late date in the 
calendar of stock market reforms. Vienna, until recently alone in its 
region, nevertheless remains important for the whole of this corner of 
Europe. Until recently it has also remained mainly what it was 200 
years earlier, namely a financing instrument for the public purse and 
large institutions.
By the early 1970s, of the 78 listed domestic shares, only 3 were 
actively traded (Perlmooser, Steyr-Puch and Semperit) in a 
'Spitzenmarkt', a remainder market, dealing only in those securities 
not traded directly between financial institutions outside the Bourse. 
For 18 years to 1984 no new companies were listed and the Offical List 
was reduced by those choosing to delist. In this year two companies 
were introduced. In 1985, the Austrian market was 'discovered' by an 
American financial journalist, Jim Rogers, and prices rose 130%, with 
volumes increasing by a factor of six. Tax reforms followed in 1986, 
as did new listings on the back of the bull market that endured in one 
form or another for four further years. In the period 1990-1992 ensued 
collapse and stagnation, the latter strongly connected to lack of 
confidence in the mechanisms of the market itself, which has only 
recently, during 1993, begun to be addressed on the basis of proposals 
developed at the height of the difficulties in early-to-mid 1992.
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Vienna is still a remainder market, but the lack of transparency and 
opportunity for insider dealing that such a market offers has finally 
been publicly acknowledged. The recognition has been slow, as 
demonstrated by the fact that creeping reform has been under way for 
many years. Each stage has been announced as the set of measures 
necessary to rehabilitate and modernise the Vienna Bourse, only to be 
followed a year or two later by another. The continuing attitudes of 
market participants, as revealed by empirical research as well as by 
the evidence of the public prints, are not entirely reassuring 
however. The VIP (Vienna Insiders' Party), as it has been dubbed, is 
perhaps best represented by a reported comment of one of its members, 
"There is no such thing as insider trading in Vienna. Here we are all 
insiders": traders in Viennese banks and on the Schottenring floor 
will ensure that they always benefit first from seeing the order flow. 
The success of reform here cannot be measured by any immediate 
increase in trading interest such as might be induced by an 
improvement in returns following on a tax or other change, but by 
whether a long term, stable increase in trading volume over a range of 
securities, including private equity, is achieved.
Section 9.2: Contemporary Issues
Vienna's vocation, as a potentially important financial centre for the 
whole of south-eastern Europe, has been firmly recognised, but to date 
equally firmly missed. One focus of interest for the empirical 
research on the development of the Vienna Bourse has accordingly been 
the wide gap between its aspirations and opportunities on the one 
hand, and the historically unsuccessful efforts of its authorities and 
participants on the other, to create a respected national exchange 
capable of doing more than channel public funding and provide a
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playground for a clique of bank-based dealers. The possible outcomes 
of the latest attempt to bridge the gap remain unclear.
The chief problem facing the Vienna Stock Exchange is that of 
reconciling the necessity for reform with the interests of its market- 
independent members, the banks and other credit institutions in which 
Austria is rich. These institutions have either not needed the market 
or have benefited from its structural deficiencies. Private groups and 
individuals within the financial institutions, and possibly outside 
them, have also benefited from trading on privileged information, 
particularly information about order flow.
In the course of the empirical research, the status quo was vigorously 
defended by individual respondents, mainly on the ground that it 
worked well for all the parties and interests involved. This was 
stated, blandly or vehemently according to the tenor of the 
discussion, but always categorically, as if unlikely to be challenged 
by others, as was indeed the case. The circle of parties and interests 
has now widened well beyond the membership of the Vienna Exchange 
however, creating an absolute necessity for reform.
The wider circle of interests impinging on the conduct of securities 
trading in Austria includes the necessity to comply with EC 
Directives; public opinion, increasingly aware of deficiencies exposed 
by scandal and adverse public comment; the not necessarily valid, but 
real, perception of the outside world that Austria must be an 
important centre for opportunities connected with the redevelopment of 
central and eastern Europe; liquidity-driven investment surges, which 
have drawn attention to the problems of a market into which foreign 
investors have often thrust money without detailed prior knowledge
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and, finally, the rapid expansion of published comment, financial 
promotion and a general increase of financial awareness on the part of 
the public. This last has, ironically, to a large extent been 
generated by the member banks of the Vienna exchange themselves, 
through two mechanisms. First, they have actively promoted and 
disseminated financial information about investment opportunities of 
all kinds to attract custom. Second, they have for a number of years 
been involved in a massive restructuring process through mergers to 
reduce an acknowledged over-banked, over-branched national 
infrastructure. This process has generated widespread discussion as 
well as numerous well-publicised conflicts, failures and scandals.
Finally, the liberalisation of eastern Europe released an early wave 
of optimism in Austria which later collapsed, partly due to belated 
realisation that profits would not flow quickly, partly because the 
Vienna exchange did not inspire enough confidence to retain anything 
other than high-risk opportunistic interest. The understanding that 
large gains will one day occur, but that the boat may again be missed, 
particularly as regards confidence on the part of foreign investors if 
respectability is not achieved, is another factor militating for the 
acceptance of reform by those who might otherwise prefer to continue 
to fish profitably in the small Viennese pool.
Section 9.3: The structure of the Austrian market
The Vienna Bourse has three trading sections, excluding its 
commodities exchange and the recently introduced derivatives market.
It is not mandatory to trade on the exchange and the market exists for 
those orders that cannot be matched outside it. The markets are 
organised, in outline, as follows:
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1. The Official Market is characterised by strict listing 
requirements, intermediation by Official Brokers ("Sensale") and a 
periodic open outcry auction system. The Official Brokers are not 
allowed to trade for their own account and are fundamentally market 
officials charged with facilitating price discovery at least once per 
trading session, and smoothing the process of transactions in crowd 
('consecutive price') trading thereafter. Price movements of more than 
5% in any one session are inhibited by the right to revoke orders if 
that limit is exceeded and the Official Broker may scale down orders 
to ensure balance between the "Geld" (bid) and "Brief" (offer) sides 
of the market.
2. The Semi-Official Market, the second market, is characterised by 
reduced listing requirements and the participation of 'non-official* 
or independent commercial brokers. These are intermediaries rewarded 
by commission rather than dealers for their own account. Consecutive 
prices (i.e. continuous price fixing) is intended to operate in the 
semi-official market, but in fact a single price is usually determined 
and maintained for the whole of the trading session. Non-official 
brokers must be qualified by a period of five years' previous activity 
either within the exchange or in the securities department of a member 
bank.
3. The Unregulated Market is characterised by the curious single 
listing requirement that the securities' print quality be up to the 
standard set by the VSE and that the application for listing be made, 
not by the issuer, but by a proposer and seconder drawn from the ranks 
of exchange members. In this market free brokers operate a market- 
making system similar to that in the German 'Freiverkehr* free market, 
under an arrangement adopted by the Council of the VSE only in 1990.
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Settlement takes place outside the exchange under the aegis of the 
Austrian Control Bank AG, an institution set up for the purpose and 
within which both cash settlement and clearing arrangements exist. A 
weekly 'account* is maintained with settlement of transaction details 
following on Monday and delivery on Thursday of the following week. 
Delivery usually constitutes offsetting entries in the central 
depositary system, rather than physical delivery of printerd 
securities. Actual payment of outstanding account balances takes place 
on the second Monday following the business week, so that, in terms of 
the 'Group of Thirty' settlement criteria, Vienna operates a 'T+14' 
system.
Section 9.4: Regulatory issues
Regulation of the Austrian market reflects two previously mentioned 
structural features of the country and its single Vienna exchange 
respectively. The closely interwoven ('verflechtet') nature of 
political, administrative and business institutions produces congruity 
between the aims of the exchange authorities and the aims of the 
regulators. And the constitution of the exchange ensures personal 
dominance by bank directors. The second largest contingent represented 
on its Council, ignoring the group representing the commodities 
segment of the Vienna Stock and Commodities Exchange, are the 
appointees of the Finance Ministry and the central bank.
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Some idea of the strength of the weighting is given by Table 1. 
showing council membership:
Table 1.
Constituency I Banks 16 members, who must be directors of
member banks
II Independent
brokers
III Official brokers
IV Floor dealer
V Commodity 
exchange
1 member 
1 member
1 member (floor dealers are the 
representatives of 
banks)
5 members
Federal
Finance Ministry 
Central Bank
2 members 
1 member
TOTAL 27 members
Independent (non-official) brokers may deal only in the semi-official 
(geregelte Freiverkehr) secondary market, which effectively prevents 
them from offering trading and specialist services in the larger 
official market. The cause of the problem lies not in the regulation 
of the exchange, but in Austrian banking law which prescribes that 
only institutions holding a banking charter may trade in securities. 
The role of independent brokers is thereby further restricted to 
acting as simple intermediaries for dealings which must ultimately 
involve a member bank. Since, on the other hand, direct dealing 
between principals may take place off-exchange, there is no incentive, 
either on the part of the non-official dealers themselves or the
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regulatory authorities, to widen the scope of exchange trading to 
include more active participation by more entrepreneurial, market- 
dependent brokers. Intermediaries do not compete with one another and 
for most securities traded on the exchange, uniform prices (i.e. one 
price established per trading day) are the rule. The English-language 
version of the Exchange's official publication on its structure 
remarks "The American system of separate banking institutions or of 
having proper (sic) brokerage houses does not exist in Austria". This 
turns out to be a mistranslation of the original German version 
(eigene Brokerhauser) but rather neatly states the position.
Banks trade on behalf of clients for commission, but have the option 
to use their own inventories. Not being required to trade across the 
exchange, much less is known about the dealings of banks, which are 
effectively 'over-the-counter' for the most part. This reduces the 
amount of evidence available to support claims of market distortion or 
insider dealing but increases the probability that it will occur. This 
was freely admitted by respondents as if it were a theoretical 
consideration but one not likely to have any effect in practice. The 
researcher considers that this reply reflected a disingenuous attitude 
to the whole matter. An exception is reported below.
All of the above factors are cited as regulatory rather than trading 
issues because, by virtue of its regulatory structure, the Vienna 
market appears to be incapable of the reforms that would produce 
greater transparency, and hence the regular, stable trading volumes 
indispensable for viability, as a byproduct of more open access. The 
kind of reform being engineered today merely introduces restrictions 
on improper dealing activity and penalties for insider trading. There 
is no evidence that reform of this type actually reduces the incidence
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of impropriety. Improved concealment would be as likely as better 
behaviour to account for any recorded improvement. And in Vienna one 
is not dealing not with an acknowledged problem but with a set of 
market practices that have hitherto constituted normality. The 
suspicion must remain that the authorities have done enough to satisfy 
requirements for EC entry and silence public criticism, but no more.
Section 9.5; Information expansion
Increased public awareness of savings and investment possibilities has 
been a basic objective of banking promotion for many years. Most 
interview respondents characterised the increase in press and 
periodical coverage as 'great* rather than 'some* in the period 1986- 
1992. Two described it as 'explosive', but coupled this opinion with 
the view that scandal rather than investment information supplied the 
main source of interest. Visits to bank branches in Salzburg and 
Vienna revealed large amounts of investment promotion material on 
display and available on request.
Material collected from one Salzburg bank branch was analysed.
Included were prospectuses for airport and (Danube) port 
privatisations, a variety of company reports, brochures for investment 
clubs and investment hotlines as well as bank reviews and offprints of 
articles by economic specialists, resulting in a two-kilogram package. 
A wide range of investment magazines was on sale.
The two main Vienna broadsheet dailies offer two views of the 
financial world. At the time fieldwork was conducted (and on the
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occasion of many other visits to Vienna) the conservative 'Die Presse* 
maintained the bland line recognisable from interview responses. The 
other, 'Der Standard* carried stories and letters critical of bourse 
practices. Die Presse is owned by the Bundeswirtschaftskammer (BWK, 
the national chamber of trade, with close links to the higher echelons 
of business and government).
Section 9.6; Survev results
Interviews were conducted with eight organisations; the Vienna Bourse, 
major banks (3), private banks (2) and a specialist financial 
institution responsible for coordinating the bond issues of a number 
of large public bodies, plus one of the few remaining private brokers. 
Twelve interviews in all were carried out, eight based on the 
structured questionnaire and four with other individuals to whom the 
researcher was handed on for further discussion about (a) trading 
practice on the Vienna Bourse and (b) new stock markets in central and 
eastern Europe. The respondents based in major banks maintained a 
uniform line, restricting their responses to views that translated as 
a broad assertion that the Vienna market functioned to their entire 
satisfaction. It was maintained that sufficient information flowed 
from the floor-based price setting process conducted by the official 
brokers and daily reporting of bargains concluded for them to be 
assured that the market itself was efficient, transparent and 
undistorted. Interviewees found it difficult to respond to the 
suggestion that the market should serve other purposes than a kind of 
liaison function among themselves. One considered the proposition 
impertinent, reflecting the researcher's 'obvious lack of experience* 
of the way business was conducted in Vienna. Others conceded that 
there was a problem arising from established practice. The point was
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generally accompanied by a complacent gesture, being a matter of no 
great importance other than to market participants, they being the 
only parties concerned.
A particularly disingenuous attitude was revealed towards the Vienna 
market by one major member of the exchange. On the same day that a 
former Official Broker ('Sensal') of the Vienna Bourse, now head of a 
major energy group, was railing against corrupt market practice in the 
columns of ’Der Standard’, the researcher was handed a university 
seminar presentation on the Vienna Bourse by its author. The document 
presented conventional arguments for transparency and efficiency 
without referring to the fact that these qualities were notoriously 
absent from the Vienna market and not addressed by the round of 
reforms at that time (August 1992) under public discussion. The 
proposals that form the basis for the reforms presently under way 
(1993-94) were issued one month earlier than the date of interview in 
1992, but were not referred to by any respondents. Most would have 
been aware of them at the time or have participated in their 
preparation. A copy was supplied on request to the researcher only 
some months later, when public discussion had begun and newspaper 
articles began to mention it (’Konzept Finanzmarkt Osterreich’, 
Osterreichische Kontrollbank AG, Vienna, July 1992).
The two private banks interviewed responded very much as parties 
outside the mainstream of Bourse activity. Arrangements with other, 
mainly larger, banks allowed them to transact most business directly, 
not through the Bourse, even though both were members. One private 
bank was completely unabashed in proposing to push particular forms of 
market organisation on the new exchanges in eastern Europe in order to 
improve the chances of selling its own software systems to the new
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markets. At the time of interview it was abundantly clear that these 
systems were dependent on market institutions such as effective 
custody and settlements arrangements that were hardly to be found 
anywhere in eastern Europe and difficult to legislate for, let alone 
implement, in the circumstances of the time. The published reason for 
marketing these systems energeticaly was "to leverage the investment 
we have sunk into software development for the Austrian market by 
reproducing that market elsewhere." ('Organisational structure for 
securities markets in eastern Europe', Effectinvestbank, Vienna, 
November 1991).
The director of a nationally important non-bank financial institution 
visited agreed to a discussion of the problem of market manipulation 
in a lengthy second meeting, held on the day after the formal, 
structured interview had been completed. Confidentiality about 
techniques was insisted upon, but consent given to characterise the 
situation as follows: "The banks first arrange the market and then say 
to the client, 'well, you see, that's the way the market is at the 
moment'". During this meeting, detailed corroboration was obtained of 
many of the conclusions inferred from the responses of other 
respondents, as discussed above.
One small market-dependent broker was visited for formal interview and 
informal discussions to follow. The partner interviewed confirmed only 
the outline of the market structure reflected in official 
descriptions. It was put to him that there were few opportunities for 
in the Vienna market, either in the corporate finance area or in 
equity trading. He agreed, using a formula observed in other centres, 
namely that the run-down or closure of other brokers had yielded 
useful clients and business, giving grounds for optimism about the
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future. Partnership with a small bank was the single development area 
at the time, leading to systematic channelling of broking business. Of 
the six independent brokers (Freimakler) in Vienna, three were 
controlled by larger banks. The respondent confirmed that a non-reply 
and a negative reply to requests for interview by the other two were 
due to imminent retirement of their principals and possible closure.
Section 9.7: The position and prospects of market-dependent brokers
Many independently expressed opinions contribute to the conclusion 
that the structure of the Vienna exchange and its trading practices 
may be held directly responsible for the low volume and poor 
reputation of the market, apart from discrete episodes of activity 
stimulated by external events. Vienna has participated in the overall 
rise in volume of market trading during the 1980s, but its development 
has not been synchronised with that of other centres and the rise has 
not been sustained.
The market is effectively controlled by its market-independent 
participants who have little interest in promoting it, beyond 
servicing high-volume institutional securities trading interest from 
abroad when opportunity offers. The narrowness of the interests 
represented in the governance of the Vienna exchange seems likely to 
ensure that the market remains marginal in the eyes of foreign 
institutional investors due to its reputation. It remains inadequate 
for the purposes of mobilising personal saving or raising equity 
capital by virtue of the banks interposed between it and the saving 
public and business firms alike. The lack of independent brokers to 
supply entrepreneurial initiative in trading and specialist services 
to encourage wider participation is a factor in this disconnection
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between the securities market and the economy at large, apart from 
large-scale public and private bond finance.
If the market authorities are not able or willing to promote the wider 
business development of the bourse and the independent brokers are too 
few, too small and too poorly represented on the governing body to 
induce change, then a vicious rather than a virtuous circle would seem 
to have been closed for the foreseeable future. That future does 
however include growth episodes of the kind that occurred during 1993, 
where the growth of volume was sufficient to provide material and 
motivational support for a change of heart. On the other hand it is 
difficult to see in contemporary events a pattern that has not already 
occurred at one time or another in the history of the Vienna exchange. 
And on each previous occasion bursts of activity have been followed by 
periods of stagnation.
Finally, a barrier has been put in the way of new genuinely market- 
dependent brokers that was not there before. Participation now 
requires a high level of investment in information technology, greater 
efficiency in settlement and greater sophistication in trading 
simultaneously on derivative and underlying securities markets. For a 
group of participants restricted to commission based operations in a 
small part of the market, the incentive to found new firms is absent.
A NOTE ON EXTENSION OF AUSTRIAN BOND TRADING TO LONDON
In the course of studying developments in the Vienna market, attention 
was drawn at several points by respondents to bond dealing for 
Austrian clients carried on outside Austria. This turned out in the 
main to refer to the overseas operations of Austrian institutions,
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mainly in London. As a result a number of visits, four in all, were 
made to examine the operations of the main independent London broker 
active in the field.
Although now independently operated in London and capitalised partly 
from outside the United Kingdom (but not from Austria), the firm was 
originally the United Kingdom trading arm of a major Austrian bank, 
set up as a profit centre in London for the purpose. The operation 
turned out to be difficult to operate and less than profitable. It 
was, as a result, bought out by its dealing principals and has 
continued to operate as an independent entity. The net result had been 
a loss of commission income and trading presence for Vienna and a gain 
to London, without the underlying pattern of bond trades being 
affected. The purpose of the investigation was to determine the cause 
of this bond trading activity and gain experience of dealing practice. 
Two directors of the firm made themselves available for informal 
conversation as dealing was in progress and the use of a dealing room 
position was offered for several half-day sessions, including the use 
of Reuters and Bloomberg services, to observe the market and follow 
individual transactions in the period October-December 1992. The 
results were as follows:
1) Several technical features of the operation made London- 
based trading less costly than Vienna-based dealings.
Telephone charges between dealers and to information 
services (including the rest of Europe) were at local call 
rates for exeimple.
2) Trading in London began earlier than in Frankfurt, often an
advantage in securing urgent execution of a market order.
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3) The clients were mainly banks carrying out 'nostro' (own 
account) bond dealings in European centres, notably Spain 
and Portugal, although corporate bonds were on occasion 
sought on a worldwide basis. The basis of dealing was 
commission or a spread on covered bond trades. In other 
words both a buyer and a seller were required to be 
committed before a bargain was executed, but the broking 
firm was on occasion liable for the market risk inherent 
in a price change in the interval of up to two trading 
days between purchase and delivery.
4) Private client business was out of the question in London. It 
was estimated that up to four staff would need to be added (to a 
firm of four dealers and two administrative staff) to cater for 
regulatory requirements. This would not have been the case in 
Vienna.
5) Proposed capital adequacy requirements were regarded as 
'ridiculous' by the firm's principals, given the very small 
risks borne by the firm (see 3. above) and the existence of 
large-scale funds from client banks to which agreed recourse 
existed. Membership of ISMA (International Securities Management 
Association) was also an effective guarantee of confidence and 
probity.
6) Opportunities for gaining new clients occurred in London that 
would not have occurred in Vienna, particularly the opportunity 
to offer potential clients 'pass-ons' in new issues (i.e. passed 
on at the issue price) as an inducement to trade on better 
terms later.
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7) The information environment in London was superior, there was 
less to fear from market 'arrangements' and such practices as 
front-running.
CONCLUSION
The Austrian market does not offer an example to be followed, but 
rather illustrates a number of difficulties better avoided by aspirant 
national exchanges. Its validity cannot be questioned, having survived 
countless crises for 200 years, currently performing a useful if 
limited function, valued by its participants and currently in course 
of reform. Its viability has often been publicly questioned, including 
during 1992, the period during which most fieldwork in Vienna was 
completed. Its potential however remains to be realised: it is not a 
source of immediacy, does not produce large amounts of useful 
information and is unattractive to the corporate sector as a source of 
risk capital through initial public offerings. Turnover volume has 
suffered wide swings of a long-term nature, varying even in recent 
years between unstable boom conditions not related to underlying 
prospects and moribundity accompanied by public criticism. The few 
market-dependent brokers lead a precarious existence. There is 
evidence of relatively easy 'calving' of new firms out of existing 
large credit institutions. New firms have, however, tended to take the 
form of investment banking entities and become involved in financial 
scandal. The Vienna Stock Exchange and its member institutions share 
in the closely interlinked structure of government, politics and 
national economic affairs which is characteristic of Austria. The 
system features close personal relationships and individuals 
simultaneously exercising multiple rôles in political, administrative, 
economic and business organisations. In many contexts the Austrian 
model of political and economic management is admirable and has been
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successful in maintaining the country's prosperity and influence over 
a long period. The national model is undergoing rapid transformation 
under the influence of internal political pressure and Europe-wide 
economic and other developments. It may be held that multiple rôles 
and close personal relationships running across institutional 
boundaries are inimical to the development of transparency in 
securities markets. This appears to have been the case in Austria. The 
problem has been publicly identified and made the subject of reforming 
efforts. The present research took place during the period of problem 
recognition, policy formulation and early efforts at implementation. 
Thus accrues some advantage in immediacy and directness of observation 
but no opportunity to pronounce on the outcome.
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CHAPTER 10: OTHER MARKETS STUDIED 
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter are discussed the findings of visits to the Amsterdam, 
Brussels and Budapest Stock Exchanges, and to the then-nascent Prague 
and Bratislava financial centres. One other exchange not visited, 
namely Warsaw, is examined briefly on the basis of its trading volume 
statistics, which are striking. Visits were also paid to each of two 
German regional exchanges, Hamburg and Bremen. Each exchange was found 
to exhibit individual characteristics that provided insights into 
different aspects of the study as a whole. Amsterdam represented an 
efficient exchange suffering loss of turnover volume to other centres 
but acting vigorously to restore its position. Brussels furnished an 
example of an old-fashioned, bank-dominated exchange with too many 
traditional brokers, under pressure from technological and financial 
change. Budapest is attempting to develop a conventional modern 
exchange to underpin its liberalised economy, but frustrated by the 
problems of the Hungarian economy and its own poorly balanced 
structure of trading instruments. Prague was, and is, a tiny market 
swamped by large numbers of privatisation issues. Bratislava started 
life under the influence of Prague but today suffers political 
interference in its own and listed companies* affairs. Warsaw has 
suffered the problems of being a narrow equity market in a rapidly 
developing free economy without benefit of a broad, deep, underpinning 
bond market to stabilise it against boom and bust. The German 
regionals in 1992 were suffering from greatly exaggerated reports of 
their death, but continue to flourish. We begin with Amsterdam, 
visited in 1992 and 1994.
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Section 10.1: AMSTERDAM
10.1.1: Historical background
The Netherlands East India Company founded in 1602 was the first in 
the world to offer its shares to the public and have them traded in a 
market. Trading in shares was treated as an adjunct to commodity 
trading. Indeed the Amsterdam Bourse occupied the same building as the 
Commodity Exchange until early in the 20th century.
By the mid-1750's 44 securities were being traded, including 25 
republic and provincial bond issues and three domestic equities.
Modern observers have been surprised by the seIf-organising ability of 
emergent markets, but the case of Amsterdam shows that these elements 
have in fact always been present. This early example of the rôle of 
confidence and information in promoting market development has been 
studied in some detail by Neal [1990].
In 1877 the first attempt was made to ensure that all trading was 
carried out only by members of a unified Stock Exchange organisation, 
but this was never entirely satisfactory until the market obtained its 
own building in 1907 and could control physical access to the floor 
(Kutscher [1976]). Since 1947 it has been a legal requirement that all 
securities trading is restricted to Exchange members.
10.1.2: Contemporary issues
The Amsterdam exchange was first visited in July 1992 for the purpose 
of establishing comparisons between small national markets with a 
mainly domestic rôle and those with an international rather than 
domestic orientation. Amsterdam, like Brussels, falls into the latter 
class.
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An extensive formal interview was conducted with the manager of the 
Information Department, whose views on the problems and prospects for 
the market were secured, plus informal discussions later with brokers.
The Amsterdam market was at that time based on a system of 
specialists, the ’hoekmen’ who divide up the sections of the market 
after the fashion of jobbers on the London market before 1986. The 
international dimension of the market permitted far more 'hoekmen' to 
operate than would be necessary for a purely domestic market. On the 
other hand, the number of very large multinational companies based in 
the Netherlands required a sophisticated market to enable trading in 
their equity to be retained in Amsterdam. Thus an international rôle 
for the market was more of a necessity than a strategic option or a 
matter of historical tradition.
The specialist system had proved to be sufficiently flexible and 
efficient in terms of transaction costs, but had failed to halt a 
steady drift of trade volume to London that had now reached alarming 
proportions. The small size of the 'hoekman' firms meant that each was 
individually able to obtain enough business to be unwilling to 
consider change, particularly in view of their monopoly specialist 
position, which valued each firm higher than its business volume would 
warrant. The specialists were undercapitalised, introducing a bias in 
the direction of small, covered trades, with the result that it was 
precisely the larger bargains required by international fund managers 
that were increasingly being made in London. Outside brokers were much 
more competitive than the specialists and had invested heavily in 
technological support and the provision of services. The banks on the 
other hand obviously had no difficulty with capital and could 
undertake exposure during the settlement period, hold inventory and
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take long positions if they wished. In practice however they used the 
market principally only as required by their mainstream business and 
did not acknowledge a responsibility to support the exchange.
During the course of the interview and other discussions it became 
clear that while the trading and regulatory system and other aspects 
of exchange organisation was regarded as entirely satisfactory from a 
mechanical point of view, there was a serious problem of who was to 
'look after the shop'. A working party of exchange members had been 
set up to consider reform but no decisions had been taken. There was a 
certain amount of friction between the 'hoekmen' who wished to protect 
their position and privileges, the outside brokers who were suffering 
loss of both trading and advisory business and the banks who had no 
particular motivation to act.
The reform process in Amsterdam was observed over the two-year period 
which followed, on the basis of press reporting and comment in 
business and professional periodicals, followed by a further visit for 
confirmation of the changes, which were finally agreed in March 1994. 
The reforms, briefly, consisted of further specialisation among the 
'hoekmen' which would give them a monopoly in their allocated stocks 
but demand that they deal in them at any size. Other exchange members 
would be able to subscribe to the capital of the 'hoekmen' firms - 
henceforward to be known as 'specialists' after the example of the 
NYSE - in order to ensure an adequate capital base for operations that 
would now require exposure. The market would nevertheless remain 
order-driven rather than marketmaker-based. The top 30 stocks on the 
Amsterdam exchange were to be divided among 17 firms and form a 
separate market sector. The remaining market in equities would be 
served by an automatic screen trading system with much wider access
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for brokers, retaining an order-driven market for this sector also. 
Hoekmen firms who decided to withdraw from the market were to be 
compensated by a block grant based on earnings over the preceding 2.5 
years, paid for out of fees charged to the new monopoly specialists 
(PINT [1993]/lJ). A two-tier system for government bonds had already 
been introduced in October 1993 with some return of busines from 
London already experienced (PINT [1993]/2).
The further visit was made to Amsterdam in April 1994 in order to 
secure an authoritative view on the reformed system at the time of its 
introduction. An interview was conducted with the principal of a major 
broking firm who was also a member of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange's 
reform committee. Presh official information setting out the new 
position was obtained from the market authorities and has been 
described briefly above. The main opinion expressed at interview was 
that the reforms appeared to have been opposed, in most cases on 
principle, by both brokers and banks, but had in the end been accepted 
because of the overwhelming perceived risk of damage to the Dutch 
market by steady loss of volume to London. The banks demanded more 
immediacy in the market but were themselves reluctant to provide it, 
particularly in the case of small domestic companies.
The brokers did not like the new capital requirement: 500,000 guilders 
to become an agent, PLS1,000,000 for a market principal and 
PLS2,500,000 for a bank. Larger brokers like the firm interviewed had 
to opt for bank status in order to reduce the cost of bridging finance 
during the settlement period. The new system would however allow 
economies of scale to those participants who took advantage of the 
possibility to offer a wide range of services that had not been 
possible before, due to narrow specialisation. Custodial services,
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settlement, corporate finance, portfolio management and all the 
related dealing could now be handled within a single house.
In the present market small brokers had about 35% share, one bank, ABN 
AMRO, had 30% and the rest was divided up between other banks and 
brokers. Under the new arrangements it was thought likely that both 
this large bank share and the proportion of business done by smaller 
brokers and specialists would fall, the market being divided up 
instead between a relatively small number of institutions. Competition 
would steadily raise the threshold level for new participants: even 
today it was extremely difficult for a new independent to enter the 
Amsterdam market as the respondent had done in 1982 as a member of a 
small private partnership. A capital of around 2 million guilders was 
currently about the critical level and this would rise rapidly. The 
difficulty for the respondent's organisation and, it was stated, a 
number of others, was to remain above the critical level and 'swim' in 
the new market. A further difficulty was marketing pressure from the 
banks, due to their promotional spending power, their captive client 
base and their monopoly of their clients' ear in terms of advice. The 
respondent considered that banks were able to get away with offering a 
large amount of misinformation to their clients and the public due to 
their privileged position and clients' uncritical acceptance of their 
pronouncements. Brokers in the Netherlands were not considered the 
obverse of this coin, but themselves rather respected as members of 
the financial community. Nevertheless an asymmetry of means and of 
regard for their financial advice continued to place them at a 
disadvantage.
Domestic investment volume was not sufficient to support a reasonably 
efficient market in even substantial Dutch firms who were not
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household names abroad. It was therefore important for the market as a 
whole to maintain levels of international investor interest.
There is absolutely no reason to doubt the viability and validity of 
the Amsterdam market, nor its ability to exploit development potential 
(in the present case by recovering lost ground). The strongest 
evidence for these assertions is the fact that the reforms now in 
place were instigated and executed for the common good in spite of 
operating against vested interests on all sides and being quite 
vigorously oposed as such.
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Section 10.2; BRUSSELS
10.2.1: Historical background
The word 'Bourse' derives from the arms of the Chevalier van der 
Buerse, which featured three purses and hung outside his house in 
Bruge, a house which was used for a variety of mercantile purposes, 
giving rise to the expression 'going to the (house of the) purses'.
The Antwerp Bourse is thought to have existed as a commodity exchange 
since 1515, being referred to as an institution in an edict of the 
French king Henry II in 1549 and continued its existence, somewhat 
overshadowed by Amsterdam, until 1801 when the region we now call 
Belgium acquired a public market ('Bourse de Fonds Publics') 
established by Napoleonic decree at Brussels. Only after the 
revolution of 1831 had established the Kingdom of Belgium did Brussels 
become the site of a truly national bourse.
Brussels profited from and contributed to Belgium's industrialisation 
as one of the earliest continental countries to develop a large iron 
and steel industry and as a late coloniser in the Congo. The world's 
first large holding companies were a Belgian invention and remain a 
feature of the country's financial landscape. By the outbreak of the 
first World War however, the boards of the 'Holdings' had become 
stuffed with retired politicians and were no longer at the leading 
edge of industrial enterprise.
With its industrial and colonial networks, the Brussels Bourse enjoyed 
a golden period immediately before 1914, but was unable to protect 
investors from the false markets of the inflationary period and the 
inevitable crash and depression which followed. A Royal Commission 
worked from 1930 to produce the Commercial Code on which a thoroughly
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reformed Bourse was re-established in 1935. A monopoly was re­
established for the exchange in trading all but the largest blocks of 
securities and strict rules introduced for the conduct of brokers 
(Schwarzer [1976]).
The post-Congo period was also marked by internationalisation and this 
remains a characteristic of the Belgian equity market. The bond market 
by contrast, although large because of high and sustained levels of 
government borrowing, remained until recently largely a domestic 
concern despite being one of the largest in Europe in terms of issue 
volume. This has been held to be due to Belgium’s intricate tax 
arrangements (PINT [1994]/5), adding to foreign investors’ transaction 
and information costs. The bond market had been subjected to an 
ongoing reform process in 1989 but, apart from reduced broker numbers, 
its results were not evident at the time of fieldwork visits.
10.2.2; Contemporary issues
The Brussels Bourse was visited in July 1992 for similar reasons to 
Amsterdam, namely to assess the position of an internationally 
oriented small exchange under competition from abroad, as opposed to 
that of a mainly domestic market. Formal interviews were conducted 
with two members (jointly) of the exchange’s technical staff and with 
senior managers/directors with securities trading responsibilities in 
three commercial banks. Two of the banks were large household-name 
full service institutions. The third was a private client specialist 
with extensive portfolio management business. All were active on the 
Brussels Bourse and many other European markets. Formal enquiries were 
made about their activities and policies on the basis of the standard 
questionnaire developed for this purpose and applied in other centres.
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The results of all interviews may be stated briefly. The banks 
regarded their securities trading as a mechanical process without 
regard to the market as a whole. In all cases they dealt through 
broking firms with whom they had close connections and, significantly, 
were not willing to expand on the nature of the connection. The 
interviewees did not appear to be aware that the situation was already 
in the public domain. The banks' activities in buying up small brokers 
in order to obtain access to the computer-based trading system while 
at the same time preferring to use the bourse at arm's length for 
their own trading needs was the subject of a newsapaper report in 
October 1991 (PINT [1991]/1). All interviewees, both banks and 
exchange authorities, agreed that the main distinguishing feature of 
the Brussels Bourse was the severe rundown in the number of broking 
firms due to the external reforms applied to the bond market and to 
the stock exchange itself by the Belgian finance minister Phillippe 
Maystadt since 1989. Undertaken in order to widen the investor base 
and reduce the cost of financing a large and increasing budget 
deficit, the reforms introduced in 1990 had removed stockbrokers' 
monopoly on exchange dealing, required their incorporation as limited 
liability companies, reduced fees and commissions by an average of 
30%, allowed foreign investors to take interest payments gross of tax, 
reduced withholding tax for residents from 25% to 10% (PINT [1991]/2) 
and set in train the organisation of a new settlement system (Belarfi) 
and the introduction of a futures market (Belfox). The latter had just 
opened at the time of the visits, the former was delayed by technical 
and organisational factors. Among these factors was cited the 
inadequate financial resources of the Brussels Bourse. Listing fees 
were among the lowest in Europe and unable to provide a source of 
income for the exchange as was common elsewhere in Europe.
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The number of broker firms had reduced from 200 in 1989 to 115 in late 
1991 (PINT [1991]/1) and were 74 at the time of the visit in mid-1992. 
As a footnote, the visible evidence of this process was to be observed 
in the shabby and neglected exchange floor of the Bourse, in public 
view from the entrance portico, itself infested with loungers and 
drinkers, where the last of the old-style brokers occupied small 
folding tables for the day's session. Only further within and 
invisible to the public was a more salubrious modern environment 
supporting the apparatus of screen-based trading.
By 1994 the bond market reforms were substantially complete, but had 
achieved more for the Belgian finance ministry than for the market, 
with spreads and commissions in line with other European markets and a 
wider range of maturities able to be offered to foreign and domestic 
investors. It must be concluded that the Belgian market remains both 
viable and valid for its purpose and unlikely to become stagnant 
because of high government borrowing, in spite of the Maastricht 
Treaty conditions. It continues, as many observers have noted (see for 
example PINT [1994]/5) to neglect a large part of its development 
potential due to the inability of its participants to work together. 
Brussels is apparently controlled by brokers rather than by banks, 
although, as in many other markets, it can be increasingly difficult 
to identify who controls the brokers.
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Section 10.3: BUDAPEST 
10.3.1: Introduction
The Budapest Stock Exchange (BSE) reopened after a break of 42 years 
on 21st June 1990, the first to do so among the formerly socialist 
countries of central and eastern Europe. A pilot inter-bank market 
('Stock Exchange Days') in bonds had operated since 1988, following 
legislation liberalising securities trading by banks. At the opening 
380 bonds and 20 equity issues were opened for trading by the founding 
forty security firm members.
The close historic connection with Austria, plus the obvious 
difficulty of private placement under a socialist regime have always 
made Vienna a second home for Hungarian investors, both resident and 
expatriate. An early disadvantage for the Budapest market was 
therefore the early listing of a number of companies on the Vienna 
Bourse. Prices were equalised by arbitrage but possession of a Vienna 
listing automatically upgraded companies such as Ibusz (the well known 
travel and tourism company) above purely domestic Hungarian issues 
with off-putting ex-socialist names like Agrimpex, particularly as 
regards foreign interest. Foreign investors were, and remain, more 
prepared to deal in the Austrian than in the Hungarian market for 
Hungarian equity issues. For the exchange a practical operating 
disadvantage from the start was the necessity to wait for the price 
from Vienna to be established and become known each day before trading 
in Budapest could effectively begin (FINT [1990J/1).
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10.3.2; Contemporary issues
A first visit was paid to Budapest in July 1992. Interviews were 
conducted with a major bank as described below and with a group of 
brokers and officials at the Budapest Stock Exchange.
An outside view of the new Budapest exchange was secured at interview 
with a director of a large domestic commercial bank. In his view the 
market was too narrow and volatile, with the continuing fall in the 
index due to the failure of the exchange to establish its viability, 
particularly as regards a worthwhile bond market. Broking was a new 
profession and although admission tests were to be welcomed and 
individual brokers were basically honest, there was a great deal still 
to be done. Information expansion had run well ahead of what the 
market could deliver: several daily papers, daily radio and television 
bulletins and a wealth of analytical material all based their message 
on 'western' perceptions of how stock markets should be expected to 
perform. The result was public suspicion rather than enthusiasm. The 
bank had been a founding member of the exchange but had now withdrawn, 
taking the view that participation was administratively burdensome 
with insufficient prospect of useful returns. The bank's own equity 
portfolio consisted of only 40-50 companies since trustee-status 
limitations on holdings applied. No more than 10% of the equity of any 
one company was held. Enforced debt/equity swaps were "unfortunately 
common" and accounted for many holdings that had arisen as a result of 
privatising companies that were basically insolvent.
Bank guaranteed bond emissions were now beginning to replace bank 
credit but were regarded as a stopgap by the interviewee, rather than 
as a major future development affecting trading volume on the Budapest 
exchange. This and other opinion expressed has to be evaluated against
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the fact that the interviewee's bank, along with several others, 
itself became insolvent a few months later.
At the Exchange the discussions were conducted semi-serially, with a 
great deal of interruption and debate. The end result, supported by 
official documentation and other material obtained from the BSE and 
elsewhere, nevertheless allowed a clear picture of the aims and 
aspirations of the exchange and its position at the time to emerge. 
Rapid change in the Hungarian market and the impressionistic nature of 
the data have since eroded the value of the information obtained. The 
following analysis of the contemporary (1995) position is therefore 
based on two further visits to Budapest. As will be seen in the next 
section, the Budapest Stock Exchange is organised on liberal lines 
that do not unduly favour market-independent participants and is 
capable of processing considerable volume. Automatic computer-based 
trading was introduced in March 1994. Volume remains a principal 
problem of the BSE however, for reasons that the exchange itself 
cannot influence to any great extent. The elections in 1994 did not 
move the country back towards socialism, but slowed an already tardy 
privatisation process and reinforced levels of welfare provision that 
were already too high under the more conservative government of the 
late Jozsef Antal1. This situation contrasts with the hope expressed 
by interviewees in 1992, that the BSE was gearing up for rapid 
privatisation and a large increase in primary debt and equity issues. 
Three factors strongly inimical to investment may be identified as 
continuing to inhibit the development of the Hungarian securities 
market. They are discussed below: the official statistics are drawn 
from Kornai [1994].
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First, there is ground for believing that consumer price inflation has 
become entrenched in Hungary and incorporated in the expectations of 
the borrowing, investing and general public alike. In the private 
sector, portfolio borrowers are real investors for return, aware of 
the inflation and contraction risk. In the public sector the borrower 
is government with a vested interest in reducing the repayment burden 
of its debt, if necessary through inflation.
Between 1980 and 1987 the annual rate of inflation moved in the range 
5.3% - 9.1% annually with no regular trend. Since 1991 the rates have 
moved in the range 16.6% - 23% with no trend, a level usually 
considered likely to risk endemic high levels of inflation or a 
runaway inflation. The present government has been widely seen as 
insufficiently secure in its mandate for it to tackle inflation 
aggressively. A programme was nevertheless introduced on March 12th 
1995 (MISC [1995]/1), beginning with an exchange devaluation and 
import surcharges; both likely to increase the rate of consumer 
inflation in the short run unless trade elasticities conveniently obey 
the Marshall Lerner condition.
Second, while Hungarian per capita GDP is only 20% of the average for 
the countries of the OECD, Hungary lies at 140% above the OECD average 
for the proportion of per capita GDP spent on welfare; a proportion 
exceeded only by the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Norway.
Third, real interest rates were only significantly positive, at 2%, 
for one month (July 1992) in the entire period January 1992 - March 
1994. The most recent maximum, at minus 12%, was recorded in January 
1993, the figures having moved, apparently cyclically, through the 
range -12.5% to +2% in the whole period mentioned (Kornai [1994]).
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This is, of course, a prime disadvantage to a securities market (van 
Agtmael [1984]).
In the course of further visits to Budapest in September 1994 and 
February 1995 interviews were conducted with a director of a major 
insurance company active in the Hungarian market and senior managers 
from three industrial companies, all privatised from state ownership. 
The following points emerged:
1. Small banks are now at considerable and increasing risk of 
takeover by larger ones. Companies and brokers who have relied on 
the flexibility, the connections or the specialised expertise of 
the smaller banks, particularly in private placement, may lose 
these advantages in the process. It is no longer appropriate to 
choose a bank on service grounds. In both the banking and 
securities trading sector it is better to play safe with larger, 
well-capitalised institutions. There may well be a flight to 
security with loss of flexibility and, in the longer run, loss of 
the institutions able to provide it.
2. The government's financing requirement is crowding out the private 
sector in a large-scale way. Also the tax system treats leasing as 
borrowing where the primary motivation is financial.
Back to back finance with foreign partners (foreign currency deposit 
in Budapest as security for a domestic forint loan) has become the 
favoured way of obtaining finance for companies, avoiding both 
crowding out for the borrower and domestic inflation concerns for the 
foreign lender. This does not help the development of the stock 
market.
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The BSE has provided a wide range of investment instruments and 
facilities and promoted them vigorously. Public offerings on the 
Budapest exchange have benefitted from first class advice. Because of 
Hungary's excellent general economic and enterprise record until 
recently, many of the world's leading investment bankers have featured 
in offer announcements, led by Credit Suisse-First Boston (CSFB) with 
a major presence in Budapest (FINT [1994]/2).
10.3.3; The structure of the Hungarian market
The Hungarian Stock Exchange, the governing body, is autonomous and 
self-regulating under the terms of the enabling Act on Securities (No. 
IV of 1990) and externally monitored by the State Securities 
Supervisory Board which issues trading licences to securities firms in 
the form of limited liability companies meeting capital, technical and 
personal qualification requirements.
Two types of bonds exist: those traded but not registered, and those 
registered and traded. The former require a nominal issue capital 
minimum of HUF 10 million of which a 'float' of 10% must be made 
available to the public. This is a rather minimal float requirement 
and applies also to equities, where the issue minimum however is HUF 
100 million. Registered securities exhibit the same structure but with 
higher minima: for equities a minimum of HUF 200 million with a 25% 
float, for example.
Trading is carried out along traditional non-Nasdaq US rather than 
Austro-German lines, with continuous auction by open outcry. Brokers 
face technical examinations before being admitted to the exchange.
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Licensed brokers may trade for their own account but are barred from 
doing so until they have made best efforts to execute client orders. 
Brokers are required to accept client orders. Spot trading, futures 
and options bargains are all possible. Limited insider trading rules 
are operated with the right of the exchange authorities to suspend 
trading in a suspect security for up to three days.
Of the forty founding members a wide mixture of market-independent and 
market-dependent firms was to be found. The only practical method of 
assessing into which category into which any one firm fell was its 
registered capital (MISC [19901/1). The banks were predictably (but 
not necessarily) capitalised in the billions, some intermediate-sized 
firms were capitalised at around HUF 500 million and the remainder 
typically in the range HUF 5-100 million. On the basis of first 
eliminating all small-capital firms with a known banking name such as 
Girozentrale in the title and treating the rest as market-dependent, a 
figure of 12 market-dependent and 28 market-independent broking firms 
was arrived at. This was confirmed by two Stock Exchange interviewees. 
By end-1992 the number of licensed brokers had grown to 48 (EGON 
[1992J/1) but liquidity and volume had declined to the point where 
only 3 (of 21) equities attracted regular trading (FINT [1992J/2).
The first longer-term fixed issue bond, a dollar convertible with a 
coupon of 16%, was not issued until December 1992 (redemption 1997): 
with a second tranche to be marketed internationally it was 
immediately dubbed a "paprika" in international bond market jargon 
(FINT [19921/1). The true significance of the issue however lay in it 
being the first commitment to a fixed term, fixed interest, externally 
convertible issue from any former socialist-bloc country.
Short term commercial paper trading was introduced in January 1993
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with a single-firm issue (PINT [1993]/2). Foreign financial 
institutions were permitted to list forint-denominated securities in 
Budapest from March 1994. The first group of institutions included the 
IMF, IFC, IBRD and EBRD as well as a number of regional development 
banking institutions from other parts of the world (PINT [1994]/4).
Open-outcry trading was supplemented, but not replaced, by a screen- 
based trading system in 1993. The system is similar to the Copenhagen 
limit order book system described in Chapter 7, but is in fact the 
Nordex system used by Sweden and Norway (PINT [1992]/3). As noted 
above, this system was further extended in March 1994.
10.3.4: Regulatory issues
The Budapest Stock Exchange enjoys a similar experience to many, more 
mature western European exchanges as regards both insider trading and 
diversion of turnover. The latter, diversion to Vienna, has already 
been discussed, but since the destination market has experienced its 
own regulatory difficulties, no regulatory issues of the 'lightness 
versus tightness' variety arise.
There is evidence that the Budapest authorities are prepared to act on 
suspicious trading 'events' however. In late 1993 the State Securities 
Supervisor asked the police to investigate dealings in a company, 
Novotrade, and has itself investigated trading in a major company, 
Danubius Hotels.
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Section 10.4: HAMBURG and BREMEN
Interviews with the chief executives of the Hamburg Stock Exchange and 
the Bremen exchange were carried out in July 1992. The purpose of the 
interviews was to discuss the role of the Hamburg and Bremen exchanges 
as small regional bourses:
1. in the context of the spatial 'horizon' of equity issuers and 
investors
2. as an institution offering the facilities normally associated with 
a single national exchange for a region, under competition from 
the centre, Frankfurt.
The interviews predated the formation of the German national stock 
exchange some months later. At the time the demise of the German 
regional exchanges was widely forecast but has not since transpired. 
Although it does not form part of this study, the vigorous promotion 
and subsequent continuing success of the German regional exchanges is 
extremely relevant to the potential of smaller national exchanges and 
is continuing to be monitored with a view to further research at a 
later date. Both of the exchanges visited regarded themselves as part 
of the strong Hanseatic trading tradition. As such, with Munich, they 
should be regarded as the most strongly independent of all the German 
regional bourses. The main findings of the interviews are reported 
below.
Both interviewees were clear that many potential equity issuers would 
be prepared to float companies or issue further equity on their 
regional exchange where they would not do so in Frankfurt. From 
London, Frankfurt is often viewed as a sleepy provincial exchange, 
(more often on grounds of its extremely restricted opening hours than 
any other factor). From Hamburg and Bremen it is seen as a centre of
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banking power, insensitive to the aspirations of individual firms.
Both interviewees were quite definite in placing this high on their 
list of justifications for the continuance of their market.
A second factor regarded as significant was the larger role of the 
independent brokers ('Freimakler') and the Official Broker ('Amtlicher 
Makler') in the regional exchanges. The advantage of the independent 
brokers' position was to be 'more short term in their thinking than 
the banks, but better able to enable a fair price to be set'. The rôTe 
of the official broker was to ensure an orderly market, particularly 
as regards the fair and sequential presentation of the order flow. In 
the first market ('Geregelter Markt'), prices are set by the Official 
Broker at the callover. In the second market ('Freiverkehr') the 
brokers themselves establish the price. The practice is uniform 
throughout the country, but only in the regional exchanges was the 
balance of broker and banker power regarded as more equitable than 
Frankfurt.
Neither interviewee considered that the regional exchanges were more 
likely to attract savers and larger private investors than Frankfurt, 
with the exception of placements in recognisably local or regional 
companies. There is a far higher proportion of such companies in 
Germany than in the United Kingdom. It is usual in routine press 
coverage for the nzune of a company to be coupled with its headquarters 
location, together, often, with its proprietors' names and family 
connections.
There was no arbitrage between centres and, at the time of the visits, 
conversion to a nationwide screen-based trading system was in 
progress. It was concluded at the time that, whatever the threat to
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the future existence of the regional exchanges, there was little 
reason to doubt their viability, confirmed by visible evidence of 
activity and a high level of technological support and material 
infrastructure. Their validity remains open to question for several 
reasons:
1. The interviewees were interested parties defending a position 
under threat from competition and national reform.
2. There was no opportunity to corroborate interviewees' assertions 
with regard to investors and issuers.
3. At the time of interview new issues were at a low ebb. They were 
expected to revive but did not in fact do so for nearly two years 
afterwards.
4. Much of the detailed content of subsequent market reforms, 
particularly the formation of the national stock exchange 
organisation was unclear at the time.
Finally, there was little evidence of unexploited development 
potential. Small savers are still notably absent from the German stock 
market. This cannot be regarded as unexploited potential however, 
since enormous efforts are expended in attempting to break the mould 
of saving tradition. As already noted in Austria, the banks were ready 
to furnish kilos of market-oriented literature although, on this 
occasion, no advantage was taken of the facility.
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Section 10.5: PRAGUE 
INTRODUCTION
A first visit to Prague was made in August 1991 to discuss the 
organisation of the proposed stock exchange. At that time the national 
Chamber of Commerce was interested in sponsoring the institution and 
an interview was conducted with a senior executive on the subject. It 
became obvious in the course of discussion that the Chamber was more 
interested in retaining its position and privileges than in 
facilitating securities trading. The discussion turned largely on 
proposed registration procedures, and what would need to be done to 
prevent foreign companies 'making inroads into the Czech economy'.
A second visit was made in July 1993, in the course of which 
interviews were conducted with representatives of two banks. At that 
time the stock exchange was grappling with its own formation problems 
and no representative was willing to be interviewed. Telephone 
opinions were sought from representatives of several Prague-based 
broking firms, British, American and Czech. They proved to be highly 
contradictory in describing both what was happening and the prospects 
for the immediate future of what were, by then, two, competing halves 
of a fledgling market. The replies are therefore not reported here.
During the course of visits for other purposes in May and June 1994, 
the opportunity was taken to take forward discussions with one of the 
bank executives originally interviewed and to put questions to the 
chairman of a large holding company (Motokov). The results of the 
latter discussion are reported further below. The discussion and 
analysis in the following section is based on all of the above 
interviews, enquiries and discussions, together with press and
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periodical material gathered at the time and as well as that collected 
as part of the overall monitoring referred to in Chapter 1.
10.5.1: Establishment of the Prague market
Three factors distinguish the Czech market for securities from those 
of its neighbours in Poland and Hungary. First, the market's 
development has been led by the need to provide a trading mechanism 
for an existing, ongoing mass privatisation process. Warsaw and 
Budapest both developed 'entrepreneurial' exchanges - in Hungary 
virtually single-handed through the personal efforts of Ms. Ilona 
Hardy - but are now having to endure a lengthening period of 
stagnation as privatisation programmes waver under continuing 
political and economic uncertainty.
Second, the economic surroundings, notably lower levels of consumer 
price inflation, less external debt and a smaller fall in industrial 
production following liberalisation than in the other two countries, 
together with widespread confidence in the general economic policy 
direction espoused by the Prime Minister, Vaclav Klaus, all
contributed to an absence of obvious barriers to progress. A circle of
interlocking mutual debt between companies remained largely unbroken 
however. Any great injections of cash into individual domestic 
companies, whether from stock market flotation or bank credit, may 
well end up somewhere else entirely, as the credit cycle unravels on 
the basis of pressure for settlement. Withholding of supply and lien
on goods, even threats of violence or criminal damage were not
uncommon. This view was confirmed in discussion with a number of 
company managers in Prague, interviewed in connection with a separate 
research project. Legal claims were currently taking two to three
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years to come to court. Direct negotiation or direct action were 
preferred methods of obtaining satisfaction. The bank view, stated 
several times, was that while no-one had funds, the status quo could 
be maintained: if funds became suddenly more plentiful a chaotic 
situation could develop.
Third, by virtue of the lack of any reforming culture before 1990, 
political transformation has been more radical and more rapid than in 
the other two countries, as well as being disrupted by the separation 
of the former Czechoslovakia into two sovereign republics at the 
beginning of 1993. At the political level there was, according to 
interviewees who ventured a view, a straight split between old guard 
and reformist ministers, almost irrespective of their formal political 
allegiances. The will of Vaclav Klaus had tended to prevail, to the 
general relief of the business and financial community. Rapidity of 
change and resistance to it in the legislative and administrative 
infrastructure, has been most responsible for the actual course of 
events in relation to the establishment of a securities market. 
Legislation to enable the formation of a federal stock exchange was 
blocked in Parliament by Slovak deputies in 1991. The Slovak republic, 
not yet sovereign, legislated for an exchange in Bratislava which was 
set up in the same year by a group of banks and insurance companies. 
The present situation of the Bratislava exchange is summarised in a 
note at the end of this section.
In July 1991, informal trading between banks began in Prague, 
initially in a single bond of the Komercni Banka (ECON [1991]/1). On 
October 1st of that year the distribution of coupons for the first 
'small' privatisation commenced. The second, 'large' privatisation 
took place between June and December 1992 (FINT[1993]/5). The Prague
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stock exchange (FSE) formally opened on 6th April 1993 before listing 
arrangements were completed. Dealing desks were provided for up to 32 
representatives of the 53 founding registered brokers, with a 
supporting staff of 30. The French CAC system was supplied with 
funding from the French government. The operation, although 
technically well-equipped, thus commenced as an informal unlisted 
market. The proximate cause of the hasty opening was that a rival 
market, the screen-based over-the-counter RM trading system was about 
to start up its own business. Due to legislative and admininistrative 
delays, the two unlisted markets began to compete with one another, 
rather than operating in different spheres. The number of potential 
investors was large, since by mid-1993 8.5 million Czech and Slovak 
coupon holders held interests in 1,500 companies (FINT [1993]/4). The 
activities of the large number of investment funds set up to manage or 
buy out the holdings of private citizens had also long been cause for 
concern, both locally and internationally (FINT [1992]/4,5), requiring 
transparency in dealing and publicly visible methods of price 
determination as a matter of political as well as business urgency.
10.5.2: Contemporary issues
By the time of further visits in mid-1994 the FSE was divided into a 
listed and an official unquoted securities market, with the OTC market 
still served by the RM (now RM-S) system. Frices of over 1,200 
companies were listed. The English language Frague Fost was 
reorganising and expanding its financial pages almost weekly (MISC 
[1994]/1). Five market indexes were provided. The overall presentation 
of the Frague market in the Czech, German and English language press 
was unrecognisable from a year before.
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A central securities registry, the Centre for Securities was in the 
course of being established. By end-1994 the details of its operation 
were available, along with evidence of early problems (FINT [1995]/1). 
Shareholders' holdings are registered in 'dematerialised' form but a 
separate registry holds printed share certificates. Share transactions 
are legally binding only from the time at which the registers are 
amended. This has led to the practice of dealing at the Centre, rather 
than on the exchange, at prices that are privately agreed and not 
disclosed. Amendments to the securities trading legislation are in 
train to require the quantity and price of these off-exchange dealings 
to be reported in the interests of greater transparency.
For reasons given at the outset, the validity of the Czech market 
cannot be doubted. It was held by most interviewees to be the only 
mechanism that could have created transparency sufficient to maintain 
the general credibility of a voucher privatisation involving an 
initial public participation measured in millions. Transparency in 
this sense is understood to mean merely the existence of a price, 
awareness that a market exists and that securities can be exchanged or 
encashed if required. The average private citizen's holding has been 
widely estimated to be only KC3,000 (about £70) and thus of symbolic 
or political rather than trading importance to the individual.
The viability of the Czech securities market remains an open question, 
but one on which an opinion can be offered with some confidence.
Unlike Hungary there is no obvious single market to which diversion by 
drift can take place. The economic dynamism of the Czech Republic 
seems likely to continue to make the 'waves' on which most market- 
dependent participants thrive, and, finally there is a healthy balance 
among the interests involved. Banks appear to dominate, but they are
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counterbalanced by the representation of a very wide range of foreign 
financial institutions. This in turn is balanced among US, British, 
German, Swiss and Austrian, even Japanese interests, to an extent 
greater than elsewhere in central and eastern Europe (FINT 
[1994]/6,7).
Development potential may be held to be large, not least because the 
growth from trading a single bank bond in 1991 to becoming the largest 
new stock market in the liberalising countries of central and eastern 
Europe has been achieved rapidly, without excess in the form of boom 
and bust. The stability of government policy in the direction of 
developing a 'standard' western economy (the term is generally 
attributed to Vaclav Klaus) may be held to be sufficient to offset the 
political risk associated with long delays in legislating for new 
circumstances as they arise. The level of organisation in the market, 
with attendant long term growth of trading volume, may be expected to 
improve rather than deteriorate therefore.
10.5.3: A note on Bratislava
Three official trading systems exist in Bratislava, the Stock Exchange 
itself, an options exchange and the RM-S computer trading system 
intended to cope with trading associated with the large number of 
small holdings resulting from voucher privatisations carried out along 
similar lines to those in the Czech Republic. Lack of regulation and 
associated poor transparency sets a limit to investor confidence; the 
almost-complete proposed regulatory system was one of many legislative 
victims of the Sepember 1994 elections which returned the Meciar 
government to power in a doubtful coalition unlikely to be able to 
carry through detailed programmes satisfactorily. About 50 stocks are
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traded actively, creating sufficient liquidity for a valid market. 
Trading is largely carried out by the large investment funds which 
have appeared to 'mop up' private holdings. These funds themselves 
suffer from liquidity problems, having devoted all of their resources 
to acquiring privatisation equity, leaving little cash for active 
trading based on market opportunity. Those that were liquid enough to 
sustain trading on the Bratislave exchange have been exposed to 
government interference as a direct result. One large fund (VUB Kupon) 
was suspended from trading in April 1995. Another has been closed down 
by the finance ministry. Political opposition to investment funds is 
understood to be based on the fact that they had begun to enforce 
management change in the companies they now owned. The managers of 
these former, or still partly state-owned, enterprises continue to be 
part of the machinery supporting the Meciar government (FINT 
(19951/2).
Despite being able to quote over 500 companies, over 90% of share 
trading is carried on outside the Bratislava Exchange, leaving daily 
equity turnover on the exchange only the equivalent of at most 
$US150,000. Only 13 companies have a full listing and only four major 
bond issues had been carried out to end-1994.
334
Section 10.6: WARSAW
The Warsaw exchange opening in 1991 was marked by the distribution of 
pairs of red braces to traders. Subsequent development of the exchange 
has revealed the gesture to be prophetic, its progress having 
resembled more the tabloid mythology of stock markets than the mundane 
reality of other centres. This profile is the reason for providing a 
brief note on the Polish market. Vivid economic growth accompanied by 
bouts of inflation everywhere creates increasing demand for assets 
whose values will not erode (van Agtmael [1984]). Real estate is not 
an easy option while the terms of ownership are unclear and capital 
flight abroad is difficult in the face of currency restrictions and 
lack of other transferable assets. To these factors must be added the 
desire of some owners of Polish commercial assets, acquired under a 
variety of circumstances from the state, to liquidate them and realise 
essentially speculative gains. Finally, the absence of established 
bond markets, which do not possess scope to gyrate in the same way as 
equity markets and act as an indicator of sensible limits to returns, 
can allow equity volatility to get out of hand (von Rosen [1991]).
These conditions in Poland, amplified by wide swings in inflation and 
changes in the level of external debt have led to the trading volume 
variations shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. POLAND EQUITY TURNOVER
POLAND EQUITY TURNOVER
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336
The results were first treated by commentators as evidence of economic 
boom (and bust) but are now more soberly regarded as market events, as 
they would be in western economies, and as such are of interest for 
this study.
CONCLUSION
The case of the Warsaw exchange demonstrates in an extreme form the 
intrinsic flexibility and adaptability of securities markets in the 
face of turbulence. Markets do not require great resource inputs for 
their creation, nor for the initial stages of recovery and reform 
after a disastrous episode. Hence they are able to survive massive 
change and are, indeed, particularly good at doing so. Smaller, newer 
markets are more flexible than older, larger ones in that the 
resources required to make changes are smaller and vested interests 
are less able to resist the required initiatives.
This general conclusion is echoed for all the markets considered in 
this chapter. It leads to the corollary that, for larger markets, the 
real risk to their medium term viability lies in slower speed of 
response. If a market reacts quickly, whether in terms of trading 
activity or structural adaptation to any situation, then it will 
recover. There is no situation short of crippling legislative or other 
interference that cannot be dealt with, provided that traders still 
wish to trade and reform is accepted as necessary. If an underlying 
problem is not dealt with promptly however, then trading volume will 
decline. With it will decline, first, resources in the form of income, 
inhibiting action, then the will to reform itself, in face of conflict
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and competition for orders in a shrinking market. Finally, the 
constituency for reform within the ranks of the surviving market 
participants may well be lost by the disappearance of the market- 
dependent sector.
Amsterdam and Brussels, the largest markets in this part of the study 
represent the two contrasting approaches. Amsterdam has been proactive 
and is maintaining its position. That of Brussels remains doubtful, 
reforms having been made too slowly, in a piecemeal fashion and 
without removing the underlying structural problems of a market that 
can only remain viable by remaining international but persists in 
retaining a structure tailored to the domestic banking interest and 
government financing needs.
As for the smaller markets of central Europe, they are able to cope 
satisfactorily with enormous levels of change because they are small 
and pragmatically managed and do not possess the inertia of 
established interest groups able to stand out for a long time against 
reform. All markets however benefit today from being very well- 
informed about all aspects of their competitors' experience: as in 
other spheres of politics, economics and business, much more is now 
known about what has to be done to stay in the game, allowing less 
scope for unexposed conservatism and inertia and for institutions to 
survive at the expense of the processes they exist to facilitate. That 
theme is further explored in Chapter 11.
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PART THREE
CHAPTER 11: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, SUMMARY AND SYNTHESIS OF CONCLUSIONS 
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we summarise the results of the empirical research 
described in Part II and derive conclusions therefrom, based on the 
objectives of the thesis, the hypotheses and definitions of criteria 
and the review of relevant literature set out in Part I.
The objectives of the research, it will be recalled, were to 
understand the rationale for the formation, revival and/or continuance 
of small national and regional securities markets in Europe; to 
establish criteria for their validity, viability and potential for 
further development; to identify trading practices and structures most 
likely to favour stability and growth and, finally, to assess the rôle 
of securities turnover volume as a factor in determining the success 
or otherwise of selected markets. All the above are examined primarily 
over the medium term: the short term is considered to be of less 
relevance to the life of the institutions concerned and the long term 
is difficult to define in a world where securities markets may range 
from permanent structures to ephemeral, dormant or periodically non­
existent institutions and processes.
The hypotheses tested have been:
1. that external economic gains accrue to the promotion of viable, 
valid markets, motivating research and justifying policy 
attention;
2. that internal gains on the other hand tend to accrue to dominant 
participants to the detriment of the market as a whole;
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3. that reform, particularly the removal of entry barriers, may be
held to work against this abuse of market power;
4. that individual acts of reform produce only temporary
improvement requiring continuous change as a prerequisite for 
continued viability;
5. that spatial perceptions, particularly on the part of equity
issuers and investors, work in favour of national and regional 
markets and, finally,
6. that market processes need to be identified as having a separate
existence from the institutions that normally embody them, in 
order to make reform easier to achieve.
To facilitate arrival at conclusions on all these issues, the 
discussion in Part I passed by way of the choice of appropriate small 
European markets for study and the information resources and research 
methodologies to be employed, through a brief survey of recent 
developments in the structure of world markets, to selection of 
relevant criteria for examining the chosen geographical grouping in 
more detail. For the purpose of comparison with the approach taken in 
this thesis, two classical approaches in the literature, - the 
international financial institutional approach represented by van 
Agtmael [1984] and the academic market economics approach of Baumol 
[1966] - were presented in some detail.
In Chapter 3 the wider theoretical literature on the functioning of 
capital markets was surveyed. The topics considered of most importance 
for the present purpose were price discovery, market efficiency and 
the rôle of information. The determinants of volume were considered as 
a separate matter in Chapter 4 where, the discussion in the literature 
being essentially unresolved on the question of whether trading should
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or should not take place, a simple model was developed demonstrating 
the motivation to trade in primary and secondary markets on the part 
of investing individuals and issuing firms.
Part I concluded with an examination of securities markets considered 
as economic institutions, initially from the essentially North 
American viewpoint adopted in most of the theoretical and empirical 
literature and then specifically to recent experience in the European 
arena. As in the case of volume determination, it was found necessary 
to develop fresh models of the phenomena actually observed.
Part II concerned itself with reporting the conduct and results of two 
independent lines of empirical research. The first, in Chapter 6, 
examined in detail the evolution of bond trading volume and equity 
turnover in selected markets over two decades to 1993 and looked for 
relationships between the data of these markets over time. The second 
approach, recorded in Chapters 7 to 10, was a questionnaire and 
interview based institutional study of the same markets, plus others, 
directed towards understanding the relationships between different 
groups of market participants and the effect of those relationships on 
the conduct of the market, on reform processes and on the evolution of 
trading volume - in short, upon the viability, validity and 
development potential of each market as a whole over the medium term.
Before proceeding to a synthesis of the results and conclusions 
derived from the work as a whole, it is appropriate to emphasise the 
temporal context. The main fieldwork for the institutional study was 
completed in mid-1992, with subsequent updating visits to financial 
centres carried out to mid-1995. The principal econometric study was 
based on data from the period 1971-1993, with certain series reported 
to later dates. The dates chosen for study of contemporary phenomena
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are to some extent arbitrary by definition of 'contemporary', and the 
time period chosen for the quantitative data cannot allow them to be 
considered a representative sample of a continuous linear process. The 
two decades and more of the econometric study cover a period of 
accelerating trading volume with both a beginning and, apparently, an 
end. In the absence of forecast indications to the contrary it is 
possible to assert that both the start and the finish of the era of 
massive volume growth in what are now called 'cash' (as opposed to 
derivative) markets are encompassed by the study. Derivative markets 
themselves and the cash markets of high-growth economies outside 
Europe may furnish the next wave of large-scale volume growth. There 
is little evidence that the new markets of liberalised eastern Europe 
will grow rapidly, although there are, of course, massive surges to be 
observed from time to time under the influence of speculation in 
narrow equity markets (as Warsaw) or large-scale privatisations (as 
Prague).
Market reforms and a variety of trading developments were similarly 
the understood, if somewhat unstable, background of the first round of 
formal interviews in each market, conducted during a period of 
intensive activity in those areas. What was perhaps not fully 
appreciated at the time by either the present researcher or the market 
participants, was the extent to which the frequency of reforms and new 
trading developments would accelerate in the future. In markets such 
as Copenhagen, where reform had been undertaken, the sense was of 
assimilating those reforms, perhaps modifying them to deal with 
perceived problems, and then continuing as before. In markets like 
Vienna, where reform was overdue, the sense was of a need to enact 
reform (and then continue as before..). From the perspective of 1995, 
with accumulating hindsight, it is evident that the pace of
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development is still accelerating. Reforms are still treated as single 
steps in the life of éach market, but there is an increasing awareness 
that these steps will become ever more frequent and may become 
virtually continuous under competitive and technological pressure.
Since the research began, three other factors have assumed greater 
importance. They are the growing tendency of governments to run larger 
budget deficits requiring to be efficiently funded; the related need 
to fund pension provision rather than meeting increasing national 
pension burdens out of current revenue and, finally, the enormous 
development of derivatives markets and the risk to stability in 
banking and financial systems associated with their operations.
New research would be required to assess the future position of small 
European securities markets as these trends develop, perhaps using the 
present work as the starting point and benchmark. It has been possible 
to give some indication of the scale and volume of events here by 
presenting evidence of recent reports and announcements affecting 
European markets. Table 1 furnishes a chronology of reported 
developments since the beginning of 1992. Of particular interest is 
the stream of announcements from German regional bourses (not all 
reported here) confirming their intention to resist absorption by 
Frankfurt, and strongly supporting the hypothesis of a spatial horizon 
in the investment community. The only conclusion that could have been 
supported by the original interviews in Bremen, Hamburg and elsewhere 
would have been that the sentiments expressed were defiance, shortly 
to give way to resignation in the face of pressure to centralise the 
German market. Although that pressure continues, the outcome is much 
less clear and the German regional exchanges remain very much in 
business. They retain many attributes of the smaller national
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exchanges examined in the rest of the thesis and their progress 
therefore continues to be of interest. A string of new bourse openings 
in smaller countries and the large numbers of reforms to trading 
systems, market structures, regulation and settlement (by no means all 
reported here) form the main burden of the table.
With this essential context in mind we then turn to the results and 
conclusions of the research and literature review, beginning with the 
latter.
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Table 1. CHRONOLOGY OF RECENT EVENTS
1992
1993
Jan
Jun
Sept
Dec
1994 
Apr 
Jun 
Aug 
Nov 
Dec 
Dec
1995 
Jan- 
Apr
Jun
Jun
Jul
Nov
Valletta
Nicosia
Tashkent
Frankfurt
Bratislava
Budapest
Vilnius
Istanbul
Milan
Amsterdam
Lisbon
Frankfurt
Milan
Bremen
Stuttgart
Bratislava
Feb Berlin 
Feb Stuttgart 
Mar Moscow
Frankfurt
Moldova
Zurich
Riga
Bucharest
Bourse opened [WELT/1994/1] 
Bourse opened [FINT/1992/1] 
Bourse opened [MISC/1993/1]
German bourses unified into Deutsche Borse AG 
[FINT/1994/2]
Bourse opened [MISC/1993/3]
First major insider trading prosecution 
[MISC/1993/2]
Bourse opened, Paris-model trading system 
[MISC/1993/1, FINT/1993/1]
Major trading, settlement and custody reforms 
introduced [FINT/1994/8]
Trading system reform and T+5 settlement 
introduced [FINT/1994/5]
Major Bourse reform [FINT/1994/1]
Major bourse reform [FINT/1994/6]
Insider trading regulation introduced in 
Germany [FINT/1994/3]
First insider trading prosecution in Italy 
[FINT/1994/4]
Listing conditions and trading reforms 
announced [WELT/1994/2,3]
First French stock listed on a German regional 
[WELT/1994/4]
Listing, trading and participation 
'reforms'introduced by Meciar government to 
restrict privatisation [FINT 1995/3]
Trading reforms announced [WELT/1995/1]
Trading reforms announced [WELT/1995/2] 
Regulatory Commission announced to register 
and license stock exchanges in Russian 
Federation [MISC/1995/1]
Trading system reforms announced [FINT/1995/1] 
Bourse opened [FINT/1995/2]
Swiss exchanges introduced electronic trading 
[FINT/1994/7]
Bourse opened [FINT/1995/8]
Bourse opened [FINT/1995/9]
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Section 11.1 Conclusions from Part I
While trading volume may be held to determine the medium term 
prospects of securities markets, it was pointed out in Chapter 2 that 
the causality is reversed in the short term: volume is generated by 
the success of the market in offering opportunities to investors and 
traders to detect and pursue prospective gains. This consideration 
motivated a study of the literature of price discovery, returns 
generation, securities markets' relationship to the real economy and 
market microstructure, in order to find out to what extent small 
European markets examined do, in fact, reflect the underlying economy 
of their country and generate patterns of returns that are consistent 
with those obtainable in larger markets. The conclusion is that, as 
elsewhere, the relationship with the underlying economy is somewhat 
loose. Market cycles are not synchronous with economic cycles but a 
general relationship, whereby securities markets lead real markets by 
up to half-a-cycle, may be discerned wherever the economy is large 
enough and stable enough to generate definable cycles. As regards 
returns generation the Friedmanesque hypothesis - 'there is no such 
thing as a free lunch' - is strongly supported. In other words, the 
risk-return relationship is generally maintained across all markets, 
with local differences attributable to poor information or 
communications quickly traded out, once identified. The fact that 
comprehensive market information, rapidly communicated, is now the 
norm - anything else now being qualified as 'poor' - is itself a 
commentary on the advance of technology and the degree of organisation 
of the securities industry worldwide.
The liberalising (in journalistic parlance 'emerging') economies, 
among which only a restricted number in Europe have been studied for
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this research, represent a large, anomalous class where market 
structures and the availability of information can still be classed as 
'poor' by the new world standard. Market structures are poor because 
equity markets are often narrow, unsupported by large, liquid, bond 
markets but influenced by very large scale political, economic and 
market factors, notably privatisation, which overshadow their often 
modest and embryonic institutions. There is, on the other hand, no 
reason to doubt that these markets are anomalous in the sense that the 
same forces are working upon them as operate within all established 
markets large and small, as discussed in Chapters 2 to 5. They may, in 
general, be expected to approach US and western European norms in due 
course.
A caveat must of course be entered for retrograde cases. Recent 
developments in Slovakia for example (see Table 1.) represent a case 
of 'reform* moving in the wrong direction under political influence. 
Far more encouraging is the evidence of a World Bank study published 
since the present research was completed. Annual economic growth rates 
over 18 years in 42 countries were, reported as on average 1.6% 
greater in those countries classified as 'liquid' by virtue of 
possessing reasonably accessible stock markets than in those not so 
endowed [WELT 1995/3].
The price-volume relationship and the determinants of volume in the 
medium term were examined in Chapter 4 and a somewhat different 
conclusion reached from that noted in parts of the literature. In 
general, previous authors have noted the dynamic response relationship 
of price to volume and vice versa and attributed the overall behaviour 
of the system to an attempt to extract returns from information about 
real events, the order flow, the behaviour of other traders and so on. 
Since the models used to inform the debate are largely constructed to
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be solved in equilibrium, the question arises as to whether any 
trading at all would take place in equilibrium. As every trader knows, 
equilibrium is never arrived at, but this is the result of untidiness 
in the real world and not a sufficient answer for theoretical 
purposes. In this study we have substituted a variant of a model in 
which a single agent, by virtue of progressing through a human life 
cycle and possessing different wealth and preferences at each stage, 
cannot come to equilibrium. This is sufficient to generate trading in 
an event-free world. The 'waves' that generate trading in the real 
world, particularly in large bond markets, are created by a not- 
dissimilar process, although nominally event-driven. The cash-flow 
situation and prospects of large financial institutions, for instance, 
are constantly altering, not least because of demographic change, 
which in turn represents the aggregate of all individual life-cycle 
stages. Their response is to change the liquidity profile and risk 
structure of their portfolios to match, by extensive trading.
Finally in Part I, the structure of the securities industry and 
investor behaviour was examined against the background of evidence 
from European securities markets. The conclusions reached may be 
summarised as indicating that all markets yield broadly comparable 
returns and behave in a similar manner in the very short run, given 
their varying degrees of informational efficiency. In the medium term 
their status, reputation and specialisms operate on the levels of 
trading volume achieved and determine the degree of use made of them 
by investors and traders. Status in particular is determined by the 
balance struck between the lightness and the effectiveness of 
regulation; by the existence of local, attractive instruments (German 
Pfandbriefe, Danish bullet bonds, British equities); by tradition,
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including journalistic tradition, and by indirect trading links 
between institutions in different markets. Direct links remain few but 
are multiplying at the present time. Stockholm for excunple is the only 
market in Europe to allow foreign institutions actually to become 
domestic exchange members and UBS is the only institution to take 
advantage of the fact: Austria only recently (1995) allowed foreign 
banks to bid at auction for government bond issues. The most recent 
phenomenon observed is a wave of agreements between derivatives 
exchanges which have not formed part of the present research, but, as 
indicated earlier, may be expected to take up the running in large- 
scale development activity.
As with trading volume it was found necessary to supplement the models 
to be found in the formal literature with forms consistent with the 
findings from the empirical research and with market activity as 
described in the informal literature and press reports. It was 
concluded that the minimal broking firm size had increased from one to 
about six members, largely (a) because of the need for technology used 
to trade, to research and to process information in support of trading 
activity and (b) to be represented in more than one place at the same 
time - often simultaneously in two or more parts of a trading floor as 
well as at office quotation and trading screens. Senior partners in 
broking firms seemed to spend a great deal of time on business 
reorganisation and development connected with reform and extra 
competition, rather than on transacting routine broking business as 
formerly. The process of change and concomitant workload is by no 
means exhausted. For example, the Canadian CATS trading system found 
in many European exchanges at the time of the empirical research and 
then mini-computer based, is shortly to be released in a PC version, 
allowing dealers to conduct screen-based business anywhere, including, 
ironically, the exchange floor.
350
The formal literature of market microstructure contains many studies 
comparing market forms - continuous versus intermittent auction, 
dealer versus marketmaker and so on - without reaching a definite 
conclusion on which is to be preferred outside of a prior, closely 
restricted theoretical context. It has been shown that nearly all 
market forms are equivalent under certain assumptions (the exception 
being marketmaking on the London model). The informal literature cited 
in this study, anecdotal evidence in the form of responses to 
questions outside the formal questionnaire reported in Chapters 7 to 
10 in the empirical research itself, all support the same conclusion 
in a looser form, namely that, in small markets, the market form does 
not matter, provided that it offers an efficient, competitive platform 
for the activity of that marketplace (Roell, 1991). Pagano and Roell 
(1990) give a comprehensive analysis of the theoretical issues 
underpinning this view, supported by empirical evidence from European 
exchanges and a review of separate work by Roell (1986,1989). Formal 
discussion and evidence of the influence of variation in market 
structure are to be found in Section 5.2.3. In larger markets the 
issue is clouded by such considerations as block trading, capital 
adequacy and continuous liquidity which are less important in the 
centres studied here, as evidenced by the tendency to make special 
arrangements for them outside the main market; by splitting the market 
rather than reforming the main market (see, for example, Copenhagen 
Stock Exchange Annual Report 1993, p.7, among others, as well as 
Pagano and Roell (1990) p.49). Even in larger centres, the form of 
market adopted for small firm equity is widely disputed. The 
contemporary debate over AIM and Tradepoint in London, the Paris 'new 
market' and the form that the new Easdaq and other proposed markets 
might take, provides further evidence of diversity of views [PINT 
1995/4,5,6,7).
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By a reading of contemporary literature and anecdotal evidence from 
informal contacts, later confirmed by the empirical research, two 
additional factors were found to operate in European markets. First, 
there exists a process of new firm creation out of, and extinction and 
absorption by, larger institutions. This process is the principal 
means of maintaining a varied fauna of market organisms as markets 
contract and expand in the longer term. Examples were cited, and 
continue to emerge, as evidence of 'calving' (by analogy with the 
glacial process of the same name) in a warm market climate. A winter 
snow of small firms obliged to integrate with larger, longer-lived 
institutions constitutes the other side of the same coin. It was 
observed that the risk to small firms appeared not to be noticed by 
them however, and a model, based on the starving population paradigm, 
explaining apparently insouciant behaviour in the face of continued 
contraction of the broking industry, was developed and tested by 
simulation.
The foregoing conclusions developed in Part I and set out in more 
detail at the end of the relevant chapters, were used to analyse the 
evidence obtained from the empirical described in Part II, and whose 
results are next discussed.
In closing on Part I, it should be noted that there was a strong 
connection between the evidence of contemporary reporting in the press 
and specialist market literature and the later testimony of individual 
direct interviews conducted as part of the empirical research. The 
models developed ab initio or extended from the versions in the formal 
literature, were originally chosen as a response to a reading of the 
informal literature, but satisfactorily withstood exposure to direct 
use within the empirical research. In other words respondents 
recognised the models and could relate them to their own market. This
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experience supports the further conclusion that, by and large, the 
professional press and practitioner literature of securities markets 
is well-informed and a useful source of evidence about the real 
structure and behaviour of markets: it supports and is supported by 
direct testimony. Due care was neverthelesss taken, using practical 
experience and requests for evidence, to filter for 'market myths' 
propagated by the same means. The large category of informal 
literature designed to entertain, interest and motivate investors, not 
always easy to separate from more reliable material, was carefully 
filtered out. There was no evidence from reading or research that 
markets ever 'strove' to reach new highs or 'responded' to general 
situations in the anthropomorphic manner suggested by some 
commentators in every language and every centre visited. The popular 
working rule 'post hoc, ergo propter hoc* and its associated 
functional form, belief in the validity of technical analysis 
('chartism'), was avoided wherever possible in the search for 
explanations of market behaviour.
Section 11.2 Conclusions from Part II - Econometrics 
The econometric research described in Chapter 6 was designed, first, 
to assess the validity and information content of price, volume and 
associated economic data from each of the three national markets 
studied (Denmark, Austria, Germany); second, to test for seasonality, 
stationarity and the existence of correlations, and, third, to attempt 
to construct a satisfactory model of the data generating process for 
equity trading volume.
The data were found to be stationary in first differences of 
logarithms or levels and a number of weak correlations identified.
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Very weak seasonality was also identified in correlograjns but was not 
sufficient to fail tests or, as a matter of judgement, to require 
filtering by dummies. In other words, the short-run (monthly) dynamics 
of the models was not considered to be affected by weak annual 
patterns: this would not have been the case if the study was primarily 
concerned with returns generation, when seasonal patterns would, at 
some threshold, offer the possibility of excess returns.
Error correction models of the Danish and Austrian markets were 
developed, with closely related parameters and coefficients. The 
German market also showed strongly similar features, leading to the 
conclusion that all three markets behaved in a similar manner as 
regards the response of bond trading volume and equity turnover to 
stimuli. The final model treated equity turnover as the dependent 
variable, strongly related to bond trading volume. This led to the 
conclusion that all three markets were essentially driven by bond 
trading considerations, with the equity market accommodating the 
resultant need for overall portfolio balancing.
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Section 11.3 Conclusions from Part II - Survey and Final Assessment
In this section we attempt to draw together the threads of the entire 
study and consider what conclusions may be drawn by considering the 
results from all markets under a variety of topic headings, each 
related to the appropriate hypotheses set out in Chapter 1.
11.3.1. Trade Volume and Relative Strengths of Market Participants
The importance of trading volume for the development of small markets 
is the focus of this section, relating to the first hypothesis of this 
study, that volume is the prime determinant of market health, the 
second, that channelling market share to certain participants is 
deleterious to market health and the fourth, that continuity of reform 
is essential for longer-term progress. There are three aspects to the 
case:
(a) the distribution of trade among groups of market participants is
important for maintaining a balance of power among them and,
ultimately, for the survival of each, while,
(b) exposure of orders to the market promotes greater informational
efficiency, and hence more trading opportunities.
(c) the ability of the market authorities to insist on business
being put through the market increases their financial and 
managerial strength to reform and develop the market.
The Danish market offers the closest approach to an ideal model under 
all three headings. Increases in trading attendant on reform improved 
the visibility of market opportunities and generated further business. 
This conclusion is strongly confirmed by the econometric results for
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both Copenhagen and Vienna: in the former case the improvement is 
continuous, in the latter spasmodic, but visible. When added to the 
Lisbon case, where large 'waves' of activity followed the joint 
occurrence of reform and large privatisation issues, there would 
appear to be considerable support for the view that continuity of 
reform is the key to development. Further reform in Denmark did not 
however eliminate the power of the market-independent participants to 
capture the order flow in bonds, as the survey results show. There is 
a remarkable disparity of views between market-independent and market- 
dependent participants as regards price formation, trading volume and 
spreads and commissions (Introduction to Part II, Table 2, Section 2). 
Even in Denmark it has been possible to create, at least partially, a 
secondary market with its own structure of prices, spreads and 
commission levels. In all the secondary centres studied, with the 
exception of Amsterdam and the German regionals (where only the view 
of the market authorities is represented) the pattern of response is 
the same although insufficient numbers prevent a tabular analysis.
In Vienna none of the three aspects of the case is favourable. The 
market is effectively in the hands of the market-independent sector; 
their ability to trade extensively outside the market vitiates the 
value of trading information and the market authorities are neither 
independent nor have a strong pecuniary interest in order flow through 
the market. In neither Copenhagen nor Vienna is equity turnover 
sufficiently important to count in the overall trading volume, or to 
sway the balance of power away from the market independent group 
towards the smaller brokers who have most to offer clients in this 
area. Lisbon offers a similar scenario, but with an important 
difference. Bond trading still predominates and the banks have again 
penetrated the ranks of the broking community after seat
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redistributions in 1990, but the process of economic transformation, 
including privatisation and foreign investment interest, has created 
more equity trading and related services than in the two more mature 
centres. The ratio of bond to equity trading is only 10:1 in Lisbon as 
opposed to 60:1 in Copenhagen and 12:1 (reported) in Vienna, as shown 
in Table 1. of the Introduction to Part II. The Lisbon case also 
translates with ease to Budapest and Prague, where interest in the 
markets is maintained by equity and equity-related dealing, the bond 
market has yet to develop, and openings exist for market-dependent 
participants. In all cases however, under-developed equity markets 
result in high levels of short and long term volume volatility.
Survey respondents in all countries looked to the future restructuring 
of pension funding arrangements to remedy the situation by creating 
greater interest in efficient portfolios with a substantial equity 
weighting. This is reflected in the large shift of view recorded in 
survey responses (Introduction to Part II, Table 2, Section 11) as 
between 'past and present’ and ’future’. No such shift was expected in 
small saver participation (Table 2, Section 8).
It is thus a conclusion of this study, on the evidence of all the 
countries surveyed, that maintaining high trading volume is the best 
means to promote a balanced, healthy diversity of participants. 
Ensuring that all trades are exposed to the market, or, at the very 
least (block trades excluded) reported in full and immediately, is the 
best way of promoting higher volume and offering opportunities to all 
classes of trader.
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11.3.2. Technology. Internationalisation and 'Process*
In this section we discuss the above elements in the context of ease 
of entry as a precondition for market health, as set out in the third 
hypothesis of the study; as it affects the spatial perception, or 
sense of place, identified in the fifth hypothesis; and as regards 
processes replacing institutions as the vehicle for market activity, 
the subject of the sixth hypothesis. Transformation was strongly under 
way in all centres, at the time of the original fieldwork and 
continues apace driven mainly by technological advance and increasing 
international business. Spatial perceptions are essentially a more 
conservative force, but continue to operate (ECON [1996/1]).
Technology has however demolished the claim that a 'presence' bourse 
is essential for the development of new exchanges (von Rosen, 1990) 
and trading floors continue to shrink and/or disappear in all European 
centres. This is an appropriate starting point for the discussion.
As is often the case with the introduction of new technology, the old 
and the new persist side-by-side. In the centres studied this has been 
more of a hindrance and a barrier to entry for small firms than the 
introduction of technology per se. The need for a firm size minimum of 
approximately six persons in all centres has already been discussed in 
Section 5.5,2. In those centres where presence was required (Vienna, 
Amsterdam, Lisbon, Brussels (very limited time) and the German 
regionals) the active principals' time tended to be taken up by floor 
dealing. Elsewhere (Copenhagen, Prague (still evolving) and Budapest) 
principals could deal, provide client services and supervise 
administration and back-office operations, all at the same time. This 
constitutes a considerable advantage of technology, allowing all 
functions to be performed from one desk, which far outweighs its cost.
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It was further seen in London (Note in Section 9.7) that world-market 
levels of information efficiency, probity and security can also be 
achieved in a small office by on-screen information services, data and 
voice recording and direct communication to arrange banking 
facilities, settlement and custody. All of this goes a long way to 
explain the disappearance of trading floors and the rapid adoption of 
complex technology observed in all centres, even where severe currency 
and other financial restrictions obtained (since completion of 
research these are much eased in the Czech Republic but remain a 
problem in Hungary and, to some extent, in Portugal). The migration of 
entire trading systems such as CATS to smaller platforms, even PCs 
encourages the uptake of technology. Promotion by the Paris Bourse of 
its CAC system among transition countries, accompanied by generous 
financial and technical aid, has been a further force for the 
widespread immediate adoption of electronic trading, with no presence 
requirement from the outset, in these countries.
Technology rather obviously promotes processes above institutions, as 
exemplified by frequent, detailed, undifferentiated references to the 
technology and trading systems to be found in the annual reports and 
descriptive documentation supplied by all centres and reported in some 
detail in Chapters 7-10. Small markets are now obliged to organise 
their trading arrangements around the capabilities of the software 
they have purchased. Hardware also remains a problem, despite the move 
to personal computers and workstations referred to above. This is 
because, increasingly, market systems are expected to run on fault- 
tolerant hardware, which recovers, restores damaged data files and 
continues to function automatically, following power failures and 
other interruptions. Provided that transactions are securely recorded, 
this is not a problem traders need cater for, but is essential for the
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central parts of the trading system operated by the market 
authorities. For the authorities in turn it is not a question of cost; 
at the level of the whole market the cost of proprietary systems is 
modest; but of loss of freedom to adopt other than standard systems. 
The alternative, tailor-made systems are too costly for small markets 
to contemplate and fraught with risk. The calamitous experience of the 
London market in its attempts to create a system to match its 
institutions, rather than the other way round, is notorious.
In a similar vein, although markets may be segregated for the purposes 
of indicating the quality of the securities offered in each of them, 
it is increasingly illogical to restrict participation in those 
markets to certain groups of dealers or brokers. Once trading is on­
screen, almost automatically, the number of those able to see a screen 
and hence observe the market continuously, whether dealing or not, 
increases without limit. This removes any ground for placing the 
market in the hands of a small group of cognoscenti, who have every 
motivation to restrict entry to their circle. Apart from issues of 
qualification, capital adequacy and so on, there is no reason why 
markets should not be open to all. This is already the case in 
Copenhagen, Lisbon, Brussels, Budapest and Prague, but not in Vienna 
and the German exchanges where the Freimakler are restricted to one 
market. Amsterdam is a somewhat special case because of its 
international vocation, needing (post-reform) to offer the services of 
well-capitalised specialists for institutional investors. The downside 
risk of easier market access is however that the market-independent 
institutions can move in. The one virtue of the Freimakler was, as the 
name suggests, their freedom or independence from the larger 
institutions. On the other hand this freedom has long been eroded. At 
the time of the Bremen fieldwork visit a significant part of the
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discussion concerned the recent (mid-1992) takeover of a major Munich 
broker by S. G Warbourg: this was regarded, vainly as it turned out, 
as a sad, one-off occurrence. In the majority of markets however, as 
stated, the problem does not arise and falls within the general rubric 
of maintaining a healthy balance of participants across the whole 
market. Lisbon has to be mentioned as a special case where the supply 
of seats constitutes a severe barrier to entry of a different kind; 
the problem is discussed in Section 8.7. It is remarkable that the 
usual suspect for criticism as regards difficulty of entry, capital 
adequacy requirements, was not cited as important by any respondent 
(Table 2., Section 7). The recorded response in Lisbon relates to seat 
price, not capital. In detailed discussion with market-dependent 
participants it turned out that they were either engaged exclusively 
in commission transactions or covered trades, or had banking 
affiliations that qualified under capital adequacy rules, or were 
registered as banks exclusively for the purpose of their securities 
trading. In every centre except Vienna, capital adequacy rules were 
currently under discussion but respondents expected no future 
difficulty. This is to be compared with insider trading regulation 
where the rules were regarded as onerous whenever the question was 
raised. Responses are tabulated under 'other restrictions' in Table 2, 
Section 7, where insider trading was the prime issue raised. Overall 
the prime barrier to entry was regarded as inability to access the 
order flow (meaning bonds), except Lisbon, as already discussed.
We turn now to internationalisation, but apply to it the specific 
appellation of 'other countries', rather than the world as a whole.
The tabular summary of survey results (Introduction to Part II, Table 
2., Section 4.) clearly shows that only the banks insisted on a 'world 
view'. The responses of interviewees to a standard question are not
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regarded as especially significant evidence in this regard and was 
directly contradicted by their failure to give examples, or even 
mention, more than national or (supranational) regional issues, apart 
from such obvious matters as trade diversion, usually to London.
Region and country were cited as their main interest much more 
frequently by the market-dependent participants, both as shown in 
Section 4 of the table, and in the smaller centres not summarised in
this way. In Copenhagen there was frequent reference to the rest of
Scandinavia, plus London, but nowhere else. In Austria 'the rest of 
the world' was used as a sounding board to amplify the fact that 
Vienna was different, rather than discussed as a real place, in a 
manner reminiscent of some British discussion of Europe. Even imminent 
EU entry and the then-explosive developments in eastern Europe were 
dismissed as irrelevant to the Vienna market. To some extent this has 
in fact remained the case, although new research would be required to 
establish the contemporary facts. Lisbon alone showed real interest 
and concern for its place in the world and this has since been
evidenced by the 'global' placement of its privatisation issues,
reorganisation of the Lisbon and Oporto exchanges to reflect 
international investor requirements and continuing reform. Lisbon is 
also unique in having a weak regional identity: this is 
understandable, since its one neighbour, Spain, is regarded as a rival 
and a threat more than a partner. Prague and Budapest have not moved 
beyond a dichotomous pyschology induced by needing and promoting, but 
also resenting, foreign investment interest. It is not yet possible to 
discuss the long term position. Brussels and Amsterdam are both 
established international exchanges with different perspectives on 
their national rôle. In Belgium the national rôle is to finance the 
public deficit, in doing so creating a large, internationally
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attractive bond market. The large holdings (internationally operating 
companies) are either firmly held in portfolios or also traded 
internationally. In The Netherlands the raison d'etre for an 
international exchange is the need to finance and provide a secondary 
market for the Dutch multinational companies, the rest of the domestic 
economy being relatively insignificant in stock market terms.
All of these considerations militate against a truly international 
perspective on the part of the markets studied and point instead to a 
strong sense of place and to local (i.e. national) perspectives and 
motivations in almost every area. The celebrated 'globalisation' of 
securities markets has, as yet, failed to materialise, except as 
regards the trading out of obvious differences in returns and the 
practice of Markowitz diversification among international fund 
managers. Recent surveys, postdating this research and the analysis 
based on it, indicate that this remains true, but commentators 
continue to forecast that "investors should soon start gobbling up 
foreign shares in record numbers" (ECON [1996/1]). The article just 
cited, by the way, takes an average annual return for the period 1970- 
95 to make its point that returns could be improved by further 
diversification. The econometric and other evidence of this study 
shows that two completely different epochs are thereby forcibly 
entrained, possibly three if one includes the emergence of eastern 
Europe, rendering the conclusion less than useful.
The evidence of the study, however diffuse, is that spatial 
perspectives remain important. New national securities markets 
continue to open at a rate of one every three months in Europe and the 
territories of the former Soviet Union alone. With the exception of 
increasing co-operation among futures and options markets not covered
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by this study, even the most limited regional international co­
operation in Europe is hard to see, let alone the internationalisation 
of trading. A new market, EASDAQ, is of course to open in September 
1996, but the fact of its opening is not evidence of its likely 
success. The evidence required would be the rapid uptake of equity 
trading, extending to the small and medium-sized companies that 
constitute the major part of the private-sector economic activity of 
most small countries in Europe. Bond trading is of course effectively 
international by virtue of the structure of interest rates and 
currency parities: differences are widely observed to be traded out by 
covered interest arbitrage (Shapiro, 1992). Larger multinational 
enterprises are increasingly cross-listed on the major and some minor 
exchanges, but there is as yet no evidence that this has produced any 
marked effect on their general performance, or indeed their 
visibility. Rather the reverse may be true: those exchanges already 
deemed to be likely to generate investor interest, both local and 
international, would seem to be offer themselves as the target for 
listing applications, rather than those which 'might' produce results.
An end to geography through global financial integration has been 
posited by O'Brien (1991). Like Lord Kelvin before him, announcing the 
imminent end of the study of physics just before the quantum 
revolution, O’Brien was writing at the onset of a vigorous outbreak of 
'geography* which, it was evident as early as 1989, required close 
examination and reflection upon its possible consequences. He delivers 
his conclusions however, with the opening remark "This paper has sped 
across many subjects and has raised many issues without even 
attempting the further analytical task of gauging the extent of 
change". To be fair, the burden of his argument is concerned with the 
world financial system and the rôle of freer (sic) capital flows in
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allowing change to be managed, rather than the development of smaller 
national securities markets. This broader topic has been more fully 
discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.1. As stated elsewhere in Chapter 1, 
variety and richness sustained by geography, in this case the spatial 
distribution of different, historically evolved economic and 
commercial cultures, has inspired the present research. Predicting 
outcomes that differ radically from established patterns seems to 
remain a risky activity. A personal observation based on this and 
considerable research in the transition economies beginning in 1990 
and continuing, is that, if anything, patterns of business behaviour 
developed during the 19th century, modified but as often amplified as 
attenuated by large political changes during the inter-war period, are 
re-establishing themselves in central and eastern Europe. For a full 
discussion of this thesis with supporting evidence and empirical 
research see Webb (1996). This work echoes O'Brien in one respect: 
"Long-standing relationships between finance and commerce cannot be 
changed quickly without radically upsetting the macro and the micro 
economy" (O'Brien, 1991, p. 115). Elsewhere: " Eventually, local 
exchanges will find that their ability to control trading in the more 
local companies will prevail, whereas the stocks of international 
companies will be traded more widely" (op. cit. p. 103). This is a 
continuation, not the end, of geography. On the other hand one simply 
cannot find evidence for the assertion which follows: "Undermining the 
efforts of any exchange to preserve its historic position is the fact 
that its members, ultimately, will migrate to the most profitable 
market, with few geographical loyalties." (op. cit. p.103). This may 
well be true of some investors, but not of stock exchange members and 
even that process, trade diversion, as the case of Amsterdam shows, 
can be reversed by reform. Amsterdam has regained popularity and, in 
1996 (to April), with a 14% rise, has posted the largest price gains
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of any European bourse (WELT [1996/2]). That is actually evidence for 
resumed geographical loyalty, since it has never been suggested that 
Amsterdam is clearly more attractive than London in its own right. It 
is, finally, rare, as noted elsewhere, for broking firms to be members 
of more than one exchange, still less to migrate from one to another.
It is also a conclusion of this study that there is a certain pre­
existing lack of geography, and indeed of history after their initial 
formation, among securities markets. Their vocation was mostly 
established in the 17th century as a result of three phenomena: (a) 
the beginning of massive world trade in the modern sense, requiring 
cargos to be financed and traded, (b) the invention of the joint-stock 
company and (c) technological advance and scale increases in the 
conduct of warfare and empire building, requiring increasingly large 
amounts of finance to be raised. The basis was reinforced by the 
industrial revolution, notably in financing railway development, but 
eroded by the frequency of episodes of scandal, collapse and dormancy. 
Historical developments have been traced briefly in this study 
country-by-country. They are not a superfluous element of the 
presentation and show clearly the origins of each exchange in one or 
more of the above factors and, in particular, a strong tendency for 
the original flavour imparted by those origins, to persist unchanged. 
The timeless logic of securities trading itself, the attitudes of 
market participants and the central function of information (see Neal, 
1990 for an exposition of these topics in the context of the Amsterdam 
market over a three-hundred year period) make the examination of every 
market a curiously dèja-vu experience for the observer: one has, in 
the end to restrain the urge to write down the answer to a question 
before it has been delivered. These similarities have been noted
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extensively in Chapters 7 - 1 0  and refer not to a real absence, or 
end, of geography, but of universality in the subject matter. This 
universality is not that of the investment literature, but that of 
awkward mixtures of large and small traders in often extremely 
imperfect markets where definitions of immediacy and liquidity 
developed from NYSE data apply in only the most rudimentary fashion, 
if at all. Financial markets in small countries are, it may be 
asserted, more the product of their surrounding economic environment 
than a generator of it, certainly in the eyes of their participants.
It is here that geography and recent history make their mark. Poland 
and the Czech Republic are coping with privatisation and need equity 
markets for this purpose while lacking the bond markets that lend them 
stability. Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia, to name only those familiar 
on the ground to the present researcher, but not part of this study, 
are in the same position and variously preparing or scrambling to get 
started. Slovenia has run a 'toy' exchange in Ljubljana for some 
years, more or less purely to train personnel and acquire experience, 
while Romania is hastily trying to put a market in place before 
privatisation overtakes it. Slovakia is backtracking and Hungary, 
despite efforts to create a fully fledged institution in the Budapest 
Stock Exchange, still cannot generate volume due to its external 
borrowing versus foreign direct investment conundrum, coupled with 
high welfare spending, high inflation and negative real interest 
rates. These are all, in the modern, comprehensive sense of the term 
'geographical* considerations. Convergence may eventually remove some 
of them, but it is likely to take many years. Only then can 'sense of 
place' or national perspective be isolated for examination as a factor 
on its own. In the established markets there is an equal predominance 
of national and regional considerations in any discussion of market 
matters that leaves little doubt about the spatial perspectives of
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participants. Indeed, dare one say, an equally spatially-biassed 
perspective is to be observed in the English-speaking world. Reference 
has already been made in Section 5.4.1 to American authors citing 
non-American practice (non-exclusion of banks from securities trading) 
as 'peculiar* when in fact it applies commonly in Europe and most of 
the rest of the world. The British financial press commonly lumps 
together 'the continental bourses' as one. And adequately functional 
national markets are sometimes referred to as 'under-developed' while 
doing a far better job as secondary markets for small and medium-sized 
enterprise than London. It is a fact of geography that America is 
large but only one of history that London is an international centre. 
The former will not change but the latter may well do so: 
geographically and in some other respects, London lies on the 
periphery of Europe. As with humans, it is the fate of those who 
become part of history, to end up becoming merely part of geography.
11.3.3. The rôle of banking in small national securities markets
At the time of the research fieldwork, the banks which formed the 
backbone of the market-independent sector sample were a mixture of 
credit and universal banking institutions, the latter in the German 
Hausbank tradition rather than the more recent multi-purpose financial 
institutions ascribed a universal banking rôle in the English speaking 
world. In Denmark, Portugal and Belgium credit banking appeared to 
predominate, in Austria, naturally, German-style universal banking. In 
the Czech Republic and Hungary state control was too recent or still 
present, allowing no judgement to be made. There was no detectable 
difference between the two groupings among responses given at 
interview, even in Germany. The distinction has, accordingly, not been
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pursued in great detail. In all centres it was considered that small 
and medium sized firms were under-capitalised (this expression, 
Eigenkapitalmangel, being preferred to the usual ’overgeared* or its 
equivalent). The question has been discussed in more detail for each 
market in Chapters 7-10. There is evidence from elsewhere, outside 
this study, that universal banking does not automatically lead to 
restricted development of securities markets (Lewis, 1996), citing the 
case of Switzerland. The converse is claimed here, namely that a 
credit banking environment does not necessarily lead to more rapid 
development of small securities markets, as confirmed by the non­
committal or negative responses to section 9 of the questionnaire in 
Table 2. The exception is Vienna where, as has been remarked in a 
different context "They would say that, wouldn’t they". For future 
reference, developments since the conclusion of this research are 
worth noting. The main Danish banks are reportedly moving rapidly in 
the direction of universal banking with a new service orientation and 
financial offerings (PINT [1996/1]), while, in the Czech Republic, the 
banks are also moving in the direction of the German model, much to 
the disgust of the major US institutions who have expended much effort 
to impose their own philosophy (PINT [1996/2]). We have already 
reported the absorption of smaller banks by larger ones in Hungary 
(Section 10.3) but stressed the significance of US influence. That 
situation has now been overtaken by the very recent ’panic* 
privatisation and selloff of the Hungarian banks to all comers, 
including, it is reported, Russian interests (MISC [1996/1]). In the 
spirit of the discussion in Section 11.3.2, the immediate facts merely 
confuse the issue and one must rely upon a model of likely future 
development for guidance on the outturn. On the basis of other 
research in the region, cited above, and frequent visits to Budapest
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and other centres, the author prefers to forecast eventual reversion 
to the German and Austrian-centred central European universal banking 
tradition for all the centres discussed except Lisbon, albeit with 
considerable modification of that tradition and some sort of 
convergence with US and British practice. The course of this evolution 
lies outside the present study. In Portugal, the traditional hegemony 
of the banking families expropriated in 1974 seems at least arguably 
likely to be re-established, but the situation is unclear at present.
Banking business in the countries studied does have a great deal to do 
with the predominance of bond markets. For example, in April 1996 
alone, three Danish banks announced that the main component of their 
increased profit in 1995 has been derived from securities trading 
(PINT [1996/4,5,6]). Markets studies exhibited differing degrees of 
bond predominance, as the following summary table 2 shows (detailed 
figures are given in the Introduction to Part II, Table 1):
Table 2.
MARKET BOND MARKET 
SIZE RELATIVE 
TO EQUITY
BOND MARKET 
PREDOMINANCE
Amsterdam Large Weak
Bratislava Small Strong
Brussels Large Strong
Budapest Small Strong
Copenhagen Large Strong
Lisbon Large Strong
Prague Smal 1 Weak
Vienna Large Strong
source: own interview and econometric data, central bank reports
In those markets where bond dominance is strong, banks are the 
dominant participants and brokers are relatively weak. It was observed 
that whenever bond dominance was temporarily reduced by increased 
enthusiasm for equity, numbers of market-dependent broking firms
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increased, only to reduce again when bonds again predominated. See for 
example Chapter 7, Figure 1. The available statistics do not reveal 
this trend clearly, since although the process of broking firm 
formation is clearly visible, reabsorption by larger institutions is 
not. The cases of Copenhagen and Lisbon were examined in detail on the 
basis of information volunteered by interviewees: in other cases the 
situation was either not clear cut or not easy to demonstrate. In 
Brussels, for example, it is well-known, but not we11-documented, that 
many brokers operate exclusively for particular banks and that their 
successor-firms have continued the tradition even after many 
amalgamations and disappearances from among the original population of 
one-man broking firms. Evidence of considerable tension between 
market-dependent and market-independent participants and the influence 
of this conflict on reform, hence on the position and prospects of 
each market in the medium term was one of the main results of the 
institutional study. Where the problem was serious, as in Vienna and, 
potentially, in Lisbon, it was concluded that the viability and 
validity of the markets were capable of being fatally undermined and 
that their development potential would remain restricted. At the time 
of the original research it appeared that recognition or otherwise of 
the existence of the problem would be the main determinant of the 
outcome. Since 1992 however the intensification of competition between 
exchanges and the large number of reforms and structural changes, 
evidenced in part by Table 1, has given the entire subject of 
competitive reform a very high public profile. That has in turn 
resulted in greater willingness to admit and debate shortcomings in 
public, with resulting benefits for easing the process of reform. The 
public prints give no special advantage to larger organisations, 
especially if they are fewer in number and less inclined to be 
vociferous than smaller fry. Indeed if, like the German and Austrian
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banks (among others) at the present time, they are subject to a steady 
stream of adverse publicity for their general trading policies and 
practices, there may be a general presumption of resistance to reform 
in order to exploit securities market dominance.
We conclude therefore with directions of debate rather than final rest 
positions with regard to the two main strands of this enquiry. With 
regard to the development of trading volume and its implications for 
sustained viability of smaller markets, it remains to be seen whether 
the main era of secular expansion is over, to be replaced with growth 
in derivative markets or in cash markets outside Europe. Small markets 
will, of course, continue to open, but maintained high rates of growth 
are more questionable. With regard to institutional development it is 
already clear that single-step, large-scale reform, whether actual, in 
dispute or in prospect is no longer regarded as the end of the matter 
in most centres. The reform process has become a question of 
continuously refining the 'product features' of competing securities 
markets, observing the results and trying again. A future research 
project in this area would therefore more closely resemble the study 
of an industry and its products, with the success or otherwise of 
member firms as one of the outcomes. The equivalents of domestic and 
foreign competition as well as mergers and acquisitions are in many 
cases possible. Germany offers the spectacle of competing domestic 
exchanges; Portugal has seen the 'acquisition* and sidelining of 
Oporto by Lisbon. The new Europe-wide NASDAQ equivalents, separate 
small firm equity markets and the removal of exchange monopoly status 
(as proposed in Denmark) threaten traditional exchange institutions.
Very few of the questions addressed by this thesis can therefore be 
regarded as finally closed: rather the CQOqlusions reached here should
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regarded as milestones serving the purpose of recording, on the one 
hand, how much ground has been covered by securities markets in the 
last quarter-century and, on the other, what places have yet to be 
visited on the road to evolving a stable set of institutions and 
trading arrangements that will serve the needs of smaller European 
economies in the longer term.
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APPENDIX ONE: STANDARD QUESTIONNAIRE TO SUPPORT STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
VALIDITY OF THE NATIONAL MARKET
Is the market dependent on special situations for its existence or 
volume maintenance ?
as regards:
-tax bias
-government deficit 
funding 
-privatisation 
-property values 
-foreign investor 
interest
-interest rate differentials with other countries 
-inter-bank trading on small margins
Does activity in the public market and the information thereby 
generated reflect the extent of securities trading ?
as regards:
-price formation 
-trading volume 
-spreads and commissions 
-fundamental value of securities 
-price sensitive information
390
What taxes and pension funding arrangements affect the type of 
instruments traded, trading volume and clientèle, now and in the 
future ?
as regards:
-turnover tax 
-capital gains tax 
-inheritance tax 
-pension funding arrangements 
-any others
VIABILITY OF THE NATIONAL MARKET 
What is your spread of interests ?
as regards:
-countries
-types of business transacted 
-types of client sought 
-specialised instruments and markets 
-other services provided
What is your organisation's relationship with its 
parent bank, if any ?
as regards:
-organisation structure and control 
-source of securities trading business
391
-source of new issue business 
-source of client/market information 
-capital resource
Is the Bourse well organised, regulated and promoted ? 
as regards:
-broking
-finance for business 
-small savers 
-the level of volume 
-public opinion
-balancing the interests of market participants 
Are there effective limits to market participation ? 
as regards:
-absolute numbers of brokers 
-sale of seats or capital requirement 
-technological base required 
-other restrictions
What is the level of small saver/private investor participation in 
markets, directly or indirectly ?
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Is the equity market soundly based ? 
as regards:
-new issues
-finance for small and medium size business 
-liquidity of individual stocks 
-small savers and private investors 
-flow of publicly available information
Is there significant trade diversion abroad ?
as regards:
-particular instruments, issuers or investors
-the past, present or future
-domestic investors' funds moving abroad
POTENTIAL OF THE NATIONAL MARKET
What is the minimum size of private client portfolio you would agree 
to manage ?
-with a fee 
-without a fee
How large is the funded pension schemes sector ?
-in the past and at present 
-in future ?
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What measures could the market authorities, participants, investors, 
other financial intermediaries and issuers take to increase trading 
volume ?
as regards:
(all relevant instruments and sectors here taken in turn, depending on 
the market and respondent interviewed)
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APPENDIX TWO: PROGRAM LISTING, UTILVEST.BAS 
****************************************************************************
'UTILVEST.BAS created 930409/1600 
'950407/0720 950406/1345 
****************************************************************************
'Models inter-period investment decisions and trading volume 
**************************************************************************** 
************************************* definitions **************************
DECLARE FUNCTION SOLVE! (TAAA!, TBBB!, TCCC!, TDDD!, XP!, YP!)
'A = 0: B = 1: C = 5.5: D = -.333
'ERIC = SOLVE(A, B, C, D, E, F)
'CLS : PRINT E, F;
'INPUT YENO$
*************************************************************************** 
RANDOMIZE TIMER 
CLS
LOCATE 1, 1: INPUT GRAPHWHICH 
SELECT CASE GRAPHWHICH 
CASE 1
DURATION = 110 
PERIODS = DURATION - 1 
RESOLUTION = 4 
FASSETS = 1: GASSETS = 1
PRICEl = 1: PRICE2 = 1 
BASRATE = .15
REALRATE = .2 'real return
STARTAT = 0: UNIT = .01: POWER = 20 
RHO = .15: GRHO = .15 
CASE 2
DURATION = 200 
PERIODS = DURATION - 1 
RESOLUTION = 3 
FASSETS = 1: GASSETS = 1
PRICEl = 1: PRICE2 = 1 
BASRATE = .15
REALRATE = .2 'real return
STARTAT = 0: UNIT = .01: POWER = 20 
GRHO = .15 
END SELECT
DIM VECTOR(1048, 4), GVECTOR(1048, 4), PERIOD(DURATION, 19)
PERIODd, 1) = FASSETS: PERI0D(1, 5) = FASSETS
PERI0D(1, 7) = GASSETS: PERI0D(1, 9) = .5: PERI0D(1, 8) = .5
************************************* graphics SETUP *********************** 
CLS : GOSUB BOXDRAW
LINE (ORIGX, 48)-(MAXX, 48): LINE (DURATION * RESOLUTION, MAXY)-(DURATION 
* RESOLUTION, 48)
395
SELECT CASE GRAPHWHICH 
CASE 1
LOCATE 23, 10: PRINT " ASSETS CONSUM BONDS";
LOCATE 22, 10: PRINT " RISK PROFILE REQUIRED RETURN EQUITY";
LOCATE 22, 68: PRINT "VOLUME"
CIRCLE (50, 10), 1, 6: CIRCLE (200, 10), 1, 14: CIRCLE (350, 10), 1, 13
CIRCLE (50, 30), 1, 10: CIRCLE (200, 30), 1, 11: CIRCLE (350, 30), 1, 15
CIRCLE (500, 30), 1, 12
VSCALE = 20: HSCALE = 1 'GRAPHIC SCALING
VSCALF = 100: HSCALF = RESOLUTION 
VATTEN = .2
CASE 2
LOCATE 23, 10: PRINT " ASSETS CONSUM BONDS";
LOCATE 22, 10: PRINT " RISK PROFILE REQUIRED RETURN EQUITY";
LOCATE 22, 68: PRINT "VOLUME"
CIRCLE (50, 10), 1, 6: CIRCLE (200, 10), 1, 14: CIRCLE (350, 10), 1, 13
CIRCLE (50, 30), 1, 10: CIRCLE (200, 30), 1, 11: CIRCLE (350, 30), 1, 15
CIRCLE (500, 30), 1, 12
VSCALE = 20: HSCALE = 1 'GRAPHIC SCALING
VSCALF = 100: HSCALF = RESOLUTION 
VATTEN = .3
END SELECT
'************************************ MAIN LINE CODE ***********************
B; '************************************MAIN
LOOP******************************
FOR N = 1 TO PERIODS 
SELECT CASE GRAPHWHICH 
CASE 1
IF N = 1 THEN
PERIOD(N, 4) = BASRATE: PERIOD(0, 5) = 1: PERIOD(0, 6) = 0
PERIOD(0, 0) = .01
END IF 
CURRATE = PERIOD(N, 4)
C = STARTAT: K = 0: TOGLB = 0
CLIMIT = (FASSETS * PRICE2) + (FASSETS * CURRATE)
ARRAYLEN = CLIMIT / UNIT 
IF FASSETS >= 1 THEN
'determine risk appetite=premium required as an increasing function 
'of wealth subject to diminishing utility 
COEFFR = ((.01 * N) " 2 - (.01 * N) " 3) * .1
COEFFA = .01 * (2 - (1 / FASSETS))
RISKP = (COEFFR + COEFFA) '* ((FASSETS - EQUITY) / FASSETS)
' "optional equity weight damping
'determine bond/equity portfolio composition 
NEWRATE = BASRATE + RISKP 
IF NEWRATE < REALRATE THEN 
EQUITY = FASSETS * (NEWRATE - BASRATE) / (REALRATE - BASRATE)
ELSE EQUITY = FASSETS 
END IF
IF EQUITY < 0 THEN EQUITY = O'***************
BONDS = FASSETS - EQUITY
PERIOD(N, 5) = BONDS: PERIOD(N, 6) = EQUITY
ELSE NEWRATE = BASRATE: PERIOD(N, 5) = FASSETS: PERIOD(N, 6) = 0 
END IF 
IF N > 1 THEN
PERIOD(N, 10) = ABS(PERIOD(N, 5) - PERIOD(N - 1, 5))'bond trade volume 
PERIOD(N, 11) = ABS(PERIOD(N, 6) - PERIOD(N - 1, 6))'equity trade volume 
END IF
PERIOD(N + 1 , 4 ) =  NEWRATE
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WHILE TOGLB = 0 AND C < CLIMIT - UNIT 
C = C + UNIT 
K = K + 1
'determine utility of current consumption 
VECTOR(K, 1) = ((C " (1 - RHO)) / (1 - RHO))
'tradeoff rate against future 'consumption 
PRICE = ((BONDS * PRICEl) + (EQUITY * PRICE2)) / (BONDS + EQUITY)
HORIZON = POWER / FASSETS
'a long horizon of discounted future returns is required to induce a 
'level of investment sufficient to grow capital fast - equivalent to 
'foregoing all consumption until capital can continue to grow with a 
'consumption slice removed from income: as assets grow the horizon 
'can be reduced: makes no difference to the dynamics but represents 
'a hungry (high power) or consuming (low power) investor: if an 
'initial endowment sufficient for moderate consumption is provided 
'this parameter is not required.
PERIOD(N, 3) = HORIZON
TRADEOFF = (1 + (NEWRATE / PRICE))  ^HORIZON
'utility of future consumption given up for present consumption 
VECTOR(K, 2) = ((((CLIMIT - C) * TRADEOFF) " (1 - RHO)) / (1 - RHO)) 
VECTOR(K, 4) = CLIMIT - C: VECTOR(K, 3) = C 'ie assets/consumption level 
'determine point where consumption equals current income 
'find maximum for sum of utilities and mark location 
'to determine asset level retained in vector 4 
USUM = VECTOR(K, 1) + VECTOR(K, 2)
IF USUM > MAXU THEN 
MAXU = USUM: MAXL = K + 1
ELSEIF TOGLB = 0 THEN TOGLB = 1: PERIOD(N, 2) = MAXU 
END IF
WEND
FASSETS = VECTOR(MAXL, 4)
CONSUM = VECTOR(MAXL, 3)
IF N < PERIODS THEN PERIOD(N +1, 1) = FASSETS 
'store this period consumption 
PERIOD(N, 0) = CONSUM 
PERIOD(N, 2) = MAXU: MAXU = 0: MAXL = 0
»*************************CORPQRATE FINANCE*********************** 
CASE 2
IF N = 1 THEN
PERIOD(N, 14) = REALRATE 
END IF
IF N < PERIODS THEN 'PERIOD(N, 7) >= 1 AND N < PERIODS THEN 
COEFGR = ((.005 * N) " 2 - (.005 * N) " 3)
'"time profile risk function 
FACTOR = SQR((SQR(SQR(PERIOD(N, 7)))))
GREALRATE = BASRATE + ((REALRATE - BASRATE) / FACTOR)
'"diminishing returns to assets 
RISKGP = ((REALRATE - BASRATE) / (GREALRATE - BASRATE)) * (1 + COEFGR) 
POT = GREALRATE * PERIOD(N, 7)
GEARISK = (1 + ((PERIOD(N, 8) / PERIOD(N, 9))))
COVERISK = 1 + (PERIOD(N, 18) / POT)
INTEREST = PERIOD(N, 8) * BASRATE 
BONDRISK = GEARISK * COVERISK 
RISKINDEX = BONDRISK * RISKGP 
SPARE = POT - INTEREST
IF SPARE > 0 THEN
DIVRATE = BASRATE * RISKGP
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DIVID = DIVRATE * PERIOD(N, 9)
ELSE DIVID = 0 
END IF 
SPARE = SPARE - DIVID
NEWBONGS = (SPARE / BASRATE) / (BONDRISK * RISKGP 5) 
BONGS = PERIOD(N, 8) + NEWBONGS 
IF BONGS < 0 THEN BONGS = 0 
EQUITG = PERIOD(N, 9) + SPARE 
PERIOD(N + 1, 9) = EQUITG 
PERIOD(N + 1 , 8 ) =  BONGS
PERIOD(N + 1, 7) = PERIOD(N + 1, 8) + PERIOD(N 
PERIOD(N +1, 18) = INTEREST 
TRADVOL = ABS(PERIOD(N + 1, 8) - PERIOD(N, 8))
PERIOD(N, 9))
END IF
PERIOD(N, 17) = DIVID: PERIOD(N, 16) = INVEST
'LOCATE 2, 50: PRINT SPACE$(20): LOCATE 2, 50: PRINT "SPARE
'LOCATE 3, 50: PRINT SPACE$(20): LOCATE 3, 50: PRINT "ASSETS";
1, 9)
ABS(PERIOD(N
7); 
9);
8);
'LOCATE 4, 50: PRINT SPACE$(20): LOCATE 4, 50: PRINT "EQUI ";
'LOCATE 5, 50: PRINT SPACE$(20): LOCATE 5, 50: PRINT "DEBT ";
'LOCATE 6, 50: PRINT SPACES(20): LOCATE 6, 50: PRINT "GREAL ";
'LOCATE 7, 50: PRINT SPACE$(20): LOCATE 7, 50: PRINT "DIVID ";
'LOCATE 8, 50: PRINT SPACES(20): LOCATE 8, 50: PRINT "BRISK "
'LOCATE 9, 50: PRINT SPACES(20): LOCATE 9, 50: PRINT "DRISK "
'LOCATE 10, 50: PRINT SPACES(ZO): LOCATE 10, 50: PRINT "GRISK"
'LOCATE 11, 50: PRINT SPACES(20): LOCATE 10, 50: PRINT "COEFF"
'LOCATE 20, 50: INPUT YENOS
+ 1, 9) -
SPARE;
PERIOD(N,
PERIOD(N,
PERIOD(N,
GREALRATE;
DIVRATE;
; BONDRISK; 
; RISKGP;
; GEARISK;
; COEFGR;
END SELECT
****************************************************************** 
SELECT CASE GRAPHWHICH 
CASE 1
CIRCLE (N * HSCALF, (PERIOD(N, 1) * VATTEN * VSCALF) + 50), 1, 6'assets
CIRCLE (N * HSCALF, (PERIOD(N, 0) * VATTEN * VSCALF) + 50), 1, 14'consum
CIRCLE (N * HSCALF, (PERIOD(N, 4) * 10 * VSCALF) +50), 1, 11'rate
CIRCLE (N * HSCALF, (PERIOD(N, 5) * VATTEN ♦ VSCALF) + 50), 1, 13'bonds
CIRCLE (N * HSCALF, (PERIOD(N, 6) * VATTEN * VSCALF) + 50), 1. 15'equity
CIRCLE (N * HSCALF, (PERIOD(N, 10) ■H PERIOD(N, 11) * VSCALF) + 50), 1,
12'returns
CASE 2
CIRCLE (N * HSCALF, (TRADVOL * VATTEN * VSCALF * 4) 4- 50), 1, 12'
CIRCLE (N * HSCALF, (PERIOD(N, 8) * VATTEN * VSCALF) + 50), 1, 13'bonds
CIRCLE (N * HSCALF, (PERIOD(N, 9) * VATTEN * VSCALF) + 50), 1, 15'equity
CIRCLE (N * HSCALF, (RISKINDEX * 50 + 60)), 1, 12'
END SELECT 
NEXT N
f***********************************EMD MAIN LOOP*************************** 
GOTO FIN
****************************** end of main line CODE************************ 
****************************************************************************
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APPENDIX THREE:PROGRAM LISTING, STARVATA.BAS
DECLARE FUNCTION CASES! (AAA!, BBB!, CCC!, DDD!, ELASTD!, BLASTS!, XP!, YP!) 
DECLARE FUNCTION MAPPER! (PRICED!, DEMO!, SUPPLYO!, VOLUMEO!, ELASTD!, I!) 
DECLARE FUNCTION ERREXIT! () 
**************************************************************************** 
'STARVATA.BAS created 930101/1415
 ^4:4c******4:*4e*********** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
'Models starvation process of a population of (broking firms)
f*************************************************************************** 
**************************************************************************** 
**************************************************************************** 
************************************* definitions **************************
************************************* main LINE CODE ***********************
************************************* main line code ***********************
CLS : RANDOMIZE TIMER 
ORIGVOL = 320: DOWNBY = 300 
DIM FIRMS(14, 4), VECTOR(320, 4)
SIZER = 4 'FIRM SIZE AND FIXED COST STEPS
FOR I = 1 TO 14 ' 2 @ LEVEL 4, 4 @ LEVEL 2 AND 8 @ LEVEL 1 
IF I = 3 THEN SIZER = 2 ELSE IF I = 7 THEN SIZER = 1 
FIRMSd, 1) = SIZER: ' SET FIRM SIZES
BLOB = INT((RND / 10 + .1) * 100)
FIRMSd, 2) = BLOB / 100 'RANGE 0.1-0.2 EFFICIENCY
'LOCATE 1,1: PRINT FIRMS(I, 1); " BLOB;
NEXT I
FOR I = ORIGVOL TO ORIGVOL - DOWNBY STEP -1 ' RUN MAIN MODEL LOOP
VOLUME = I '+ INT((RND * 4) - 2) ' RANGE +/- 1
SIZTOT = 0: PROFTOT = 0 
FOR J = 1 TO 14
SIZTOT = SIZTOT + FIRMS(J, 1)
NEXT J
IF SIZTOT <= 0 THEN GOTO FIN 
SHARE = VOLUME / SIZTOT 
FOR J = 1 TO 14
FIRMSd, 3) = FIRMSd, 2) * FIRMS(J, 1) * SHARE - FIRMS(J, 1) 
'PROFIT = EFFICIENCY * SIZE * SHARE - FIXCOST
IF FIRMS(J, 3) < 0 AND FIRMS(J, 1) > 0 THEN 
FIRMSd, 1) = FIRMS(J, 1) - 1 
END IF
PROFTOT = PROFTOT + FIRMS(J, 3)
NEXT J 
K = K + 1
VECTOR(K, 1) = INT(((I / ORIGVOL) / (SIZTOT / 24)) * 100)
VECTOR(K, 2) = INT((PROFTOT / SIZTOT) * 100)
VECTOR(K, 3) = SIZTOT
VECTOR(K, 4) = PROFTOT
VECTOR(K, 0) = INT((PROFTOT / I) * 100)
FOR J = 1 TO 14
LOCATE J, COL + 16: PRINT "
LOCATE J, COL + 12: PRINT FIRMS(J, 1); "
NEXT J
LOCATE 16, COL + 16: PRINT "
LOCATE 16, COL + 12: PRINT VECTOR(K, 1);
IF COL < 60 THEN COL = COL + 4 ELSE COL = 0 
NEXT I
'LOCATE 25, 1: INPUT YENO$
GOSUB BOXDRAW
LINE (ORIGX, 48)-(MAXX, 48)
FOR I = 1 TO DOWNBY
PSET (I * 2, (VECTORd, 0) * 2) + 50), 10 'PROFIT/VOLUME
LINE (I * 2, (VECTORd - 1, 1) * 2) + 50)-(I * 2, (VECTOR(I, 1) *
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2) + 50)
'CIRCLE (1*2, VECTOR(I, 1) * 2), 2, 4 '%VOLUME/%CAPACITY 
'PSET (1*2, VECTOR(I, 2) * 2), 6 'PROFIT/CAPACITY
PSET (1*2, (VECTOR(I, 3) * 2) + 50), 8 'TOTAL CAPACITY
(SCALED)
'PSET (1*2, VECTOR(I, 4) * 2), 1 'TOTAL PROFIT
NEXT I 
GOTO FIN
'************** end of main line code 
****************************************************************************
f************ draw box *******************
BOXDRAW: CLS : SCREEN 9: COLOR , 2
ORIGX = 0: ORIGY = 0: MAXX = 600: MAXY = 320 
VIEW (20, 20)-(620, 330)
WINDOW (0, 0)-(600, 320) 'CREATE CARTESIAN CO-ORDINATES 
CLS 1
LINE (ORIGX, ORIGY)-(ORIGX, MAXY): LINE (ORIGX, ORIGY)-(MAXX, ORIGY): 
LINE (MAXX, ORIGY)-(MAXX, MAXY): LINE (ORIGX, MAXY)-(MAXX, MAXY) 
RETURN
SC: ************* SCREEN CONTROL *****************
SCA: YENO$ = INKEY$: IF YENO$ = THEN GOTO SCA
IF LEN(YENO$) > 1 THEN GOTO SCB 
IF YENO$ = CHR$(13) THEN ENDIC = 1: GOTO SCZ
IF YENO$ = CHR$(27) THEN ENDIC = 9: GOTO SCZ
GOTO SCZ 'TRAP ONLY
'LOCATE CY, CX, 1, 1, 13: CLA = 2: PRINT YENO$;
'MID$(SCRIN$(CY), CX, 1) = YENO$
SCB: SCANIT$ = MID$(YENO$, 2, 1): SCANIT = ASC(SCANIT$)
IF SCANIT = 75 THEN TILT = TILT - .05: GOTO SCZ 'LEFT
IF SCANIT = 77 THEN TILT = TILT + .05: GOTO SCZ 'RIGHT
IF SCANIT = 80 THEN CONS = CONS - 5: GOTO SCZ 'DOWN
IF SCANIT = 72 THEN CONS = CONS + 5: GOTO SCZ 'UP
'IF SCANIT = 71 'HOME
'IF SCANIT = 73 'PGUP
IF SCANIT = 79 THEN ENDIC = 2: GOTO SCZ 'END
'IF SCANIT = 81 'PGDN
'IF SCANIT = 82 'INS
GOTO SCA 
SCZ: RETURN
FIN; LOCATE 25, 1: PRINT "ANY KEY TO FINISH";
IF INKEY$ = "" THEN GOTO FIN 
SCREEN 0, 0
FUNCTION CASES (AAA, BBB, CCC, DDD, ELASTD, ELASTS, XP, YP) STATIC
SELEC = 1:
SELECT CASE SELEC 
CASE 1
FOR I = 1 TO 250
IF I = 1 THEN DEMI = XP: SUPl = XP: PRICEl = YP 
ELASTD = AAA / PRICEl: ELASTS = 1 
DEMO = (PRICEl - AAA) / BBB 
SUPPLYO = INT((PRICEl - CCC) / DDD)
IF SUPPLYO < 0 THEN SUPPLYO = 0 
IF DEMO > SUPPLYO THEN
PRICEO = AAA + SUPPLYO * BBB
DEMO = INT(DEMO + (DEMO - (PRICEO - AAA) / BBB) * ELASTD)
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HERE:
ELASTD 
ELASTS 
PRICEO 
DEMO; 
VOLUMEO; 
SUPPLYO;
PRICEO = AAA + DEMO * BBB 
IF DEMO < 0 THEN DEMO = 0 
IF PRICEO < 0 THEN PRICEO = 1
IF DEMO > SUPPLYO THEN VOLUMEO = SUPPLYO ELSE VOLUMEO = DEMO 
ELSE '*****DEMAND<=SUPPLY ****
PRICEO = AAA + DEMO * BBB
DEMO = INT(DEMO + (SUPPLY - DEMO) * ELASTD)
IF DEMO > SUPPLYO THEN VOLUMEO = SUPPLYO ELSE VOLUMEO = DEMO 
IF DEMO < 0 THEN DEMO = 0 
IF PRICEO < 0 THEN PRICEO = 1 
END IF 
NUDGE = 0 
IF NUDGE = 1 THEN 
SCREEN 0, 0
PRINT "DEMAND SUPPLY VOLUME PRICE ELAST-D ELAST-S"
PRINT DEMO; " "; SUPPLYO; " "; VOLUMEO; " "; PRICEO; " "
PRINT ELASTD; " "; ELASTS; " ";
IF INKEY$ = "" THEN GOTO HERE 
ELSE
PSET (DEMI, DEMO), 4: PSET (PRICEl, PRICEO), 11 
LINE (DEMI, PRICE1)-(DEM0, PRICEO), 14 
ERIC = MAPPER(PRICEO, DEMO, SUPPLYO, VOLUMEO, ELASTD, I)
LOCATE 18, 1: PRINT SPACES(10); : LOCATE 18, 1: PRINT "ED";
LOCATE 19, 1: PRINT SPACES(10); : LOCATE 19, 1: PRINT "ES";
LOCATE 20, 1: PRINT SPACES(10); : LOCATE 20, 1: PRINT T T p  fT .
LOCATE 21, 1: PRINT SPACES(10); : LOCATE 21, 1: PRINT "D ";
LOCATE 22, 1: PRINT SPACES(10); : LOCATE 22, 1: PRINT "V ";
LOCATE 23, 1: PRINT SPACES(10); : LOCATE 23, 1: PRINT "S ";
END IF
DEM2 = DEMI: DEMI = DEMO:
PRICE2 = PRICEl: PRICEl = PRICEO 
V0LUME2 = VOLUME1: VOLUME1 = VOLUMEO: 
SUPPLY2 = SUPPLYl: SUPPLYl = SUPPLYO 
IF EXIC = 1 THEN EXIC = 0: GOTO FUNXIT
RESERRl: NEXT I
CASE 2
FOR I = 1 TO 250
IF I = 1 THEN DEMI = XP: SUPl = XP: PRICEl = YP 
ELASTD = AAA / PRICEl: ELASTS = 1 
DEMO = (PRICEl - AAA) / BBB 
SUPPLYO = (PRICEl - CCC) / DDD 
IF SUPPLYO < 0 THEN SUPPLYO = 0 
IF DEMO > SUPPLYO THEN 
DEMO = DEMO + (DEMO - SUPPLYO) * ELASTD 
IF DEMO < 0 THEN DEMO = 0 
PRICEO = AAA + SUPPLYO * BBB 
IF PRICEO < 0 THEN PRICEO = 0 
VOLUMEO = SUPPLYO 
ELSE
DEMO = DEMO + (DEMO - SUPPLYO) * ELASTD
IF DEMO < 0 THEN DEMO = 0
VOLUMEO = DEMO
PRICEO = AAA + BBB * DEMO
IF PRICEO < 1 THEN PRICEO = 1
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END IF 
IF NUDGE = 1 THEN 
SCREEN 0, 0
PRINT "DEMAND SUPPLY VOLUME PRICE ELAST-D ELAST-S"
PRINT DEMO; " SUPPLYO; " "; VOLUMEO; " "; PRICEO; " ";
PRINT ELASTD; " "; ELASTS; " ";
YERE: IF INKEY$ = "" THEN GOTO YERE
ELSE
PSET (DEMI, DEMO), 4: PSET (PRICEl, PRICEO), 11 
LINE (DEMI, PRICEl)-(DEMO, PRICEO), 14 
ERIC = MAPPER(PRICEO, DEMO, SUPPLYO, VOLUMEO, ELASTD, I) 
END IF
DEM2 = DEMI: DEMI = DEMO:
PRICE2 = PRICEl: PRICEl = PRICEO 
V0LUME2 = VOLUME1: VOLUME1 = VOLUMEO:
SUPPLY2 = SUPPLYl: SUPPLYl = SUPPLYO 
IF EXIC = 1 THEN EXIC = 0: GOTO FUNXIT
NEXT I
END SELECT
FUNXIT: END FUNCTION
FUNCTION ERREXIT
END FUNCTION
FUNCTION MAPPER (PRICEO, DEMO, SUPPLYO, VOLUMEO, ELASTD, I) STATIC 
CLS : SCREEN 9: COLOR , 2
VIEW (100, 230)-(600, 330) ' PHASE SPACE
WINDOW (0, 0)-(500, 200)
LINE (0, 0)-(500, 200), , B
LINE (I * 2, PRICE1)-(I * 2, PRICEO)
LINE (I * 2, DEM1)-(I * 2, DEMO), 14, , &H8888
ORIGX = 0: ORIGY = 0: MAXX = 300: MAXY = 200 
VIEW (0, 20)-(300, 220) ' TIME SERIES
WINDOW (0, 0)-(300, 200)
'CLS 1
LINE (ORIGX, ORIGY)-(ORIGX, MAXY)
LINE (ORIGX, ORIGY)-(MAXX, ORIGY)
LINE (MAXX, ORIGY)-(MAXX, MAXY)
LINE (ORIGX, MAXY)-(MAXX, MAXY)
LINE (ORIGX, AA)-(MAXX, AA + MAXX * BE), , , &H8888
LINE (ORIGX, CC)-(MAXX, CC + MAXX * DD), , , &H8888
LINE (ORIGX, AAA)-(MAXX, AAA + MAXX * BBB)
LINE (ORIGX, CCC)-(MAXX, CCC + MAXX * DDD)
CIRCLE (XP, YP), 3: CIRCLE (OXP, OYP), 3
MAXIT: PRICEl = PRICEO: DEMI = DEMO: SUPPLYl = SUPPLYO: VOLUME1 = VOLUMEO
END FUNCTION
FUNCTION SOLVE (AAA, BBB, CCC, DDD, XP, YP) STATIC
************* SOLVE SIMULTANEOUSLY ********* 
OYP = YP: OXP = XP
IF ABS(BBB) - ABS(CCC) = 0 AND BBB <> 0 THEN 
YP = (AAA + CCC) / 2 
XP = (YP - AAA) / BBB 'slopes equal 
ELSEIF BBB = 0 THEN
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' YP = ((BBB * CCC) - (DDD * AAA)) / (BBB - DDD)
' XP = (YP - CCC) / DDD
YP = AAA
XP = (AAA - CCC) * DDD 'slope zero 
ELSEIF DDD = 0 AND BBB <> 0 THEN 
YP = CCC
XP = (CCC - AAA) * BBB 
ELSEIF DDD <> 0 THEN
YP = ((BBB * CCC) - (DDD * AAA)) / (BBB - DDD)
XP = (YP - CCC) / (DDD)
END IF
YP = INT(YP + .5)
XP = INT(XP + .5)
LOCATE 1, 20: PRINT SPACE$(19);
LOCATE 1, 20: PRINT XP, YP;
SOLVE = 0
END FUNCTION
U03
